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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996 Supp.). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues of law are raised by plaintiff Cannon as error in her appeal 
from the orders of dismissal of the district court: 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that Cannon was a third-party 
insured, and not a first party insured under the policy, entitled to first-party coverage? 
Review by this court is under the correctness standard. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved 
at the trial court in Cannon's Memorandum in Opposition to Travelers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on August 18, 1997 (R. 251-282, others 225-246, 247-250, 
283-996), and in oral argument on the motion which occurred on November 10, 1997 (R. 
1164, 1165). 
2. Did the trial court commit error in ruling that Travelers owed no duties of 
good faith and fair dealing in adjusting and paying Cannon's first-party medical-payment 
claim? Review by this court is under the correctness standard. Mountain States, 811 P.2d 
184. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved 
at the trial court in Cannon's Memorandum in Opposition to Travelers' Motion for 
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Summary Judgment filed on August 18, 1997 (R. 251-282, others 225-246, 247-250, 
283-996), Plaintiffs Supplemental Citation to Authority filed September 26, 1997 (R. 
1049-1056), and in oral argumei^ on the motion which occurred on November 10, 1997 
(R. 1164, 1165). 
3. Did the trial court commit error in ruling that Cannon was not entitled to 
Travelers' good faith and fair dealing because she lacked privity of contract with 
Travelers? Review by this court is under the correctness standard. Mountain States, 811 
P.2d 184. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved 
at the trial court in Cannon's Memorandum in Opposition to Travelers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on August 18, 1997 (R. 251-282, others 225-246, 247-250, 
283-996), and in oral argument on the motion which occurred on November 10, 1997 (R. 
1164, 1165). 
4. Did the trial court commit error in ruling that there was no private cause of 
action for Travelers breach of duties and standards arising from statutes, regulations, 
industry standards and Travelers' own internal standards? Review by this court is under 
the correctness standard. Mountain States, 811 P.2d 184. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved 
at the trial court in Cannon's Memorandum in Opposition to Travelers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on August 18, 1997 (R. 251-282, others 225-246, 247-250, 
283-996), Plaintiffs Supplemental Citation to Authority (R. 1049-1056), and in oral 
argument on the motion which occurred on November 10, 1997 (R. 1164, 1165). 
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5. Did the trial court err in ruling that Cannon was precluded from recovering 
consequential and other damages caused by the nonpayment and other wrongful actions 
of Travelers? Review by this court is under the correctness standard. Mountain States, 
811P.2d 184. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved 
at the trial court in Cannon's Memorandum in Opposition to Travelers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed on August 18, 1997 (R. 251-282, others 225-246, 247-250, 
283-996), and in oral argument on the motion which occurred on November 10, 1997 (R. 
1164, 1165). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Rule 4-501(2)(b), (3), and (4), Code of Judicial Administration. 
3. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798, n. 2 (Utah 1985). 
4. Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967). 
5. Pixton v. State Farm, 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). 
6. Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). 
7. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995). 
8. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996). 
9. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulation, Utah Insurance 
Department, Regulation 82-3 (effective Dec. 1, 1982). 
10. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulation, Utah Insurance 
Department, Rule R940-89. 
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11. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulation, Utah Insurance 
Department, Rule 590-89 (effective September 14, 1989). 
12. Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-31-103. 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This is a civil action for breach of Travelers' legal duties to pay medical benefits to 
Carla Cannon under the medical coverage of its homeowner's insurance policy. Cannon 
was injured on the insured premises with medical expenses in excess of $10,000. 
Travelers refused to adequately investigate, would not respond to many of Cannon's 
communications, paid only $352.20, refused to provide a copy of the insurance policy 
and closed its file, forcing Cannon to file a legal action to get a copy of the policy and to 
obtain the medical coverage. Cannon filed her Complaint on October 4, 1994, alleging: 
(1) a breach of Travelers' legal duty to produce a copy of the insurance policy, (2) its 
breach of express and implied duties under the contract, (3) its breach of duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, and (4) its breach of fair claims adjusting practices, regulations, 
statutes, industry standards and other legal duties. (See Addendum 1 for a copy of 
Cannon's First Amended Complaint). 
Travelers finally produced a copy of its policy approximately two months after the 
action was commenced, and eventually paid its policy limits on medical coverage in the 
summer of 1995. (See Addendum 2 for a copy of the policy). On July 14, 1997, 
Travelers moved for summary judgment on the basis that having produced a copy of its 
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policy and having paid its limits on medical coverage, it owed no further duty to Cannon 
and was not liable for any additional damages. 
At the hearing on November 10, 1997, the Court found that there was no genuine 
issues of material facts as to plaintiffs First, Third and Fourth Causes of Action in 
plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and dismissed them. As to the Second Cause of 
Action (breach of express and implied terms), the court dismissed it with prejudice and 
on the merits, except to the extent that the claim sought attorneys fees and expenses 
directly incurred in claiming the medical benefits. (See Addendum 3 and 4). The parties 
stipulated to a final order which the court entered on April 30, 1998. (See Addendum 5). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of a claim for medical benefits under a homeowner's 
insurance policy. Plaintiff-Appellant, Carla Cannon, was seriously injured when a girl 
jumped up on her causing injury to Cannon's back, resulting in surgery. The accident 
occurred in a home insured by Travelers. The policy provided medical coverage 
(referred to hereafter as "Medpay") for people injured on the insured premises. Cannon 
submitted her claims for medical expenses, which exceeded $10,000 (the policy limit). 
For years, Travelers refused to honor plaintiff's Medpay claim, performed little or 
no investigation, refused to produce a copy of the insurance policy until a lawsuit was 
commenced, refused to respond to communications, and otherwise acted totally 
indifferent to the emotional and financial well-being of the plaintiff who had suffered a 
seriously debilitating injury. As a result, Cannon was unable to obtain necessary medical 
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treatment which would have resulted in a better recovery, she suffered loss of financial 
reputation and other damages. The specific facts are set forth below. 
1. On August 16, 1992, Cannon was at the home of her relatives, Scott and 
Jesselie Anderson, when their daughter, Heidi, jumped up on Cannon (who was standing) 
and put her arms around Cannon's neck and her feet around Cannon's waist, pulling 
Cannon forward and down. This caused immediate pain and injury to Cannon's back. 
Heidi was a large, 12-year-old girl at the time. R. 1167 at pp. 24-28. 
2. Cannon went straight to the home of her parents, James and Elaine Cannon, 
and related to them all that had happened. She immediately required bed rest and was 
barely able to get around. R. 1167 at p. 37; R. 1166 at Exh. 1 to deposition, p. 16. 
3. Cannon had not had a back injury prior to this incident. R. 1167 at pp. 74-
75. Cannon and her close family members anticipated that her back would improve over 
time with bed rest, without the need for medical treatment, however, her condition 
worsened over the ensuing months. By the end of November 1992, it became apparent 
that medical attention was necessary. R. 1167 at pp. 50-58; R. 190-193; R. 194-196. 
4. Cannon, a very gracious and non-confrontive person, did not tell the 
Andersons about the injury for approximately three months. The Andersons were 
relatives and Cannon did not want to hurt the feelings of her niece Heidi nor make 
anyone feel uncomfortable by addressing her injury. In addition, Cannon's mother, 
Elaine Cannon, strongly urged Cannon not to address the matter with the Andersons due 
to unrelated litigation involving the estate of a deceased member of the family where the 
Andersons might be witnesses. R. 1167 at pp. 51-58, 120; R. 190-193; R. 194-196. 
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5. When surgery became necessary, Cannon contacted the Andersons, advised 
them of the injury and inquired regarding the insurance under the Andersons' 
homeowner's policy. The Andersons checked with their insurance agent who told them 
that Travelers would not pay the medical expenses. R. 1167 at pp. 63-64, 75. 
6. Cannon underwent back surgery on December 9, 1992, which was partially 
successful, however, Cannon was left with nerve pain, leg problems and other 
disabilities. R. 1167 at p. 59. 
7. On December 21, 1992, Cannon submitted a claim directly to Travelers to 
have her medical bills paid under the "medical payment coverage." Travelers did not 
acknowledge the claim until January 5, 1993, and continued its refusal to pay. R. 1167 
at p. 76; R. 1166 at Exh. 1, pp. 6-8, 58). 
8. The pertinent portion of Traveler's policy reads as follows: 
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that are incurred 
or medically ascertained within three years from the date of an 
accident causing "bodily injury". Medical expenses means 
reasonable charges for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, 
ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices 
and funeral services. This coverage does not apply to you or 
regular residents of your household except "residence 
employees". As to others, this coverage applies only: 
1. to a person on the "insured location" within the 
permission of an "insured"; or 
2. . . . 
R. 166. Travelers does not presently contest that Cannon was entitled to the Medpay. 
9. After receiving the claim, Travelers did very little to investigate and obtain 
sufficient information to properly evaluate Cannon's claim. Tom Day, Travelers' 
adjuster, initially concluded that Cannon's injuries were not sustained on the insured 
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premises. Thereafter, Day refused to accept any additional information to the contrary, 
refused to interview witnesses who could verify the injury on the Anderson's premises, 
and did little else. R. 1166 at pp. 88-89, 91, 130-131; Exh. 1 to deposition at pp. 19, 27; 
R. 1167 at pp. 56; R. 287-291, at f 10. 
10. By the end of January, 1993, Cannon had signed a medical release to allow 
Travelers to obtain her medical records, however, Travelers refused to obtain them. R. 
1166 at pp. 95-101; Exh. 1. By mid-February, Cannon provided Travelers with a 
statement from her treating physician, which related her back surgery to the August 16, 
1992 incident. R. 1166 at pp. 96-97, Exh. 1 to deposition at pp. 45-46. 
11. Day continued to reject the claim on the basis that there was no "medical 
certainty" that Cannon's injury occurred on the insured premises. Day used the standard 
of "medical certainty", even though he admitted in his deposition that neither the policy 
nor the law required it. Despite Cannon's urging that Day call her parents and others 
who could confirm the injury and despite an inquiry from Day's own supervisor (Robert 
Nevens) whether Day had spoken to Cannon's parents to verify the injury, Day never 
made any attempt to contact Cannon's parents and other witnesses. R. 1166 at Exh. 1 p. 
44; R. 1167 at pp. 81-83. 
12. Cannon continued to urge Day to contact her health care providers and 
others to confirm her story; however, Day refused to do so, but instead maintained the 
position that there was no proof of "medical certainty." R. 1166 at pp. 96-97. Without 
"medical certainty" Travelers would not honor Cannon's claim even though Day 
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concluded that there was no pre-existing back condition. R. 1166 at pp. 94-99, 131, 159, 
Exh. 1 at pp. 51-52. 
13. Based on Travelers' internal policies, Travelers should have at least taken 
recorded statements to properly evaluate the claim. R. 287-288, and Exh. C to Fye 
Affidavit (R. 306-700). The only recorded statements taken was Cannon's, on April 21, 
1993, approximately four months after the claim was filed, and only because of Cannon's 
insistence. R. 1166 at p. 91, Exh. 1 (pp. 10-24). 
14. On June 14, 1993, Day offered to settle for a fraction of Cannon's Medpay 
claim, but only if she also released her potential liability claim against the Andersons. R. 
1167 at p. 87; R. 1166 at Exh. 1 (p. 60). Cannon responded that she would accept the 
Medpay benefits without the condition, however, Travelers refused unless Cannon also 
settled the liability claim. R. 1166 at Exh. 1 (pp. 61-62); R. 1167 at p. 88. 
15. Insurers generally know that failing to pay medical expenses incurred in an 
injury may result in reduced treatment, which may then lead to reduced recovery. This 
often causes financial and emotional distress, specially in a situation such as Cannon's, a 
single woman with no other means of support. Travelers had actual knowledge of 
Cannon's financial hardship. R. 291 at 11; R. 1166 at Exh. 1 (p. 56). Nonetheless, 
Travelers refused to pay anything until August, 1993, when it unexpectedly sent Cannon 
two checks totaling $352.20. Travelers has given no explanation why the amount of 
$352.20 was paid. R. 1167 at pp. 36, 86; R. 166 at pp. 106-109. 
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16. Despite Cannon's continued efforts to communicate with Travelers by 
telephone and correspondence, Travelers would not respond after June, 1993, with the 
exception of sending the above-mentioned checks. R. 1167 at pp. 88-89. 
17. Because of Travelers' refusal to communicate further or respond to 
Cannon's claim, Cannon was forced to retain an attorney. Unknown to Cannon, 
Travelers had closed its claim file after sending the $352.20. R. 1166 at Exh. 1 (p. 4). 
On May 24, 1994, Cannon, through her attorney, requested that Travelers provide her 
with a copy of the policy in order to determine what benefits might be owing. R. 1166 at 
Exh. 1 (pp. 68-69). Travelers never responded. 
18. After receiving the letter of May 24, 1994, from Cannon's attorney, two 
claims personnel (including a supervisor) reviewed the claim file, and noted that Day's 
investigation was incomplete. R. 1166 at Exh. 1 (pp. 4, 6). Nonetheless, Travelers did 
nothing further and remained silent, thereby leaving Cannon no choice but to file the 
present action. 
19. Cannon filed her complaint on October 4, 1994, requesting, among other 
things, that Travelers be ordered to produce a copy of the policy. Travelers finally 
produced the policy approximately two months later. Travelers paid the full policy limit 
of $10,000 in the summer of 1995, years after the medical expenses were submitted. 
20. In response to Travelers' motion for summary judgment, Cannon filed two 
affidavits of Gary Fye, an insurance claims expert. (See Addendum 9 and 10). Fye 
concluded that the actions of Travelers were grossly inadequate and improper as follows: 
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(a) Travelers failed to timely and diligently investigate Cannon's claim. 
Had it done so, sufficient information was readily available to establish the claim. 
Travelers ignored the evidence and "leads" which would provide sufficient 
information to process the claim. 
(b) Travelers failed to fairly evaluate the Cannon claim. Instead, 
Travelers acted indifferently toward the claim and Cannon's financial and 
emotional distress. 
(c) Travelers failed to promptly make payment of the Medpay benefits 
which should have been done on or before June, 1993. 
(d) Travelers failed to treat Cannon as a lay person who was 
unsophisticated in the area of insurance law and adjusting. It refused to provide 
adequate direction and assistance to obtain any needed information and it required 
that she prove her claim by "medical certainty" a standard not required under the 
policy nor the law. Travelers failed to communicate and give explanations, 
including the basis for its payment of $352.20. 
(e) Travelers' actions prevented Cannon from receiving the benefits 
owing under the policy by closing its file, refusing to respond to Cannon's 
communications (R. 1167 at pp. 86, 89), misrepresenting the proof requirements 
under the policy, and refusing to independently verify Cannon's claims. Further, 
Travelers encouraged Cannon not to retain legal counsel, telling her that if she did, 
she would receive less on her claim and Travelers would defend more 
aggressively. Travelers even refused to produce a copy of the policy to allow her 
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to know what coverage she had. All of these actions forced Cannon to retain 
counsel and file a lawsuit. 
(f) Travelers treated Cannon as a third-party claimant instead of a first 
party claimant. Such treatment was conscious and deliberate. R. 1166 at p. 43. 
Day admitted knowing that Cannon had separate claims, one for Medpay and the 
other for liability against the Andersons. Day admitted that Medpay coverage is 
not based on fault, and that such claim is made directly under the policy. R. 1166 
at pp. 42-49. 
(g) Travelers' actions constituted "stonewalling" by raising 
unreasonable barriers to Cannon's claims, by misrepresenting and withholding the 
policy provisions, by requiring proof based on "medical certainty," and by 
refusing to assist Cannon. Travelers also improperly attempted to force 
settlement of the liability claim by refusing to pay any Medpay benefits unless 
Cannon released her liability claim. 
(h) Travelers' actions violated its own internal procedures, its own claim 
manuals, the industry standards, and the applicable statutory and regulatory unfair 
claim practices acts. 
R. 283-292 
2L As a result of Travelers' improper conduct, Cannon has sustained injuries 
and damages including the following: 
(a) inability to obtain necessary medical care due to lack of funds; 
(b) emotional and financial distress; 
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(c) loss of credit and financial reputation; 
(d) adverse effect on her relationship with family and relatives; 
(e) additional injuries due to the mental stress associated with this case; 
(f) adverse effect on her business; 
(g) loss of use on money used to pay medical expenses; and 
(h) attorney's fees and litigation expenses. 
R. 1167 at pp. 104-120. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Cannon made a claim against Travelers based upon its medical payment coverage, 
which coverage is based solely on an injury occurring on the insured premises. As such, 
she was a first-party claimant entitled to benefits under the policy. The trial court erred 
in holding that Cannon was not a first-party insured for the following reasons: 
1. The language of the policy clearly indicates that Cannon was insured for 
medical coverage. This alone means that she is an insured under the policy. The nature 
of a Medpay claim is first-party. It requires the insured to submit a claim and proof of 
loss directly to Travelers, who in turn makes payment. A Medpay claim is not a third-
party claim, since it is not based upon liability, there is no third-party claim against an 
insured, and there is no duty to defend an insured. 
2. Cannon's status as a first-party claimant is also consistent with industry 
practices as well as Travelers own internal policies. Unnamed insureds who are covered 
under provisions such as Medpay, are considered first-party insureds. It would be 
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contrary to public policy to rule that an unnamed insured does not have first-party status. 
Many, if not most, of the persons insured under insurance policies are unnamed insureds. 
Unnamed insureds include children, guests, permissive users, business associates, 
pedestrians and others. Failing to recognize their first-party status is contrary to public 
policy. 
Travelers owed to Cannon as a first-party claimant implied duties, including duties 
of good faith and fair dealing. In Beck v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985), the court outlined that the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing apply in 
first-party situations and impliedly recognized that the interests of the insured and the 
intended "beneficiaries" (unnamed insureds) should be protected. Travelers implied 
duties arise out of the express language of the Medpay provision. Without implied 
duties, some of the language in the policy would have little or no meaning. Implied 
duties also arise out of the industry standards and practices, as evidenced by the various 
statutes, regulations, model acts and common practices of insurance companies, all of 
which recognize that such implied duties apply to unnamed insureds, such as Cannon. 
Implied duties also arise out of the theory of third-party beneficiary, which have been 
recognized by various courts as a basis for imposing these duties. Direct privity of 
contract is not required to impose good faith duties in the insurance context, since 
insurance is often purchased by someone for the benefit of many. The group of unnamed 
insureds is large and without implied duties being imposed, severe iniquities and abuses 
would occur. Implied duties should be imposed, not on the basis of direct privity of 
contract, but rather on whether there is a contractual relationship. 
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The trial court dismissed Cannon's Fourth Cause of Action based on Travelers' 
alleged breach of statutes, regulations, industry standards and Travelers' own internal 
policies because there is no private right of action. The Utah Insurance Department does 
not have authority to determine whether a private cause of action exists and therefore, 
any statement by the insurance department to that effect is not controlling. The Beck 
court recognized that independent tort actions may arise out of violating unfair claims 
practices acts. Apart from the statutes or regulations, the industry standards which have 
been adopted as the internal standards of Travelers, impose duties on Travelers, the 
violation of which would create a private cause of action. 
Finally, the fact that Travelers finally produced a copy of its policy and paid its 
policy limits, does not extinguish its wrongful conduct and consequential damages arising 
therefrom. The full extent of Cannon's damages have only been partially compensated 
by the payment of the Medpay benefits. The more far reaching and extensive damages 
remain uncompensated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CANNON WAS 
NOT A FIRST PARTY INSURED UNDER THE POLICY. 
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs claims, holding in part that Cannon was not a 
party to the insurance contract, nor was she defined as an insured in the policy. R. 1143-
1145, 1153-1154. The trial court erred in this holding based on: (1) the policy language; 
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(2) the insurance industry's policies and practices, and (3) the general law and public 
policy. 
A. Rules of Interpreting Insurance Policies. 
An insured is entitled to the broadest protection provided by an insurance contract. 
Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 1985). Ambiguities in an 
insurance policy are to be construed against the insurer, and in favor of coverage. L.D.S. 
Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted); Fuller, supra at 1046. If a term is susceptible to different interpretations which 
are equally plausible, the term is ambiguous, and should be construed in favor of 
coverage. L.D.S. Hospital at 860-68. 
In determining whether a word or phrase in an insurance contract is ambiguous, 
the court will consider whether the language in the policy "would ... be plain to a person 
of ordinary intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in 
accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the words and in light of the existing 
circumstances, including the purpose of the policy." Id. at 858-59; Draughon v. Cuna 
Mutual Insurance Society, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108, (Utah App. 1989). Accordingly, terms 
used in an insurance policy must be given their usual and ordinary meaning. See also 
Bergera v. Ideal National Life Insurance Co., 524 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1974). The Utah 
Supreme Court has rejected an insurer's argument that words in an insurance policy 
should be accorded an unusual meaning. Mason v. Commercial Union Assurance 
Companies, 626 P.2d 428, 429 (Utah 1981). 
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B. Cannon Was a First Party Insured Based on the 
Language of the Policy. 
In granting summary judgment, the trial court held, in part, that to maintain an 
action for consequential damages, Cannon must be a party to the insurance contract or be 
defined as an insured under the policy. R. 1147-1148. It is uncontested that Cannon did 
not purchase the policy and she is not a "named" insured. Aldon Scott and Jesselie 
Anderson purchased the policy and are the only named insureds. Technically, not even 
the Anderson children are parties to the contract, nor are they named insureds. This, 
however, does not mean that the Anderson children and other intended beneficiaries such 
as Cannon, are not "insureds" under the policy. 
There are numerous provisions in the policy which provide first party coverage to 
individuals or entities other than the named insureds. Most notably is Coverage F 
(Medpay) which is entitled "Medical Payments to Others" (emphasis added). The 
language of the policy reads: 
COVERAGE F - MEDICAL PAYMENTS TO OTHERS 
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that are incurred 
or medically ascertained within three years from the date of an 
accident causing "bodily injury."... This coverage does not 
apply to you or regular residents of your household1.... As to 
others, this coverage applies only: 
1. to a person on the "insured location" with the permission of 
an "insured"; or 
2. to a person off the "insured location," if ... 
The policy defines "you" as the named insured shown on the declaration sheet. It also defines 
"insured" to include "you and residents of your household". Policy p.l, R. 153. 
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Policy p. 26, R. 166 (emphasis added). (See copy of policy, Addendum 1). 
By its the express provisions, the Medpay coverage is only for "others," not the 
named insured or residents of their household. Thus, the only way to become insured 
under the Medpay coverage is to be someone other than the named insured or a resident 
of the household. Travelers does not contest that Cannon was insured under this 
provision, but somehow argues that she is really not an "insured" under the policy. 
In the general definitions of the policy, the word "insured" is described to include 
other individuals or entities, whether or not named in the declarations. The policy's 
definitions do not appear to be exhaustive, since there are numerous coverages for others 
not identified in the definitions. The policy does not exclude coverage for anyone not 
defined as an insured. If it did, it would be contrary to many of the express provisions of 
the policy. A fair reading of the entire policy illustrates many situations where an 
individual or entity may become an insured depending on the circumstances, yet not be 
specifically defined as such. 
Under the conditions of Coverage F, Travelers imposes certain duties on an 
injured person such as Cannon, before he or she is entitled to benefits: 
2
 For example, the policy provides coverage to individuals or entities which are not technically 
defines as "insureds". Apart from Coverage F, Section 1, Coverage A 2 provides coverage for 
"materials and supplies" which may or may not be owned by a defined insured (Policy p. 4, R. 
155); Coverage C, provides express coverage for personal property owned by "others" and "a 
guest" (Policy p. 5, R. 155) neither of which is defines as an insured in the definitions; a 
mortgagee is specifically covered but is not found in the definition of an insured (Policy p. 24, R. 
165); and under Additional Coverages, there is specific coverage for "Damage to Property of 
Others" (Policy p. 33, $. 169). 
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4. Duties of an injured person -- coverage F - medical 
payments to others. The injured person or someone 
acting for the injured person will: 
a. Give us written proof of claim, under oath if 
required, as soon as practical; and 
b. Authorize us to obtain copies of medical reports 
and records. 
The injured person will submit to a medical exam by a 
doctor of our choice when and as often as we reasonably 
require. 
Policy p. 35-36, R. 170-171. The above language clearly demonstrates that Cannon has 
certain duties that she must fulfill in order to claim Medpay benefits. These are the same 
kinds of duties required of any first party insured who seeks benefits under the policy. If 
she were not insured, Travelers would have no right to impose such duties. 
The legislature has defined "insured," for purposes of the insurance code, as 
follows: "'Insured' means a person to whom or for whose benefit an insurer makes a 
promise in an insurance policy."3 Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-1-301(47). Though the Code 
allows an insurer to define an insured differently, it confirms the general meaning of 
"insured," which meaning would include Cannon in a Medpay claim. Treatises on 
insurance use similar definitions as the Utah Code. See, e.g. Keeton, Insurance Law, § 
4.1(c) p. 178 ("Medical payments coverages often contain provisions that, though not 
3
 The definition also states, "This definition applies only to the provisions of this title and does 
not define the meaning of this word as used in insurance policies or certificates." Utah Code 
Ann. §31 A-1-301(47). 
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referred to as omnibus clauses, similarly designate additional insureds by description of a 
class bearing some relationship to the named insured.")-
Interestingly, Travelers does refer to Coverage F in the general definitions of an 
"insured": 
Under Sections I and II, "insured" also includes: 
e. any ADDITIONAL INSURED named in the Declarations 
but only with respect to Coverages A, B, E & F for the 
"residence premises." 
Policy p. 2, R. 154. Under this definition, anyone named in the Declarations is also 
insured, which has meaning in Coverages A (dwelling), B (other structures), and E 
(personal liability). However, the words "named in the Declarations" have no meaning 
and are inconsistent with Coverage F, since by express exclusion the "named insureds" 
(those named in the Declarations) have no Coverage F. Coverage F only applies to other 
people who are injured on the insured premises. At the very least, the definition is 
ambiguous and inherently inconsistent. Accordingly, it should be interpreted against 
Travelers' position. See L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 860-861 
(Utah 1988). 
Moreover, the above definition of insured does not use words that are exclusive, 
but instead are inclusive. For example, it states "Under Sections I and II, 'insured' also 
includes: ..." (emphasis added). The ordinary meaning of the word "include" is not that 
everything else that is not "included" is excluded. On the contrary, it means that what is 
specified as included could be one of many items. 
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The decisions of courts in many jurisdictions support the argument that the usual 
and ordinary meaning of "include" in an insurance policy is one of enlargement, rather 
than restriction. See, for example, Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Interstate Fire and Casualty 
Co., 302 Md. 383, 488 A.2d 486 (1985); Weller v. Grange Mutual Casualty Insurance 
Co. of Harrisburg, 161 A. 615, 105 Pa. Super 547 (1932); Republic Insurance Co. v. 
Silverton Elevators, Inc., 493 S.W. 2d 748, 752 (Tex. 1973) (It is "the well settled rule 
that the words 'include,' 'including,' and 'shall include' are generally employed as terms of 
enlargement rather than limitation or restriction.") Schluckebier v. Arlington Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co., 8 Wis. 2d 480, 99 N.W. 2d 705, 707 (1959). ("As shown by various 
dictionary definitions and in 20A Words and Phrases, Include, p. 144 et seq., the word 
"include" . . . mean[s] that that which is stated is . . . only a part or a component of the 
whole"); Zebulon Enterprises v. DuPage County, 146 111. App. 3d 515, 100 111. Dec. 191, 
496 N.E. 2d 1256, 1259 (1986) ("The term 'include' does not necessarily imply the 
exclusion of terms not specifically enumerated. In fact the weight of authority ordinarily 
interprets 'include' as a term of enlargement."); Phelps v. Sledd, 479 S.W. 2d 894, 896-97 
(Ky. App. 1972) ("The word 'including' in its ordinary usage connotes 'also,' 'as well as,' ' 
in addition to,' or 'together with.'...'including' implies that something else is given beyond 
what is covered by the preceding language."); St. Louis County v. State Highway 
Commission, 409 S.W. 2d 149, 153 (Mo. 1966) ("The meaning of the word 'include' may 
vary according to its context. Ordinarily it is not a word of limitation, but of 
enlargement... it implies that there may be others which are not mentioned."); Cuna v. 
Board of Fire Commissioners, 42 NJ. 292, 200 A.2d 313, 320 (1964). 
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It is well settled in Utah that contracts are to be construed to give effect to their 
provisions. G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1989). Since 
Cannon was directly insured for medical payment coverage under Coverage F, she is a 
first party insured. 
C. Cannon Was a First Party Insured Based on Industry 
Practices. 
The trial court's ruling is also contrary to the standards and practices of the 
insurance industry, as well as Travelers' own internal policies and procedures. Insurance 
policies typically provide coverages for unnamed insureds, which extend certain 
coverages to persons other than the named insured. Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law 
§ 4.7(a). A common example of this extended coverage is the Medpay provision found 
in most homeowners policies. Medpay coverage is generally designed to insure any 
person (other than the insured occupants of the home) who suffers injury on the insured 
location. R. 1166 at p. 49; 285-287 at ffl 5-8. These injured people are referred to in the 
industry as "omnibus" or "unnamed" insureds. 
Day, Travelers claims' representative, testified that based on his experience at 
Travelers, an "unnamed insured" is simply an insured under the policy, but is not 
"named" in the declarations. R. 1166 at p. 40. Day's opinion is consistent with industry 
practices. R. 285-287 at ff 5-8. Cannon thus falls squarely within the parameters of an 
unnamed insured. Therefore, the only issue is whether a Medpay claim is a first or third-
party claim. 
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In the industry, payment for a first-party claim is based on loss, whereas payment 
for a third-party claim is based on liability. Medpay is, by definition, first-party 
insurance; it does not involve fault or a third-party liability claim against the insured. R. 
285-287 at f][ 6, 8. Travelers admits this principle. R. 1166 at p. 42. As an unnamed 
insured, Cannon submitted a Medpay claim directly to Travelers, not the insureds 
(Andersons). Liability and duty to defend did not, and could not, become an issue in a 
Medpay claim. There is no tortfeasor. A Medpay claim is based on the contract and is 
never a third-party claim. R. 285-287 at ffl5-8; R. 1166 at p. 43-44. 
Travelers' claim representative admitted that the policy gave first-party coverage 
to unnamed insureds. R. 1166 at p. 41. Travelers also knew that Cannon had two 
different kinds of claims—one for Medpay, and the other a possible third-party liability 
claim based on the actions of the Andersons. R. 1166 at p. 42. Despite these admissions, 
Travelers always treated Cannon as a third-party claimant (R. 1166 at p. 43), and argued 
4
 Insurance commentator Allan D. Windt states: 
There are two general categories of insurance policies: third-party liability policies and 
first-party policies. First-party insurance is insurance covering a loss that the insured 
itself might incur. [Under] [s]uch insurance . . . the insurer covenants to reimburse the 
insured for losses directly incurred by the insured. . . . 
By contrast, liability insurance affords coverage for amounts owed by the insured to third 
parties. . . . The insurer covenants to indemnify the insured only for sums that the insured 
becomes legally obligated to pay to others. 
Many insurance policies afford both first-party and liability coverage. By way of 
example, an automobile policy provides first-party coverage for damage to the insured's 
vehicle and liability (or third-party) coverage for amounts that the insured might owe to a 
third party if the insured negligently causes an automobile accident. 
Windt, 1 Insurance Claims & Disputes, 3rd ed., § 6.05, p. 383-384. 
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to the trial court that Cannon was really a third-party claimant, which argument the court 
accepted. The trial court should therefore be reversed. 
D. Cannon was a first party insured based on general law and 
public policy. 
The Utah appellate courts have not directly dealt with the issue of whether an 
unnamed insured is considered a first party claimant. However, the courts have given 
sufficient guidelines to answer this issue. In Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court clearly defines the difference between first party 
and third-party claimants. It states: 
We use the term "first-party" to refer to an insurance agreement 
where the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the 
insured for losses suffered by the insured. The present case 
involves such a first-party situation. In contrast, a "third-party" 
situation is one where the insurer contracts to defend the 
insured against claims made by third parties against the insured 
and to pay any resulting liability, up to the specified dollar 
limit. 
Beck, at 798. Under Beck, Cannon's situation is only analogous to a first party claim. 
Cannon's Medpay claim cannot be tortured into Beck's definition of a third-party 
claimant. 
Nearly every jurisdiction has held that a third-party claimant cannot sue the liability 
insurer of the tortfeasor. This is true in Utah. See, for example, Broadwater v. Old 
Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). Yet, Travelers readily acknowledged, as 
did the trial court, that Cannon may sue Travelers to recover her Medpay benefits. R. 
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1147; R. 1164 at p. 3. This is clearly not a third-party situation. Thus, the trial court's 
comparison of Cannon to a third-party claimant5 was error. 
The mere fact that the insured is an "unnamed" insured should not alter her first-
party status. Prygrocki v. Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 407 So.2d 345 (Fla. 
4th DCA 1981), decision approved, 422 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1982). In State Farm Fire & 
Casualty v. Michael Kambara, 667 So.2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), a Florida appeals 
court addressed the question of whether a person was covered as an omnibus insured 
when he suffered injury on the insured location and claimed Medpay benefits under 
another person's homeowners policy. The Court stated: 
An individual can be both an omnibus insured seeking first-
party benefits under an insurance contract and also be a third-
party beneficiary under the liability provisions of the coverage 
when suing the tortfeasor. In the case of the omnibus insured, 
the individual's rights are derived directly from his or her status 
under a clause of the insurance policy without regard to the 
issue of liability; if the individual fits within the class he or she 
is entitled to first-party benefits. 
Id. at 833. 
Likewise, in Hammond v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 1994 WL 521193, *4 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994), the court stated: 
Because the medical payments in this case are to be paid 
directly to a party injured on the premises of the named insured, 
without regard to the named insured's liability, we believe that 
a medical payments claimant can be defined as an insured 
5
 The trial court stated: 
"The policies [sic] defined who insureds are, there are named insureds and there are other 
people, permissive users. I don't believe that Ms. Cannon fits the definition of an insured. I think 
she is more analogous to the claimant in Savage ..." R. 1165 at p. 57. 
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under the policy to whom benefits flow directly under the terms 
of the policy. 
The trial court's conclusion that Cannon was not a first party insured is also 
against public policy. A major share, if not most, of the insureds under any policy, are 
unnamed insureds. Typically, the policy is applied for and purchased by a spouse, parent, 
or entity in behalf of many others, such as children, relatives, business associates, 
employees, pedestrians, and permissive users, to name a few. These intended insureds 
seldom, if ever, are "named insureds." Under the trial court's holding, they would 
therefore not be parties to the contract nor first party claimants. Yet, they all have first 
party coverage and all meet the legal definition of first party claimants. Without the first 
party status, all unnamed insureds would have little legal protection and would be subject 
only to the good graces (or lack thereof) of any insurer. This position is clearly injurious 
to the public and against public policy, which is another basis to reverse the trial court. 
Berube v. Fashion Center, 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989); Allstate v. U.S. Fidelity, 619 P.2d 
329 (Utah 1980); Farmers v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
The trial court's ruling is also contrary to all unfair claims practices statutes and 
regulations, and is contrary to the general practices of the insurance industry. R. 283-292 
and exhibits attached thereto. The trial court's ruling should be reversed and Cannon 
should be held to be a first party insured, entitled to all the legal protection offered to a 
first party insured. 
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II. TRAVELERS SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR ITS BREACH OF 
IMPLIED DUTIES OWED TO CANNON. 
The trial court erred in ruling that Travelers owed no implied duties to Cannon 
under her first, second and third cause of action because she lacked privity and was not a 
party to the contract nor defined as an insured in the policy. R. 1164 at pp. 3-4; R. 1146-
1149. As addressed in Argument I above, Cannon was clearly a first party insured, which 
should be sufficient alone to impose implied duties on Travelers. Travelers argued, 
however, that regardless of Cannon's status, she lacked privity of contract and was 
accordingly not a party to the contract. It is not clear whether the trial court's ruling 
would have been different if it had found Cannon to be a first party insured, however, 
either way this court should still impose implied duties on Travelers. 
A. There Are Many Recognized Implied Duties. 
Due to the nature of first-party claims, the law has imposed on insurers various 
implied duties to protect the insured. In Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 
801 (Utah 1985), the court stated the implied duties, "at the very least," included (1) 
diligently investigating the claim, (2) fairly evaluating the insured's claim, (3) promptly 
and reasonably denying or settling the claim, (4) dealing with lay persons as lay persons 
and not at insurance experts, and (5) refraining from actions that will injure the insured's 
ability to obtain the benefits of the contract. Id. at 801. 
These duties are intentionally broad and were not intended to be all inclusive. 
Within these duties are found specific duties such as the duty to provide a copy of the 
insurance policy to unnamed insureds who request a copy. There is no contract provision 
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to provide a copy of the policy, but common sense would dictate this duty. If not, an 
unnamed insured would not know the coverage or the conditions to make a claim. Many 
of the other implied duties are set out in the affidavits of Cannon's expert, Gary Fye. 
(Addendum 9 and 10). 
B. Case Law Imposes Implied Duties In First Party Claims. 
Under Utah law, a first party insured is entitled to seek consequential damages if 
the insurer breaches the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. Beck, supra. The 
Beck court concluded that the existing law under Lyon v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co., 480 P.2d 739 (Utah 1971), which did not allow a claim for consequential 
damages, was improper. "Our ruling in Lyon left an insured without any effective 
remedy against an insurer that refuses to bargain or settle in good faith with the 
insured....In light of these considerations, we now conclude that an insured should be 
provided with a remedy." Id. at 798. The court then described the duties of good faith 
and fair dealing that apply to first party situations. Id. at 801. 
The Beck court never suggested different treatment for a named or unnamed 
insured. On the contrary, the court expressly acknowledged a need to protect the interests 
of unnamed insureds, as well as named insureds: 
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that insurance frequently is 
purchased not only to provide funds in case of loss, but to 
provide peace of mind for the insured or his beneficiaries. 
Id. at 802 (emphasis added). "Peace of mind" is the very foundation that justifies the 
implied duties. Without the* there is little peace of mind. 
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C. The Language Of Travelers' Policy Imposes Implied Duties. 
The operative language of the Medpay provision begins, "We will pay the 
necessary medical expenses...." R. 166. This language has little meaning if the implied 
duties of investigating thoroughly, fairly evaluating and promptly paying are not 
applicable. There is nothing in the policy stating when an insurer will pay the benefits. 
Without the implied duties, it's a promise without substance or enforceability. 
As noted above, the policy imposes obligations directly on Medpay claimants: 
4. Duties of an injured person -- coverage F -- medical 
payments to others. The injured person or someone 
acting for the injured person will: 
a. Give us written proof of claim, under oath if 
required, as soon as practical; and 
b. Authorizes us to obtain copies of medical reports 
and records. 
The injured person will submit to a medical exam by a 
doctor of our choice when and as often as we reasonably 
require. 
R. 170-171. These obligations appear to impose the reciprocal implied duties of good 
faith on Cannon (as described in Beck, at 801). Likewise, it further supports the implied 
duties of Travelers to use the information to fairly evaluate and promptly pay Medpay 
claims. Travelers' imposition of these duties on Medpay claimants illustrates the need to 
have implied duties imposed on Travelers. If nothing more, this language should estop 
Travelers from claiming it owes no implied duties, or at least, it should be construed as 
Travelers' voluntary assumption of or consent to the implied duties. 
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D. Implied Duties Arise Out Of Insurance Industry Standards and 
Practices. 
Travelers admitted that unnamed insureds are owed the same duties of fair and 
proper claims handling as are owed to named insureds. R. 1166 at 41. This is consistent 
with the standards adopted throughout the insurance industry to treat unnamed insureds 
as first-party claimants with all the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. R. 284-
287, at 4-8. Utah has adopted standards for proper claims handling, through statutes and 
regulations (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-26-301 et seq.); Unfair Claims Settlement Practices 
Regulations, Utah Ins. Department Rules R590, see Addendums 6, 7, & 8); and Travelers 
has accepted these standards as its own. Travelers testified that any violation, omission, 
or deviation of these standards would constitute improper claims handling and violations 
of its own standards. R. 1166 at p. 15-19. 
E. Travelers Owes Implied Duties To Cannon As A Third-Party 
Beneficiary. 
Implied duties are also imposed on Travelers because Cannon is an intended third-
party beneficiary under the contract. Utah law recognizes that a person not in direct 
privity of contract may still enforce the contract, and may seek damages resulting from 
breach. Peterson v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 19 Utah 2d 26, 425 P.2d 769 (1967); 
Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. 
In Broadwater, 854 P.2d 527, 535-537 (Utah 1993), the court found Broadwater to 
be a third-party claimant and held she had no privity of contract. Thus her claim for bad 
faith was dismissed. However, the court recognized that the theory of third-party 
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beneficiary, if applicable, may be grounds to support such a claim. The court described 
the elements of this theory as follows: 
Third-party beneficiaries are those "recognized as having 
enforceable rights created in them by a contract to which they 
are not parties and for which they give no consideration." 
[citations omitted] To have an enforceable right, the contracting 
parties must have clearly intended to confer a separate and 
distinct benefit upon the third-party. 
Id. at 536. Cannon clearly fits within the definition of a third-party beneficiary. 
Though the Utah courts have not directly addressed this issue, other courts have 
expressly held that a Medpay claimant can bring an action for bad faith based upon the 
theory of third-party beneficiary. In Donald v. Liberty Mutual 18 F.3d 474 (7th Cir. 
1994), the court held that Liberty Mutual owed Donald, an unnamed insured and third-
party beneficiary, the duty of good faith and fair dealing in handling his claim under the 
Medpay provision of the policy. Indiana law prohibited direct actions by third-party 
claimants against the liability insurer. However, the Seventh Circuit held that because 
Donald's claim for Medpay benefits was not based on fault he was "not barred by 
Indiana's position on direct actions..." Id. at 481. Therefore, Donald was allowed to 
maintain his bad faith action against the insurer. 
In Donaldson v. Liberty Mutual 947 F.Supp. 429 (D. Haw. 1996), the plaintiff (an 
unnamed insured) sued Liberty Mutual for wrongfully withholding no-fault benefits 
under an automobile policy. The court held that Donaldson was a third-party beneficiary 
under the policy. The insurer argued that Donaldson was not an "insured" and could not 
sue for bad faith. But the court stated: 
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This court finds, however, that Plaintiff, a third-party 
beneficiary of Witte's policy, is essentially an insured and to 
treat him otherwise makes no sense. 
The Intermediate Court of Appeals has held that third-party 
beneficiaries of an insurance contract are entitled to the same 
benefits under the contract as insureds. Dawes v. First Ins. Co. 
of Hawaii, Ltd.. 77 Haw. 117, 133, 883 P.2d 38, 54 (1994). 
The court found that a departure from a literal construction of 
the insurance statute was appropriate to prevent an inequitable, 
absurd result. Id. at 127-28, 883 P.2d at 48-49. This court 
predicts that Hawaii courts would depart from a literal reading 
of the statutory definition of an insured in the no-fault context 
to avoid an inequitable or absurd result. 947 F.Supp. at 431 
(footnote omitted). 
The court held that the plaintiff may maintain his cause of action against the 
defendant for bad faith, as well as deceptive acts and practices. See also, Hunt v. First 
Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 82 Haw. 363, 922 P.2d 976, 980-81 (Haw. App. 1996)(slip and 
fall customer was intended beneficiary of Medpay provision and could bring direct action 
against insurer without violating general prohibition against actions by third-party 
claimants against tortfeasor's insurer). 
In Harper v. Wausau Ins. Corp., 56 Cal. App. 4th 1079, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64 (Cal. 
App. 1997), Harper was injured on Wausau's insured's premises and sued for no-fault 
Medpay payments under the insurance policy. The court held that Harper was an 
"intended third-party beneficiary" who "had a right to enforce the [insurance] contract." 
56 Cal. App. 4th at 1091. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs 
claim for bad faith. See also, Desmond v. American Ins. Co., 786 S.W.2d 144, 145-47 
(Mo. App. 1989) (patron injured at theater could maintain direct action against insurer as 
a third-party beneficiary of Medpay provision). 
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F. Technical Privity Of Contract Is Not Required. 
The trial court accepted Travelers' argument that without privity to an insurance 
contract, an unnamed insured cannot maintain a suit against the insurer based on implied 
duties, relying on Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967); Beck 
v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1995); Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 
745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987); Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 
App. 1989); Pixton v. State Farm, 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991); Broadwater v. Old 
Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993); Savage v Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 
(Utah 1995); and Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996). 
However, none of these cases controls the unique legal issues presented in this case. 
All of the above cases deal in either traditional third-party claims or first-party 
named insured claims. None of the cases involve an unnamed insured submitting a first-
party claim. The only case that has a similar to the present issue is Campbell v. State 
Farm, 840 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1992), cert denied, 853 P.2d 897 (1992). The Court of 
Appeals recognized that a person who is not a named insured, but who is insured under a 
liability policy, may maintain a bad faith action against the insurer. Id. at 143 n.27. In 
that case, Curtis Campbell was the named insured. State Farm argued that Curtis' wife, 
Inez, lacked standing to sue because she was not the named insured. However, the court 
found the argument to be without merit. 
Ammerman dealt with a third-party, Soliz, who obtained a judgment against the 
insured, Ammerman, and directly sued Ammerman's insurer based on bad faith. The 
court held that Soliz [the third-party] could not "appropriate to himself a tort claim 
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Ammerman [the insured] may have against the defendant insurance company." 430 P.2d 
at 578. 
Beck involved an insured of Farmers who suffered damages from an automobile 
accident and made a claim for uninsured motorist coverage. The Beck court did not 
directly address the issue of privity of contract but it expressly recognized in dicta that if 
one is an intended beneficiary of the policy, he or she should also have a remedy for 
consequential damages resulting from an insurer's breach of implied covenants. Beck, 
701 P.2d at 802. Indeed, Beck envisioned that the implied covenants of good faith and 
fair dealing were to be afforded to any first party insured. This would include Cannon, an 
intended "beneficiary" of the Andersons (the named insureds). 
In Arnica, the insured owner of a damaged automobile had a dispute with a repair 
shop, resulting in the shop's taking the vehicle pending the owner's payment. The owner 
submitted a total loss claim to his insurer, stating that the car had been stolen. After 
settling the claim, the insurer sued for a return of the settlement money. The insured 
counter-claimed for bad faith. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Arnica, a first-party case, cites to Ammerman, a 
third-party case, and states: 
In order to maintain an action under a contractual theory of 
insurer bad faith, the parties must be in privity of contract at the 
time of the alleged wrong. 
Arnica, 768 P.2d at 958. This language appears inconsistent with Beck, and is a stretch 
from earlier rulings that were not based on the language of privity, but on "contractual 
relationship." Arnica's reliance on Ammerman appears misplaced, considering that 
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Ammerman dealt with a third-party claimant. The Ammerman court held that, in the 
context of that case, a third-party judgment creditor, who was not a named or unnamed 
insured, had no contractual relationship with the insurer and would obviously not have 
privity with the insurer. Unlike a third-party claimant, an unnamed insured does have a 
contractual relationship with the insurer because of his or her first party coverage. He or 
she is an intended "beneficiary" of first party benefits, with implied rights that arises 
directly from the contract. R. 284-287, at ffl 5-8. (See Addendum 9). 
Arnica's use of the privity language in Ammerman is not helpful to the court in the 
context of the case at bar. What Arnica fails to address is that while privity of contract 
will enable an insured to maintain a bad faith action, a contractual relationship will also 
enable an unnamed insured (spouse, child, other insured, permissive driver, Medpay 
claimant, etc.) to maintain an action based on that person's rights arising directly from the 
contractual relationship. To hold otherwise would be to eliminate clearly established 
rights and duties fully anticipated by unnamed insureds and insurers. 
Under general contract law, privity of contract is usually a simple matter and is 
determined by the parties who sign the contract. In the insurance setting, however, 
privity is not so simple because the insureds do not sign the insurance contract. An 
insured may sign an application, but not the policy. One insured, such as a spouse, parent 
or employer, may sign the application for and in behalf of other insureds. For example, it 
is quite common to have insurers issue policies listing only one spouse or parent as the 
"named" insured, even though it is intended that all family members are insureds. Under 
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the trial court's ruling, only the person who signed the application would be in privity of 
contract, and the rest of the family would only be "unnamed" insureds. 
Implied duties owed to a permissive driver would cease to exist. Directors, officers 
and employees of a business that acquired a policy would have no implied rights or 
claims, even though they are clearly covered. There would often be no duties of fair 
dealing to beneficiaries under life insurance policies, because the insured (who is often 
the owner) is dead. The list could go on and on. 
If the trial court's interpretation of privity of contract is the basis for extending 
implied duties, it will result in gross inequities. It would create economic incentives to 
treat unnamed insureds unfairly. The gross inequity would also apply equally in a third-
party context. A teenage son who causes an accident, but who is not listed as a "named" 
insured, would have no rights to be treated fairly and in good faith by his parents' liability 
carrier. The trial court's ruling runs counter to the public's common understanding, the 
standards of the insurance industry, and common sense. 
There is no public policy which supports the trial court's position. The law has 
long since recognized the ability and power of an insurance company to abuse and take 
advantage of claimants. It has accordingly developed legal theories to allow recovery for 
those harmed by insurers' improper conduct. There are only two kinds of insurance 
claims - first and third-party claims. In both situations the law imposes duties to act in 
good faith. In the third-party context, an insurer owes its good faith duties to the insured 
against whom a claim is being made. If the insurer acts unreasonably, the insured may 
sue the insurer for bad faith. See, for example, Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 
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supra. An insurer is still accountable for its failure to act in good faith in a third-party 
context even though the third-party cannot sue directly. In the first party context, courts 
impose similar duties to act in good faith. Failure to do so subjects the insurer to claims 
by the first party insured. 
The recognized duties to act in good faith in both a third or first party context are 
sufficiently broad to curtail the potential abuse by insurers in all areas of insurance. The 
trial court, however, has created a new area of claims where there are no good faith duties 
and an insurer is not accountable for its wrongful actions. The trial court's ruling divides 
first and third-party claims into two groups. First, the first and third-party claims 
regarding "named" insureds; and second, the first and third-party claims regarding 
"unnamed" insureds. Travelers apparently concedes it owes good faith duties to the first 
group, however, it proposes relieving insurers of all good faith duties in the second 
group. Yet, the second group appears to be a much larger group of people than the first. 
Despite how the courts, legislatures, insurance commissioners and industry organizations 
have tried to impose good faith duties, the trial court has carved out a huge area where 
no duties or accountability exist. This should not be allowed. 
The better approach, which is consistent with common practice, public policy, 
industry standards, the law, and fundamental fairness, would be to interpret "privity of 
contract" in the insurance arena to mean anyone who is insured under the policy, i.e., 
anyone who has a claim for coverage under a policy, whether it be liability coverage or 
first-party coverage. This approach is envisioned by the policy itself as it extends 
coverage to unnamed persons who are not named. 
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Regarding this issue, three experts have observed: 
Since the duty of good faith and fair dealing arises from an 
insurer's relationship to its insured, rather than its status as a 
party to the contract, the scope of that duty is not strictly 
defined by the terms of the contract. This holds true even 
though an insurance contract is indispensable to the relationship 
and the insurer, by definition, must be a party to it. After all, 
insureds often are not parties to the contract. For example, 
automobile insurance policies often provide that relatives of the 
named insured or persons using the owned vehicle with the 
permission of the named insured are insured under the policy. 
Shernoff, Gage, Levine, Insurance Bad Faith Litigation § 2.04[1], p. 2-24. This reflects 
the holding in Cancino v. Farmers Insurance Group, 80 Cal. App. 3d 335, 338-340, 145 
Cal. Rptr. 503 (1978), an uninsured motorist coverage case. The court held that an 
insurer owes the duty of good faith and fair dealing to any insured under uninsured 
coverage and that this duty was not limited only to named insureds, or those specifically 
identified as parties to the insurance contract. 
In the permissive driver context, the court in Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. 
v. Farmers' Insurance Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978), held that 
even though the permissive user of an automobile was not a contracting party to the 
insurance contract, the user was an insured under the policy who was owed duties by the 
insurer. In Johansen v. California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau, 538 
P.2d 744, 750 (Cal. 1975), the California Supreme Court held that an insurer's duty to 
deal in good faith "springs from the contractual relationship" between the insurer and 
insured. A claim for Medpay is quite similar to a claim for no-fault benefits in an auto 
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policy. No-fault provisions "are first party in nature, requiring payment upon proof of 
loss." Shernoff, Gage and Levine, Insurance Bad Faith Litigation, § 4.06, p. 4-35. 
The other cases relied upon in the trial court's ruling are also not supportive of its 
position. In Callioux, an insured couple submitted a claim to their insurer for the total 
loss of their vehicle. The insurer concluded that the loss was caused by arson and denied 
the claim. A jury acquitted Callioux of arson, after which Progressive paid the claim in 
full. Callioux filed suit against the insurer. No issue before the court dealt with privity of 
contract. 
In the Pixton case, Pixton was hit by Davies. State Farm insured both cars. State 
Farm fully paid Pixton no-fault PIP coverage but refused to offer enough to settle the 
liability claim against the tortfeasor Davies. Pixton then filed suit against State Farm, 
Davies' insurer. Faced with a third-party claimant's suit against a tortfeasor's insurer, the 
Court held that Pixton 
. . .had no relevant contractual relationship with State Farm. 
Pixton makes no claim that State Farm failed to perform any 
obligation under her no-fault insurance policy with State Farm. 
All Pixton's claims are grounded in her status as an injured 
claimant attempting to recover against State Farm as the insurer 
of the tortfeasor, Davies. . . . Thus, under Beck, State Farm 
owes Pixton no duty as there is no relevant contractual 
relationship. 
In sum, we are persuaded that there is no duty of good 
faith and fair dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a 
third-party claimant, such as Pixton, seeking to recover against 
the company's insured. 
809 P.2d at 749. Instead of requiring "privity of contract," the court discussed the issue 
in terms of "contractual relationship." 
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In Broadwater, the context was a third-party claim, much like Ammerman. The 
Broadwater court stated: 
Under both Beck and Ammerman, the duty of an insurer to deal 
fairly is derived from the insurance contract. In absence of a 
contractual relationship or statutory duty, a majority of the 
courts that have addressed this issue have been reluctant to 
allow an injured third-party to sue another's insurer for failure 
to bargain in good faith, [citations omitted]. Our own court of 
appeals came to the same conclusion in Pixton v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 809 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would support a 
finding of a contractual relationship between her and 
Northwestern or Old Republic. 
Broadwater, 854 P.2d at 535-536. Again, the focus was "contractual relationship," not 
the distinction between "named" and "unnamed" insureds. 
Savage involved a workers' compensation claim. Savage, the insured employee, 
requested that Educators Mutual, her employer's insurer, pay for certain medical 
expenses. Educators declined, but later paid the expenses after Savage brought the issue 
before the Industrial Commission. Thereafter, Savage instituted suit against Educators for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal of her case, holding that Savage had no contractual relationship with Educators. 
The court found that Savage's claim was a third-party claim, like that in Pixton, where 
the "duty of good faith and fair dealing [is] a contractual duty running from the insurer to 
its insured." 809P.2d749. The Court of Appeals stated: 
In the present case, Ms. Savage is a third-party claimant against 
Educators. Consequently, Ms. Savage and Educators share no 
privity of contract; rather, that privity runs between Educators 
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and the District [employer]. Therefore, given the holding of 
Pixton, and the cases cited therein, we affirm the trial court's 
ruling. 
Savage, 874 P.2d at 132. 
The difference between Savage and the case at bar is third-party versus first-party. 
Under Medpay, Cannon is an insured who presented a first-party claim under the policy. 
In a workers' compensation situation, the injured worker has a claim against the 
employer for workers' compensation. The employer in Savage had purchased the policy 
with Educators to cover its liability to its injured employees. Savage did not enjoy a 
contractual relationship with Educators and did not have a first-party claim. 
Travelers cites no authority, nor did the trial court, which directly supports its 
position that there are no good faith duties owed to unnamed insureds. Case law, sound 
policy, and industry standards mandate the opposite conclusion. 
III. TRAVELERS IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF STATUTES, 
REGULATIONS, INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND ITS OWN 
INTERNAL STANDARDS. 
With regard to Cannon's Fourth Cause of Action, the court committed error by 
granting Travelers' Motion for Summary Judgment, incorrectly holding that "the Utah 
Unfair Claim Settlement Practices statutes and rules do not give rise to any private cause 
of action." R. 1148-1149. The trial court did not address the issue of breach of industry 
and Travelers' internal standards as a basis for liability. 
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A. Utah's Various Statutes And Rules Provide Cannon With The 
Right To Pursue A Private Cause Of Action. 
Utah has both statutes and regulations relating to unfair claims practices. See, for 
example, Utah Code Ann. §31A-31-103; Utah Insurance Department's Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Rules (Addendum 6-8). In section 103 of Chapter 31, Utah Code 
Ann., it states: 
An insurer commits a fraudulent insurance act if that insurer 
with intent to deceive or defraud: (a) knowingly withholds 
information or provides false or misleading information with 
respect to an application, coverage, benefits, or claims under a 
policy or certificate. 
No where is there any indication that there is no private cause of action under the statute. 
Furthermore, under the Utah Insurance Department's Unfair Claims Settlement 
Practices Rules, Cannon is entitled to maintain an action against Travelers for its 
violations thereof. Cannon alleged that Travelers breached several Insurance Department 
rules, including Rule 590-89-7(E)(refusing to pay without conducting reasonable 
investigation), Rule 590-89-7(F) (offering substantially less that what is owing under the 
policy), Rule 590-89-7(H) (refusing and not paying claim within 30 days after a 
reasonable proof of loss), Rule 590-89-7(J) (suggesting a smaller recovery if claimant 
retains an attorney), Rule 590-89-7(P) (refusing to give written explanation of denial), 
Rule 590-89-7(R) (refusing to pay reasonably incurred expenses when such expenses 
resulted), rule 590-89-12(A) (refusing and failing to give plaintiff a statement and 
explanation of the proof required under the policy to obtain benefits), Rule 590-89-12(B) 
(refusing and failing to complete its investigation within 30 days, failing to accept or 
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deny claim within said time period, failing to provide any explanation of why the 
investigation could not be completed in 30 days), and Rule 590-89-12(C) (refusing to 
promptly pay plaintiffs claim within 30 days after written notice). R. 84-87. (Addendum 
8). 
In holding that there was no private cause of action, the trial court apparently 
relied on R590-89-3, which states, 'This rule is regulatory in nature and is not intended to 
create a private right of action." The court's reliance on this phrase is misguided. The 
insurance department has no authority to determine what may or may not create a private 
cause of action. A historical review confirms this. Under the authority of §31-27-1 et 
seq. (prior code), the Utah Insurance Department promulgated its initial set of unfair 
claims practices regulations in 1982. Regulation 82-3, Section 3, p. 3. (Addendum 6). 
These regulations were amended in 1989 which are the present rules. (Addendum 8). 
The 1982 regulations have similar language which Travelers claimed prevented Cannon 
from bringing a cause of action, i.e. no "private right of action." Id. Nonetheless, the 
Utah Supreme Court in Beck (decided in 1985, three years later) clearly indicated that a 
violation of the unfair claims practices may well give rise to an independent tort cause of 
action. 
We recognize that in some cases the acts constituting a breach 
of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are 
independent of the contract and may give rise to causes of 
action in tort. 
* * * 
Also, under various unfair practices acts, there may be statutory 
requirements that give rise to independent causes of action, e.g. 
U.C.A., 1953, §§31-27-1 to-24. 
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Beck, 701 P.2d at 800, n. 3. 
The purposes of the Insurance Code are specifically set out in Section 31A-1-102, 
"[to] ensure that policyholders, claimants, and insurers are treated fairly and equitably." 
(emphasis added). There is ample evident that Travelers violated numerous rules 
regarding fair claims handling, and that Cannon was not "treated fairly and equitably." 
She should therefore be allowed to proceed on this basis. 
B. The Breach of Insurance Industry and Travelers Internal 
Standards Provide Cannon With a Private Cause of Action. 
Industry practice also creates duties in insurers to treat first-party claimants fairly. 
The Unfair Property Casualty Claims Settlement Practices Model Regulation, established 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") serves as a guideline 
by which insurance companies adjust and handle claims. R. 297-304. Travelers itself 
has recognized that its claims handlers must abide by the industry standards. R. 306-
700. See Affidavit of Gary T. Fye. R. 284-285, 297-304, 306-700. Industry standards 
and practices create a duty on Travelers to provide proper claims handling. Travelers 
admits that such standards are proper and have been made a part of Travelers own 
internal policies. Thus, the breach of such a duty is actionable in tort. 
Even if the court were to rule that a violation of the specific acts and regulations 
does not create a private cause of action, the acts and regulations are evidence of industry 
standards, the violation of which can constitute a tort cause of action. This has been 
recognized in a number of cases. For example, in Fulton v. St. Louis-San Francisco 
Railway Co., 675 F.2d 1130 (10th Cir. 1982), the court stated that the failure to comply 
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with relevant national rules or standards of conduct is admissible to determine whether 
the defendant acted reasonable under the circumstances. Though the specific standards 
and rules do not constitute "legal duties", they evidence what the standards should be and 
that the defendant was negligent by violating the standards. Id. at 1133. See also, 
Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1091 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(violations of internal policies may be used to show negligence); Brown v. Cedar Rapids 
and Iowa City Railway Co., 650 F.2d 159, 163 (8th Cir. 1981) (Codes by industry or 
voluntary associations, private codes adopted by an employer, and advisory safety codes 
promulgated by governmental authorities are admissible to show acceptable standards of 
care). 
The unfair claims practices guidelines contained in the model act, and the Utah 
statutes and regulations demonstrate the existence of a tort duty, the violation of which 
would give Cannon a private cause of action herein. Any violation of these would also 
constitute a tort cause of action. For these reasons, the trial court erred in dismissing 
Cannon's Fourth Cause of Action. 
IV. TRAVELERS' PAYMENT OF MEDPAY BENEFITS DID NOT 
CURE ITS BREACH OF LEGAL DUTIES 
Travelers' payment of the policy limit under the Medpay coverage does not cure 
its breach of legal duties. Defendant paid the limits on July 18, 1995, nearly three years 
after the injury and over eight months after Cannon had filed suit to obtain the Medpay 
benefits. The damages and consequences of Travelers' breach have not been resolved 
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despite its late payment. There are clearly questions of fact inappropriate for summary 
judgment regarding the damages resulting from Travelers' misconduct. 
Consequential damages resulting from breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing are recoverable. In the first-party insurance context, traditional notions of 
limited contractual damages are inappropriate and "a broad range of recoverable damages 
[are] conceivable" including attorneys fees and mental anguish. Beck, 701 P.2d at 802; 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) (all types of reasonably 
foreseeable consequences naturally flowing from the breach are recoverable); Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1989) (attorneys fees); Billings, 918 
P.2dat468. 
Travelers' wrongful conduct cannot be automatically extinguished merely because 
it has made the disputed payment while in the throes of litigation. This position is similar 
to that of State Farm's in the case of Campbell v. State Farm, supra, where State Farm 
argued that because it promptly paid the excess judgment when it was affirmed on 
appeal, no bad faith action could be pursued. The Utah Court of Appeals disagreed, 
holding, 
Thus, it is clear as a matter of simple logic, as well as law, that 
the insurer cannot avoid liability by eventually paying the 
excess judgment if damages apart from the judgment have been 
proximately caused by the insurer's unreasonable failure to 
settle. In such a case, payment of the judgment may mitigate or 
limit the insured's damages, but it does not retroactively erase 
damages already sustained. 
Campbell 840 P.2d at 139. 
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Cannon was entitled to Travelers' diligent investigation, fair evaluation, and 
prompt settlement, none of which Travelers honored. This resulted in consequential 
damages to Cannon, for which she may recover. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff/Appellant Carla Cannon seeks to have the trial court's dismissal of her 
action reversed on the grounds that: (1) Cannon is a first party insured and is accordingly 
entitled to the same remedies that any other first party insured has; (2) Travelers owes 
implied duties of good faith and fair dealing to Cannon; and (3) the breach of unfair 
claims statutes, regulations, and industry standards constitutes a tort cause of action that 
Cannon may pursue. The case should therefor be remanded for a trial of the factual 
issues of liability, causation and damages. 
Dated this 28th day of January , 1999. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 




THE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 940906295PI 
The Honorable William A. Thorne 
Plaintiff, Carla Cannon, complains against defendant and alleges as follows: 
1. At all relevant times herein, Carla Cannon was a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
2. At all relevant times herein, defendant was an insurance company authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah and is doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. On or about the 16th day of August, 1992, Carla Cannon was seriously injured on 
the premises at 1326 East 3rd Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. 








jl 5. Prior to August 16, 1992, Scott and Jesselie Anderson acquired and purchased a 
I policy of homeowners insurance from the defendant, which was in full force and effect at all 
li 
j'times mentioned herein and which insured the premises in question. Said policy provided 
([coverage for medical expenses incurred by any guest, resulting from an injury on the insured 
premises. 
6. On or about May 24, 1994 plaintiff (as an unnamed insured) made demand on 
defendant to obtain a copy of defendant's policy and coverage information in order to determine 
j.the extent of her claim against defendant. A copy of said demand is attached hereto as Exhibit 
{A. Defendant refused to reply to such demand and withheld all information regarding said 
policy. 
|j FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
7. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 6 above. 
8. As an unnamed insured plaintiff is entitled to receive from defendant, and defendant 
has a duty to provide, a copy of the full policy in question. 
| 9. Defendant has breached its legal duty to plaintiff, requiring plaintiff to bring this legal 
iaction to obtain a copy of the policy. 
jl 
|j 10. Defendant's actions have been unreasonable and amount to defendant being 
1 stubbornly litigious. 
ii 11. As a result of defendant's wrongful actions plaintiff has incurred attorneys fees, legal 







it || 12. Plaintiff is entitled to recover all of said damage, together with an order requiring 
II 
!l 
^defendant to produce a copy of said policy. 
|j SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
I 13. Plaintiff reallege paragraphs 1 through 12 above. 
! 14. As a result of said accident, Ms. Cannon sustained injuries resulting in medical 
'expenses in excess of $10,000. 
15. In the first part of 1993, the plaintiff submitted to defendant medical records, bills, 
statements, and other documents verifying her medical expenses and the accident on the insured 
premises which proximately caused said medical expenses. Plaintiff made demand upon 
; i 
'[defendant to pay the medical benefits. 
I 16. By reason of said policy plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendant 
[reimbursement for her medical expenses up to the policy limit of $10,000. 
j | 17. Defendant received reasonable proof of plaintiff s claim and had more than sufficient 
time to make payment of the benefits. With the exception of $352.20, defendant failed to pay 
iany benefits pursuant to said demands. Defendant has therefore unreasonably breached the 
j | 
express and implied terms of the policy. 
ij 18. As a proximate result of defendant's breach, plaintiff is entitled to recover from 
i! 
;defendant all consequential damages resulting from said breach including mental distress, the 
*! 
|lack of full physical recovery from her injuries due to her inability to obtain necessary medical 
it 
ji 
;treatment, loss of financial reputation, financial and emotional stress, and other general and 
ii 
I 
j consequential damages in an amount not yet determined. Plaintiff is also entitled to interest at 
jjthe legal rate from the time defendant received reasonable notice of plaintiffs claim until the 
Jdate when defendant made full payment, together with attorneys fees, litigation expenses and 
j court costs, 
i 
|| THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
19. Plaintiff reallege paragraph 1 through 18 above. 
20. At all times mentioned herein, defendant's actions and omissions were performed 
by said defendant's agents and employees who were at all times acting within the purpose and 
scope of their agency and employment, and defendant has ratified and approved the acts of its 
respective agents and employees relating thereto. 
I 21. By entering in the contract of insurance and accepting premiums from Mr. and Mrs. 
|lAnderson, defendant agreed to act in good faith and deal fairly with all named or unnamed 
u 
jinsureds who seek reimbursement for medical expenses arising from accidents covered by 
[defendant's policy. Nevertheless, defendant refused and failed to act in good faith and deal 
fairly with plaintiff, as described below. 
[j 
jj 22. In the absence of a reasonable basis for doing so, and with full knowledge and/or 
j reckless disregard of the consequences, defendant has failed and refused to produce a copy of 
•I 
r 
'.its policy and to indemnify plaintiff under the policy and the laws of Utah. 
|| 
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|| 23. Without a reasonable basis and in bad faith, defendant continued to fail and refuse 
I to respond to plaintiffs claims and demands, forcing her into litigation for almost a year before 
!i 
Ijmaking payments under the policy. 
h 
ji 
J 24. Defendant has pursued said course of conduct intentionally, maliciously, in conscious 
[disregard of the rights of plaintiff, and/or with reckless disregard of the circumstances of the 
Iplaintiff and the likelihood of causing plaintiff financial, emotional and mental distress and/or 
at all times to further its own economic interest at the expense of plaintiff s economic interest, 
mental health and physical well being. 
J 25. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of defendant, plaintiff has suffered 
emotional and mental trauma. She has incurred interest and penalties on the delinquent amounts 
owing to her healthcare providers, and she was unable to obtain the reasonable and necessary 
Imedical treatment to effect full recovery from her injuries due to her inability to pay for said 
treatment. Plaintiff has suffered other consequential and general damages in an amount not yet 
jj 
i (determined. 
26. As a further direct and proximate result of the conduct of the defendant, plaintiff has 
incurred and will incur economic detriment, including, but not limited to, the loss of financial 
|opportunity, loss of credit reputation, attorneys fees, costs and expenses of litigation and other 
ji 
(special and general damages in an amount not yet determined. 
|l 
J; 27. Defendant is liable for all special, general and other consequential damages as 
j< 
(described above, and for punitive damages. 
I 5 ll Kb 
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|| FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
| 28. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 27 above. 
29. State law, administrative regulations of the Utah Insurance Department, insurance 
(industry standards for adjusting claims and defendant's internal company policies concerning the 
Ijproper adjustment of claims imposed various tort and contractual duties on defendant including: 
|(1) to investigate plaintiffs claims, (2) to fairly evaluate her claims, (3) to thereafter act 
Ipromptly and reasonably to pay said claims, (4) to deal with plaintiff as a lay person and not as 
| an expert in the subtleties of insurance law and underwriting, (5) to refrain from actions which 
jjwould injure plaintiffs and the named insured's abilities to obtain the benefits of said insurance 
jjpolicy, (6) to treat plaintiff as a first party claimant rather than a third party claimant, and (7) 
.to otherwise act in good faith and deal fairly with its named or unnamed insureds. 
30. In addition to the general duties as specified above, defendant breached specific 
Jstatutes and rules applicable to insurers in the state of Utah, including but not limited to the 
.following: 
| a. Section 31 A-26-303(2)(c) U.C. A., as amended, when defendant attempted 
ito force plaintiff to settle her third party claims against the tort feasor who caused the injuries 
|| 
1 in question, by refusing to pay the first party medical benefits owing under the policy unless 
ji 
i'plaintiff would settle said third party claim; 
|! 
;t b. Section 31A-26-303(3)(a) U.C.A., as amended, in failing to timely and 
i| 
jreasonably respond to plaintiff's communications; 
I $\ 
J c. Section 31A-26-303(3)(c) U.C.A., as amended, by forcing plaintiff into 
[litigation to enforce her rights and claims when her first party claims were reasonably clear and 
nwere owing; 
j| d. Section 31A-26-303(3)(e) U.C.A., as amended, by refusing and failing to 
liprovide explanations for its denial and/or its low offer in settlement; 
i e. Section 31 A-26-303(3)(h) U.C. A., as amended, by not acting in good faith 
jto settle the claim; 
f. Rule 590-89-7(E) Unfair Claims Practices Rules, Insurance Department, 
State of Utah, by refusing to pay plaintiffs claim without conducting a reasonable investigation; 
g. Rule 590-89-7(F) Unfair Claims Practices rules, Insurance Department, 
llState of Utah, by offering substantially less than the amount that is owing under the policy; 
I h. Rule 590-89-7(H) Unfair Claims Practices rules, Insurance Department, 
'State of Utah, by refusing and not paying plaintiff's claim within thirty days after a reasonable 
rproof of loss; 
I i. Rule 590-89-7(J) Unfair Claims Practices rules, Insurance Department, 
ji 
fState of Utah, by suggesting to plaintiff that plaintiff may recover less money if she were to 
!i 
i: 
jretain an attorney; 
j l 
j ! j . Rule 590-89-7(P) Unfair Claims Practices rules, Insurance Department, 
I! 
;State of Utah, by refusing to give plaintiff any written explanation of its denial; 
ji 
II 7 
j! k. Rule 590-89-7(R) Unfair Claims Practices rules, Insurance Department, 
I State of Utah, by refusing to pay plaintiffs reasonably incurred expenses when such expenses 
It 
j resulted from defendant's delay in payment of plaintiffs claims; 
1. Rule 590-89-7(T) Unfair Claims Practices rules, Insurance Department, 
ijState of Utah, by failing to pay interest on the amounts that defendant should have timely paid. 
m. Rule 590-89-9(A) by failing to disclose or fully disclose the first party 
coverage available to plaintiff which covered her medical expenses; 
! n. Rule 590-89-9(B) by concealing from plaintiff benefits and coverages 
available under the insurance policy in question; 
o. Rule 590-89-10(A) by failing to acknowledge plaintiffs claim within 15 
days; 
p. Rule 590-89-10(D) by failing to provide plaintiff with the necessary forms, 
I instructions and reasonable assistance to comply with the policy conditions in order to receive 
U 
j l 
!first party benefits; 
! q. Rule 590-89-11 by refusing and failing to complete a reasonable 
i 
investigation within 40 days after defendant received notice of plaintiffs claim; 
U 
il 
|j r. Rule 590-89-12(A) by refusing and failing to give plaintiff a statement and 
it 
u 
•explanation of the proof required under the policy to obtain benefits; 
8 
|| s. Rule 590-89-12(B) by refusing and failing to complete its investigation 
i | 
l|within 30 days, failing to accept or deny plaintiffs claim within said time period and failing to 
provide any explanation of why the investigation could not be completed within 30 days; 
t. Rule 590-89-12(C) by refusing to promptly pay plaintiffs claim within 30 
days after written notice; and 
I! 
J u. By the violation of other statutes, rules and regulations applicable to the 
defendant in these circumstances. 
31. Defendant breached said duties, which breach proximately caused special, general 
and other consequential damages to plaintiff, the amount of which will be established at the time 
j'of trial. 
32. Defendant has pursued said course of conduct intentionally, maliciously, in conscious 
'disregard of the rights of plaintiff, and/or with reckless disregard of the circumstances of the 
plaintiff and the likelihood of causing plaintiff financial, emotional and mental distress and/or 
! at all t imes to further its own economic interest at the expense of p la in t i f f s economic interest, 
I mental health and physical well being. 
I 3 3 . Defendant is liable for all special, general and other consequential damages as 
I described above, and for punitive damages . 
i 
ii W H E R E F O R E , plaintiff prays for judgment against defendant as follows: 
ii 




b. All special, general and other consequential damages to be proven at the time 
|of trial; 
c. Exemplary and punitive damages as established at the time of trial; 
d. Attorneys fees, costs, expenses of litigation and prejudgment interest all as 
i(determined at the time of trial; 
e. An order requiring defendant to produce a complete copy of its full policy and 
(declaration sheet applicable at the time of the accident; and 
f. Such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this ^ _ day of Beeem&er, 199?. 




~. itich Hum^her^s, 






> *.- * ^ 
HOMEOWNERS POLICY 
5 A Policy From One of Your Travelers Companies 
TheTravelersT Dwelling Form 6 3 0 
V5\ 


















Location of Your Residence 
Policy Period 
Coverages 







Coverage A—Dwelling . . 
Coverage B—Other Structures 
Coverage C—Personal Property 
Coverage D—Loss of Use 
Additional Coverages . . 
Loss Deductible 
PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS . 
CONDITIONS 
Your Duties After Loss . 
Loss Settlement 
COVERAGES 
Coverage E—Personal Liability 
Coverage F—Medical Payments 
to Others 
EXCLUSIONS . . . . 
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
CONDITIONS 
Limit of Liability . . . 
Duties After Loss . . . 
CONDITIONS 
Policy Period . . . . 
Cancellation . . . . 















. . 19 













. . 39 
. . 45 
COVERAGES 
(Continued on next page) 
Edition C4 of Policy Form 630 








INSURING AGREEMENT 45 
CLASSES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 45 
NEWLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY 47 
PERILS INSURED AGAINST 47 
LOSS DEDUCTIBLE 47 
GENERAL EXCLUSIONS 48 
TERRITORIAL LIMITS 49 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS 49 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 49 
PART I DEFINITIONS 52 
PART II INSURING AGREEMENT 55 
PART III DEFENSE AND ADDITIONAL 
COVERAGES 55 
PART IV DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNTS 57 
PART V EXCLUSIONS 58 
PART VI CONDITIONS 62 
HOMEOWNERS i JL1CY 
The Travelers Insurance Companies 
Hartford, Connecticut 
(Each a Stock Insurance Company) 
AGREEMENT 
For payment of premiums when due; and subject 
to all the terms of this policy, we will provide the 
coverages you have selected These are indicated 
by premium entries in the Declarations The 
amounts of insurance (limits of liability) you 
have chosen are also shown there The Declara 
tions is a part of this policy 
DEFINITIONS 
In this policy, "you" and "your" refer to the 
NAMED INSURED shown in the Declarations and 
the spouse if a resident of the same household 
"We", "us" and "our" refer to the member com-
pany of The Travelers providing this insurance 
and shown as the INSURER in the Declarations 
In addition, certain other words and phrases, 
when printed in quotation marks, have specific 
meanings when used in this policy These are de-
fined as follows 
1 "bodily injury" means bodily harm, sick-
ness or disease, including required care, 
loss of services and death that results 
"Bodily injury" also includes "personal in-
jury" 
2 "business" includes trade, profession or 
occupation 
3 "clerical office employee" means an em-
ployee whose duties are clerical and 
wholly confined to an office It does not 
mean any "insured" who owns or finan-
cially controls a "business" or who is a 
partner or member of a partnership that 
owns or financially controls a "business" 
4 "insured" means you and residents of 
your household who are 
1 ItTb 
a. your relat ; or 
b. other persons under the age of 21 and in 
the care of any person named above. 
Under Section II, "insured" also means: 
c. with respect to animals or watercraft to 
which this policy applies, any person or 
organization legally responsible for 
these animals or watercraft which are 
owned by you or any person included in 
4.a. or 4.b. above. A person or organiza-
tion using or having custody of these 
animals or watercraft in the course of 
any "business" or without consent of 
the owner is not an "insured"; 
d. with respect to any vehicle to which 
this policy applies: 
(1) persons while engaged in your em-
ploy or that of any person included 
in 4.a. or 4.b. above; or 
(2) other persons using the vehicle on 
an "insured location" with your 
consent. 
Under Sections I and II, "insured" also in-
cludes: 
e. any ADDITIONAL INSURED named in 
the Declarations but only with respect 
to Coverages A, B, E and F and only for 
the "residence premises". 
5. "insured location" means: 
a. the "residence premises"; 
b. the part of other premises, other struc-
tures and grounds used by you as a resi-
dence and: 
(1) which is shown in the Declarations 
as an ADDITIONAL RESIDENCE; or 
(2) which is acquired by you during the 
policy period for your use as a resi-
dence; 
c. any premises used by you in connection 
with a premises in 5.a. or 5.b. above; 
d. any part of a premises: 
(1) not owned by an "insured"; and 
(2) where an "insured" is temporarily 
residing; 
e. vacant lane j ther t farm land, 
owned by or rented to an "insured"; 
f. land owned by or rented to an "insured" 
on which a one or two family dwelling is 
being built as a residence for an "in-
sured"; 
g. individual or family cemetery plots or 
burial vaults of an "insured"; 
h. any part of a premises occasionally 
rented to an "insured" for other than 
"business" use; or 
i. any premises owned by you and rented 
to others for use as a residence by not 
more than two families if shown in the 
Declarations as a ONE OR TWO FAMILY 
DWELLING RENTED TO OTHERS. 
6. "occurrence" means an accident, includ-
ing continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful 
conditions, which results, during the policy 
period, in: 
a. "bodily injury"; or 
b. "property damage". 
7. "personal injury" means injury arising 
out of one or more of the following of-
fenses: 
a. false arrest, detention or imprisonment, 
or malicious prosecution; 
b. libel, slander or defamation of charac-
ter; or 
c. invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction 
or wrongful entry. 
8. "property damage" means physical injury 
to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible 
property. 
9. "residence employee" means: 
a. an employee of an "insured" whose du-
ties are related to the maintenance or 
use of the "residence premises", includ-
ing household or domestic services; or 
b. one who performs similar duties else-
where not related to the "business" of 
an "insured". 
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10. "residence pi Ises" me 
a. the one family dwelling, other struc-
tures, and grounds; or 
b. that part of any other building; 
where you reside and which is shown as 
the "residence premises" in the Declara-
tions. 
"Residence premises" also means a two 
family dwelling where you reside in at 
least one of the family units and which is 
shown as the RESIDENCE PREMISES in 
the Declarations. 
SECTION 1—PROPERTY COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A —DWELLING 
We cover: 
1. the dwelling on the "residence premises" 
shown in the Declarations, including struc-
tures attached to the dwelling; and 
2. materials and supplies located on or next 
to the "residence premises" used to con-
struct, alter or repair the dwelling or other 
structures on the "residence premises". 
This coverage does not apply to land, including 
land on which the dwelling is located, except as 
provided under Additional Coverage 11. Land. 
COVERAGE B—OTHER STRUCTURES 
We cover other structures on the "residence 
premises" set apart from the dwelling by clear 
space. This includes structures connected to the 
dwelling by only a fence, utility line, or similar 
connection. 
This coverage does not apply to land, including 
land on which the other structures are located, 
except as provided under Additional Coverage 
11. Land. 
We do not cover other structures: 
1. used in whole or in part for "business". 
This does not include the incidental and 
temporary storage of "business" property; 
2. rented or held for rental to any person not 
a tenant of the dwelling, unless used solely 
as a private residence or private garage. 
The limit of liability r 'his cov *e will not be 
more than 10% of the limit of i. ^ility that ap-
plies to Coverage A, unless an amount is shown 
in the Declarations for Coverage B. Use of this 
coverage does not reduce the Coverage A limit of 
liability. 
COVERAGE C—PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We cover personal property owned or used by an 
"insured" while it is anywhere in the world. At 
your request, we will cover personal property 
owned by: 
1. others while the property is on the part of 
the "residence premises" occupied by an 
"insured"; 
2. a guest or a "residence employee", while 
the property is in any residence occupied 
by an "insured". 
Our limit of liability for personal property usu-
ally located at an "insured's" residence, other 
than the "residence premises", is 10% of the limit 
of liability for Coverage C, or $1,000, whichever 
is greater. Personal property in a newly acquired 
principal residence is not subject to this limita-
tion. 
Special Limits of Liability. These limits do not in-
crease the Coverage C limit of liability. The spe-
cial limit for each numbered category below is 
the total limit for each loss for all property in 
that category. 
1. $1,000 on money, bank notes, bullion, gold 
other than goldware, silver other than 
silverware, platinum, coins and medals. 
2. $5,000 on securities, accounts, deeds, evi-
dences of debt, letters of credit, notes 
other than bank notes, manuscripts, per-
sonal records, passports, tickets and 
stamps. This dollar limit applies to these 
categories regardless of the medium (such 
as paper or computer software) on which 
the material exists. 
However, when this property is located in 
an off premises commercial or bank vault 
or safety deposit box this special limit of 
liability does not apply. 
ISS 
This limit inch the cost -esearch, re-
place or restore che information from the 
lost or damaged material 
3 $2,500 on watercraft, including their trail-
ers, furnishings, equipment and outboard 
motors 
4 $3,000 on trailers not used with water-
craft 
5 $5,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or los-
ing of jewelry, watches, furs, precious and 
semi-precious stones 
6 $6,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or los-
ing of firearms 
7 $ 10,000 for loss by theft, misplacing or los-
ing of si lverware, silver-plated ware, 
goidware, gold-plated ware and 
pewterware This includes flatware, hol-
lowware, tea sets, trays and trophies made 
of or including silver, gold or pewter 
8 $10,000 on property, on the "residence 
premises'', used at any time or in any man-
ner for any "business" purpose 
9 $1,000 on property, away from the "resi-
dence premises", used at any time or m 
any manner for any "business" purpose 
Property Not Covered. We do not cover 
1 articles separately described and specifi-
cally insured in this or other insurance ex-
cept as provided in Coverage Y, if applica-
ble, 
2 animals, birds or fish, 
3 motor vehicles or all other motorized land 
conveyances This includes the following 
while in or upon the vehicle or conveyance 
a equipment and accessories, or 
b radio receivers, transmitters, transceiv-
ers, telephones, tape decks, or other 
similar electronic equipment, if de-
signed to operate from the electrical 
system of the vehicle or conveyance 
This includes accessories, antennas, 
tapes, wires or discs for use with such 
equipment 
We do cover ides or iveyances not 
subject to motor vehicle registration which 
are 
a used to service an " insured ' s" resi-
dence, or 
b designed for assisting the handicapped, 
4 aircraft and parts Aircraft means any con-
trivance used or designed for flight, except 
model or hobby aircraft not used or de-
signed to carry people or cargo, 
5 property of roomers, boarders and other 
tenants, except property of roomers and 
boarders related to an "insured", 
6 property in an apartment regularly rented 
or held for rental to others by an "in-
sured", 
7 property rented or held for rental to others 
off the "residence premises", 
8 "business" data, including such data 
stored in 
c books of account, drawings or other pa-
per records, or 
b electronic data processing tapes, wires, 
records, discs or other software media 
However, we do cover the cost of blank re-
cording or storage media, and of pre-re-
corded computer programs available on 
the retail market 
9 credit cards or fund transfer cards except 
as provided in Additional Coverage 6 
10 We do not cover food in a refrigerator or 
freezer except as provided in Additional 
Coverage 13 
COVERAGE D—LOSS OF USE 
1 If a loss covered under Section I makes 
that part of the "residence premises" 
where you reside not fit to live in, we 
cover, at your choice, either of the follow-
ing However, if the "residence premises" 
is not your principal place of residence, we 
will not provide the option under para-
graph b below 
a Additional Living Expense, meaning 
any necessary increase in living ex-
6 7 
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penses incu d by yoi J that your 
household can maintain its normal stan-
dard of living; or 
b. Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair 
rental value of that part of the "resi-
dence premises" where you reside less 
any expenses that do not continue while 
the premises is not fit to live in. 
Payment under a. or b, w ill be for the 
shortest time required to repair or replace 
the damage or, if you permanently relo-
cate, the shortest time required for your 
household to settle elsewhere. 
2. If a loss covered under Section I makes 
that par t of the "residence premises" 
rented to others or held for rental by you 
not fit to live in, we cover the: 
Fair Rental \ aliie, meaning the fair 
rental value of that part of the "resi-
dence premises" rented to others or held 
for rental by you less any expenses that 
do not continue while the premises is 
not fit to live in. 
Payment will be for the shortest time re-
quired to repair or replace that part of the 
premises rented or held for rental. 
3. If a civil authority prohibits you from use 
of the "residence premises" as a result of 
direct damage to neighboring premises by 
a Peril Insured Against in this policy, we 
cover the Additional Living Expense or 
Fair Rental Value loss provided under 1 
and 2 above for no more than 30 days. 
he periods of time under 1, 2 and 3 above are 
not limited by expiration of this policy 
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancella-
tion of a lease or agreement. 
DDITIONAL COVERAGES 
1, Debris Removal. We will pay your reasoi t; U »!.< \ 
expense for the removal of: 
a. debris of covered property if a Peril In-
sured Against that applies to the dam™ 
aged property causes the loss; or 
b. ash, dust or particles from a volcanic 
eruption that has caused direct loss to a 
building or pr _ jrty con,, .ned in a build-
ing. 
We will also pay your reasonable expense 
for the removal from the "residence prem-
ises" of: 
a. your tree felled by the peril of Windstorm 
or I I ail; 
b. your tree felled by the peril of Weight of 
Ice, Snow or Sleet; or 
c. a neighbor's tree felled by a Peril Insured 
Against under Coverage C; 
provided the tree damages a covered struc-
ture. 
2. Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reason-
able cost incurred by you for necessary re-
pairs made solely to protect covered prop-
erty from further damage if a Peril Insured 
Against causes the loss. This coverage does 
not increase the limit of liability that applies 
to the property being repaired. 
3. Trees, Shrubs and Other Plants. We cover 
trees, shrubs, plants or lawns on the "resi-
dence premises", for loss caused by the fol-
lowing Perils Insured Against: Fire or light-
ning, Explosion, Riot or civil commotion, 
Aircraft, Vehicles not owned or operated by 
a resident of the "residence premises", Van-
dalism or malicious mischief or Theft. 
The limit of liability for this coverage will 
not be more than 5% of the limit of liability 
that applies to the dwelling or more than 
$1,000 for any one tree, shrub or plant. We 
do not cover property grown for "business" 
purposes. 
This coverage is additional insurance. 
% Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay 
up to $1,000 for your liability assumed by 
contract or agreement for fire department 
charges incurred when the fire department is 
called to save or protect covered property 
from a Peril Insured Against. 
This coverage is additional insurance. No de-
ductible applies to this coverage. 
8 9 Ibi 
5. Property Remov vVe insur vered prop-
erty against direct loss from any cause while 
being removed from a premises endangered 
by a Peril Insured Against and for no more 
than 90 days while removed. This coverage 
does not change the \\m\l of \\ab\hty that ap-
plies to the property being removed. 
6. Credit Cards, Fund Transfer Cards, Forgery 
and Counterfeit Money. 
a. We will pay for loss to an "insured": 
(1) resulting from theft or unauthorized 
use of credit cards issued to or regis-
tered in an "insured's" name; 
(2) resulting from theft or unauthorized 
use of fund transfer cards used for 
deposit, withdrawal or transfer of 
funds, issued to or registered to an 
' ' insured's" name; 
(3) resulting from forgery or alteration 
of any check or negotiable instru-
ment; and 
(4) resulting from acceptance in good 
faith of counterfeit United States or 
Canadian paper currency. 
b. The most we will pay is $L0,000 for all 
loss made possible by one event, regard-
less of the number of cards, checks, bills, 
instruments or transactions involved. Un-
der this coverage, "event" means: 
(1) a single theft or loss of any number of 
credit cards, fund transfer cards, 
checks or negotiable instruments; 
(2) the acceptance of all counterfeit 
money from any one person; and 
(3) the acquisition of an "insured's" ac-
count number or identification code 
by another person. 
c. We do not cover use of credit cards or 
fund transfer cards: 
(1) by a resident of your household; 
(2) by a person who has been entrusted 
with either type of card; or 
(3) if an "insured" has not complied with 
all terms and conditions under which 
the cards are issued. 
d. We do not coT loss an , out of "busi-
ness" use or dishonesty of an "insured". 
e. This coverage is additional insurance. No 
deductible applies to this coverage. 
f w e will defend any lawsuit brought 
against an "insured" for the losses de-
scribed in 6.a.(l) , 6.a.(2) and 6.a.(3) 
above. We may investigate or settle any 
claim or lawsuit. Our obligation to pay or 
defend ends when the applicable limit of 
liability is used up by the payment of 
judgments or settlements. 
7. Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $10,000 
for your share of any loss assessment 
charged during the policy period against you 
by a corporation or association of property 
owners. This only applies when the assess-
ment is made as a result of each direct loss 
to the property, owned by all members col-
lectively, caused by a Peril Insured Against 
under Coverage A—Dwelling. We do not 
cover earthquake or land shock waves or 
tremors before, during or after a volcanic 
eruption unless Coverage O—Earthquake 
applies. 
This coverage applies only to loss assess-
ments charged against you as owner or ten-
ant of the "residence premises". 
We do not cover loss assessments charged 
against you or a corporation or association 
of property owners by any governmental 
body. 
8. Landlord's Furnishings. We cover your prop-
erty in an apartment on the "residence 
premises" which you rent or hold for rental 
to others. Coverage is limited to household 
furnishings. We insure for direct physical 
loss to this property caused by a Peril In-
sured Against under Coverage C, except 
theft. 
Our limit of liability for this coverage is 
$10,000. 
9. Inflation Coverage. The limit of liability 
shown in the Declarations for Coverage A— 
Dwelling, will be adjusted at the time of loss 
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to reflect any in^_ .ase in UK _ost of con-
struction as reported to us by a recognized 
appraisal company. Corresponding adjust-
ments will also be made in the limits of lia-
bility for Coverages B, C and D. In no event 
will these adjustments result in limits less 
than those shown in the Declarations for 
these coverages. 
The amount of increase will be calculated 
from the effective date of the policy period 
shown in the Declarations to the date of the 
loss. If the limit of liability for Coverage A is 
changed at your request during the policy 
period, we will use the effective date of 
change in place of the effective date of the 
policy to calculate the increase. 
J. Building Additions and Alterations. We cover 
additions, alterations and improvements, 
made or acquired at the " insured 's" ex-
pense, to that part of a building which is 
rented to the "insured" as a residence. We 
insure for direct physical loss to this prop-
erty caused by a Peril Insured Against. Our 
limit of liability for this coverage is $1,000. 
I I. Land. Whenever there is a covered loss to 
your dwelling or other permanent structure 
and the related repair or rebuilding requires 
excavation, replacement, or stabilization of 
land under or around your dwelling or other 
permanent structure, we will also pay up to 
10% of the amount of the covered loss to 
your dwelling or other permanent structure 
for the excavation, replacement, or stabiliza-
tion of the land. 
12. Collapse. We insure for direct physical loss 
to covered property involving collapse of a 
building or any part of a building caused 
only by one or more of the following: 
a. Perils Insured Against in Coverage A and 
B; 
I), hidden decay; 
c. hidden insect or vermin damage; 
d. weight of contents, equipment, animals or 
people; 
e. weight of rain v\ Inch col In is on ,i im i r 
f. use of defect mateii ,i methods in 
construction, remodeling or renovation if 
the collapse occurs during the course of 
the construction, remodeling or renova-
tion. 
Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement, 
swimming pool, underground pipe, flue, 
drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation, re-
taining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf or dock is 
not included under items b., c , d., e. and f. 
unless the loss is a direct result of the col-
lapse of a building. 
Collapse does not include settling, cracking, 
shrinking, bulging or expansion. 
This coverage does not increase the limit of 
liability applying to the damaged covered 
property 
This additional coverage does in.i aijt 
Coverage C—Personal Property. 
13. Refrigerated Food Spoilage. We cover food 
in a refrigerator or freezer on the "residence 
premises" for direct physical loss caused by 
a change in temperature due to: 
a. Interruption of electrical power to the re 
frigeration equipment; or 
b. mechanical breakdown or electrical fail 
ure of the refrigeration unit. 
The most we will pay is $1,000. We will pa> 
only the part of the loss that exceeds $50. 
Any other loss to refrigerated food caused 
by a Peril Insured Against is covered up to 
the limit of Coverage C of the policy. The 
policy deductible will apply. 
14 I ock Replacement. We will pay up to $500 
for the reasonable costs incurred by you to 
replace the locks at the "residence prem 
ises" when your keys to the "residence 
premises" have been lost or stolen. No de-
ductible applies to this coverage. 
15. Reward Coverage. We will pay up to $1,000 
for the payment of rewards you have in-
curred for information leading to the return 
of stolen articles or the arrest and conviction 
of any person(s) who have stolen articles or 
damaged any of your covered property. 
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16. Data Replacemer. <Ve will pa, up to $5,000 
to recreate personal records or data stored 
on a tape, record, disc or other media de-
signed for use with a computer on the "resi-
dence premises". 
LOSS DEDUCTIBLE 
In case of a loss covered under Section I, we will 
pay only the part of the loss over the applicable 
deductible amount stated in the Declarations. 
However, if the amount of the covered loss is 
equal to or greater than $50,000 we will waive 
the first $500 of any deductible. 
SECTION I —PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
We insure the property described in Coverages A, 
B and C against risks of direct physical loss, sub-
ject to the following Exclusions, the Section I— 
General Exclusions, and other provisions of this 
policy. 
1. Coverage A, Coverage B and Coverage C 
Exclusions 
We do not cover loss caused by: 
a. freezing of a plumbing, heating, air con-
ditioning or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system or of a household appli-
ance, or by discharge, leakage or over-
flow from within the system or appliance 
caused by freezing. This exclusion ap-
plies only while the dwelling is vacant, 
unoccupied or being constructed, unless 
you have used reasonable care to: 
(1) maintain heat in the building; or 
(2) shut off the water supply and drain 
the system and appliances of water; 
b. freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of 
water or ice, whether driven by wind or 
not, to a: 
(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming 
pool; 
(2) foundation, retaining wall or bulk-
head; or 
(3) pier, wharf or dock; 
c. theft in or to a dwelling under construc-
tion, or of materials and supplies for use 
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in the constr 'on unt ie dwelling is 
finished and occupied; 
d. (1) wear and tear, marring, deteriora-
tion; 
(2) inherent vice, latent defect, mechani-
cal breakdown; 
(3) smog, rust, mold, wet or dry rot; 
(4) smoke from agricultural smudging or 
industrial operations; 
(5) release, discharge or dispersal of 
contaminants or pollutants; 
(6) settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging 
or expansion of pavements, patios, 
foundations, walls, floors, roofs or 
ceilings; or 
(7) birds, vermin, rodents, insects or do-
mestic animals. 
If any of these cause water damage not oth-
erwise excluded, from a plumbing, heating, 
air conditioning or automatic fire protec-
tive sprinkler system or household appli-
ance, we cover loss caused by the water in-
cluding the cost of tearing out and replac-
ing any par t of a building or grounds 
necessary to repair the system or appli-
ance. 
We do not cover loss to the system or appli-
ance from which this water escaped. 
Under items a. through d., any ensuing loss to 
property described in Coverages A, B and C 
not excluded or excepted in this policy is cov-
ered. 
2. Coverage A and Coverage B Exclusions 
We do not cover loss: 
a. caused by vandalism and malicious mis-
chief or breakage of glass and safety 
glazing materials if the dwelling has been 
vacant for more than 30 consecutive days 
immediately before the loss. A dwelling 
being constructed is not considered va-
cant. 
b. involving collapse, other than as pro-
vided in Additional Coverage 12. How-
ever, any ensuing loss to property de-
scribed in Coverages A and B not ex-
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eluded or ^pted in is policy is 
covered. 
3verage C Exclusions 
e do not cover loss caused by: 
a. breakage of: 
(1) eyeglasses, glassware, statuary, mar-
ble; 
(2) bric-a-brac, porcelains and similar 
fragile articles other than jewelry, 
watches, bronzes, cameras and pho 
tographic lenses. 
There is coverage for breakage of the 
property by or resulting from: 
(1) fire, lightning, windstorm, hail; 
(2) smoke, other than smoke from agri-
cultural smudging or industrial oper-
ations; 
(3) explosion, riot, civil commotion; 
(4) aircraft, vehicles, vandalism and ma-
licious mischief, earthquake, or vol-
canic eruption; 
(5) collapse of a building or any part of a 
building; 
(6) water not otherwise excluded; 
(7) theft or attempted theft; or 
(8) sudden and accidental tearing apart, 
cracking, burning or bulging of: 
(a) a steam or hot water heating sys-
tem; 
(b) an air conditioning or automatic 
fire protective sprinkler system; 
or 
(c) an appliance for heating water; 
b. dampness of atmosphere or extremes of 
temperature unless the direct cause of 
loss is rain, snow, sleet or hail; 
c. refinishing, renovating or repairing prop-
erty other than watches, jewelry and 
furs; 
d. collision, other than collision with a land 
vehicle, sinking, swamping or stranding 
of watercraft, including their trailers, 
furnishings, equipment &nd outboard mo-
tors; 
e. destructior .-.i-.t seizure by or-
der of any government o, public author-
ity; or 
f. acts or decisions, including the failure to 
act or decide, of any person, group, orga-
nization or governmental body. However, 
any ensuing loss to property described iiI 
Coverage C not excluded or excepted i 
this policy is covered. 
SECTION I —GENERAL EXCLUSIONS 
1. These additional exclusions apply to Cover-
ages A, B and C. We do not insure for loss 
caused directly or indirectly by any of the 
following, regardless of any other cause or 
event contributing concurrently or in any se-
quence to the loss: 
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of 
any ordinance or law regulating the con-
struction, repair, or demolition of a build-
ing or other structure, except as provided 
under Loss Settlement in Section I—Con-
ditions 
b. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake in-
cluding land shock waves or t remors 
before, during or after a volcanic erup-
tion; landslide; mudflow; earth sinking, 
rising or shifting; unless direct loss by: 
(1) fire or explosion; 
(2) theft; or 
(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing 
material which is part of a building, 
storm door or storm window; 
ensues and then we will pay only for the 
ensuing loss. 
This exclusion applies only to property 
described in Coverages A and B. 
c. Water Damage, meaning: 
( t ) flood, surface water, waves, tidal 
water, overflow of a body of water, or 
spray from any of these, whether or 
not driven by wind; 
(2) water below the surface of the 
ground, including water which exerts 
pressure on or seeps or leaks through 
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a build sidewall riveway, foun-
dation, swimming pool or other struc-
ture. 
Direct loss by fire, explosion or theft re-
sulting from water damage is covered. 
Water damage indirectly caused by fire, 
vehicles, aircraft or vandalism or mali-
cious mischief is also covered. 
Paragraphs (1) and (3) of this exclusion 
do not apply to any insured direct physi-
cal loss by water from any plumbing, 
heating, air conditioning or automatic fire 
protective sprinkler system on the "resi-
dence premises". 
Water damage to property described in 
Coverage C away from a premises or loca-
tion owned, rented, occupied or controlled 
by an "insured" is covered. 
Water damage to property described in 
Coverage C on a premises or location 
owned, rented, occupied or controlled by 
an "insured" is excluded even if weather 
conditions contribute in any way to pro-
duce the loss. 
d. Neglect, meaning neglect of the "insured" 
to use all reasonable means to save and 
preserve property at and after the time of 
a loss. 
e. War, including undeclared war, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, war-
like act by a military force or military per-
sonnel, destruction or seizure or use for a 
military purpose, and including any con-
sequence of any of these. Discharge of a 
nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike 
act even if accidental. 
f. Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth in 
the Nuclear Hazard Clause of Section I— 
Conditions. 
g. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising 
out of any act committed: 
(1) by or at the direction of an "insured"; 
and 
(2) with the intent to cause a loss. 
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2. We do not ins for lc o property de-
scribed in Coverages A and B caused by any 
of the following. However, any ensuing loss 
to property described in Coverages A and B 
not excluded or excepted in this policy is 
covered. 
a. Weather Conditions. However, this exclu-
sion only applies if weather conditions 
contribute in any way with a cause or 
event excluded in paragraph 1. above to 
produce the loss; 
b. Acts or Decisions, including the failure to 
act or decide, of any person, group, orga-
nization or governmental body; 
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective: 
(1) planning, zoning, development, sur-
veying, siting; 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, 
repair, construction, renovation, re-
modeling, grading, compaction; 
(3) materials used in repair, construction, 
renovation or remodeling; or 
(4) maintenance; 
of part or all of any property whether on 
or off the "residence premises". 
SECTION I —CONDITIONS 
1. Insurable Interest and Limit of Liability. Even 
if more than one person has an insurable in-
terest in the property covered, we will not 
be liable in any one loss to the "insured" for 
more than the amount of the "insured's" in-
terest at the time of loss. However, the most 
we will pay is the applicable limit of liabil-
ity. 
2. Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to 
covered property, you must see that the fol-
lowing are done: 
a. give prompt notice to us. You may phone 
our Instant Claim Service or contact your 
agent; 
b. notify the police in case of loss by theft; 
c. notify the credit card or fund transfer 
card companies in case of loss under 
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Credit Cards inid Tia i Cards cov-
erage; 
d. (1) protect the property froi i i fi n ihei 
loss; 
(2) make reasonable and necessary re-
pairs to protect the property; and 
(3) keep an accurate record of repair ex-
penses; 
e. prepare a detailed inventory of personal 
property claimed. The inventory must in-
clude a description of the property, quan-
tity, replacement cost, amount of depreci-
ation and amount of loss. Attach all bills, 
receipts and related papers that support 
your inventory; 
f. as often as we reasonably require: 
(1) show the damaged property; 
(2) provide us with records and docu-
ments we request and permit us to 
make copies; and 
(3) submit to examination under oath; 
g. send to us, within 60 days after our re-
quest, your signed, sworn proof of loss 
which sets forth, to the best of your 
knowledge and belief: 
(1) the time and cause of loss; 
(2) the interest of the "insured" and all 
others in the property involved and 
all liens on the property; 
(3) other insurance which mav --^v. 
loss; 
(4) changes in title or occupancy of the 
property during the term of the pol-
icy; 
(5) specifications of damaged buildings 
and detailed repair estimates; 
(6) the inventory of personal property 
described in 2.e. above; 
(7) receipts for additional living ex-
penses incurred and records that sup-
port the fair rental value loss; and 
(8) evidence or affidavit that supports a 
claim under the Credit Cards, Fund 
Transfer Cards, Forgery and Counter-
feit MOP ' cover* stating the 
amount a. cause o. ,ss. 
3 Loss Settlement. Covered property losses 
are settled as follows: 
a. (1) personal property; 
(2) awnings, carpeting, household appli-
ances, outdoor antennas and outdoor 
equipment, whether or not attached 
to buildings; and 
(3) structures that are not buildings; 
at the replacement cost at the time of 
loss. For articles separately described 
and specifically insured in this policy or a 
Personal Articles Policy issued to you by 
us, this settlement provision will be ex-
cess over the amount recoverable under 
such other insurance. 
We will pay no more than I he least of the 
following amounts: 
a. replacement cost at the time of loss 
without deduction for depreciation; 
b. the full cost of repair at the time of 
loss; 
c. the limit of liabilit\ i i i <u a pj" 11 -
Coverage C; or 
d. any applicable special limits of lia-
bility stated in this policy. 
We will not pay more than the actual cost 
to repair or replace, less deduction for de-
preciation, at the time of loss for any of 
the following: 
a. antiques, fine arts, paintings and 
similar articles of rarity or antiq 
uity which cannot be replaced; 
b. memorabilia, souvenirs, collector's 
items and similar articles whose age 
or history contribute to their value; 
c. articles not maintained in good or 
workable condition; or 
d. articles that are outdated or <>hs<> 
lete and are stored or nor hour. 
used 
b. Buildings under Coverage A or Coverage 
B at replacement cost without deduction 
for depreciation. Replacement cost will 
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include any eased COL ue to the en-
forcement of any ordinance or law that 
regulates the construction, repair or dem-
olition of the covered buildings. Loss set-
tlements under this paragraph are subject 
to the following: 
(1) we will pay the actual cost to repair 
or replace, without deduction for de-
preciation, but not more than the 
least of the following amounts: 
(a) the limit of liability under this 
policy that applies to the building; 
(b) the replacement cost of that part 
of the building damaged for like 
construction and use on the same 
premises; or 
(c) the necessary amount actually 
spent to repair or replace the 
damaged building; 
(2) we will pay no more than the replace-
ment cost of the damage, less deduc-
tion for depreciation, unless: 
(a) actual repair or replacement is 
complete; or 
(b) the cost to repair or replace the 
damage is less than $5,000. 
4. Loss to a Pair or Set. In case of loss to a pair 
or set we may elect to: 
a. repair or replace any part to restore the 
pair or set to its value before the loss; or 
b. pay the difference between the value of 
the property before and after the loss. 
5. Glass Replacement. Loss for damage to glass 
caused by a Peril Insured Against will be set-
tled on the basis of replacement with safety 
glazing materials when required by ordi-
nance or law. 
6. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the 
amount of loss, either may demand an ap-
praisal of the loss. In this event, each party 
will choose a competent appraiser within 20 
days after receiving a written request from 
the other. The two appraisers will choose an 
umpire. If they cannot agree upon an umpire 
within 15 days, you or we may request that 
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the choice be ma by a ju of a court of 
record in the state where me "residence 
premises" is located. The appraisers will 
separately set the amount of loss. If the ap-
praisers submit a written report of an agree-
ment to us, the amount agreed upon will be 
the amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they 
will submit their differences to the umpire. A 
decision agreed to by any two will set the 
amount of loss. 
Each party will: 
a. pay its own appraiser; and 
b. bear the other expenses of the appraisal 
and umpire equally. 
7. Other Insurance. If a loss covered by this 
policy is also covered by other insurance, we 
will pay only the proportion of the loss that 
the limit of liability that applies under this 
policy bears to the total amount of insurance 
covering the loss. 
8. Suit Against Us. Legal action may not be 
brought against us under any coverage pro-
vided by this policy unless the "insured" has 
fully complied with all the terms of this pol-
icy. Legal action taken against us must begin 
within two years after the date of loss. 
9. Our Option. If we give you written notice 
within 30 days after we receive your signed, 
sworn proof of loss, we may repair or re-
place any part of the claimed property with 
like property. 
10. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with 
you. We will pay you unless some other per-
son is named in the policy or is legally enti-
tled to receive payment. Loss will be payable 
30 days after we receive your proof of loss 
and: 
a. reach an agreement with you; 
b. there is an entry of a final judgment; or 
c. there is a filing of an appraisal award 
with us. 
11. Abandonment of Property. We need not ac-
cept any property abandoned by an "in-
sured". 23
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12. Mortgage Clau 
The word "mortgagee" includes trustee. 
If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any 
loss payable under Coverage A or B will be 
paid to the mortgagee and you, as interests 
appear. If more than one mortgagee is 
named, the order of payment will be the 
same as the order of precedence of the mort-
gages. 
If we deny your claim, that denial will not 
apply to a valid claim of the mortgagee, if 
the mortgagee: 
a. notifies us of any change in ownership, 
occupancy or substantial change in risk 
of which the mortgagee is aware; 
b. pays any premium due under this policy 
on demand if you have neglected to pay 
the premium; and 
c. submits a signed, sworn statement of loss 
within 60 days after receiving notice 
from us of your failure to do so. Policy 
conditions relating to Appraisal, Suit 
Against Us and Loss Payment apply to 
the mortgagee. 
If the policy is cancelled or not renewed by 
us, the mortgagee will be notified at least 10 
days before the date cancellation or nonre-
newal takes effect. 
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and 
deny payment to you: 
a. we are subrogated to all the rights of the 
mortgagee granted under the mortgage on 
the property; or 
b. at our option, we may pay to the mortga-
gee the whole principal on the mortgage 
plus any accrued interest. In this event, 
we will receive a full assignment and 
transfer of the mortgage and all securi-
ties held as collateral to the mortgage 
debt. 
Subrogation will not impair the right of the 
mortgagee to recover the full amount of the 
mortgagee's claim. 
13. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize 
any assignment or grant any coverage that 
benefits a perse r orga tion holding, 
storing or moving property for a fee regard-
less of any other provision of this policy. 
nuclear Hazard Clause. 
a. "Nuclear Hazard" means any nuclear re-
action, radiation, or radioactive contami-
nation, all whether controlled or uncon-
trolled or however caused, or any conse-
quence of any of these. 
b. Loss caused by the nuclear hazard will 
not be considered loss caused by fire, ex-
plosion, or smoke, whether these perils 
are specifically named in or otherwise in-
cluded within the Perils Insured Against 
in Section I. 
c. This policy does not apply under Section I 
to loss caused directly or indirectly by 
nuclear hazard, except that direct loss by 
fire resulting from the nuclear hazard is 
covered. 
1: Recovered Property. If you or we recover 
any property for which wTe have made pay-
ment under this policy, you or we will notify 
the other of the recovery. At your option, 
the property will be returned to or retained 
by you or it will become our property. If the 
recovered property is returned to or re-
tained by you, the loss payment will be ad-
justed based on the amount you received for 
the recovered property. 
Iti. Volcanic Eruption Period. One or more vol-
canic eruptions that occur within a 72-hour 
period will be considered as one volcanic 
eruption 
17. Premises Security or Fire Protection System. 
(Applies only if PROTECTIVE DEVICES 
CREDIT APPLIED is shown in the Declara-
tions.) We acknowledge the installation and 
approval of a security or fire protection sys-
tem on the "residence premises". You agree 
to maintain the system in working order and 
to notify us promptly of any change made to 
the system or if it is removed. 
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SECTION ii—LABILITY COVERAGES 
COVERAGE E —PERSONAL LIABILITY 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an 
' ' insured" for damages because of "bodily in-
jury" or "property damage" caused by an "oc-
currence" to which this coverage applies, we 
will: 
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the dam-
ages for which the ''insured" is legally lia-
ble. Damages include prejudgment interest 
awarded against the "insured"; and 
2. provide a defense at our expense by coun-
sel of our choice, even if the suit is ground-
less, false or fraudulent. We may investi-
gate and settle any claim or suit that we 
decide is appropriate. Our duty to settle or 
defend ends when the amount we pay for 
damages resulting from the "occurrence" 
equals our limit of liability. 
COVERAGE F —MEDICAL PAYMENTS TO 
OTHERS 
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that 
are incurred or medically ascertained within 
three years from the date of an accident causing 
"bodily injury". Medical expenses means reason-
able charges for medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, 
ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, pros-
thetic devices and funeral services. This cover-
age does not apply to you or regular residents of 
your household except "residence employees". 
As to others, this coverage applies only: 
1. to a person on the "insured location" with 
the permission of an "insured"; or 
2. to a person off the "insured location", if 
the "bodily injury": 
a. arises out of a condition on the "insured 
location" or the ways immediately ad-
joining; 
b. is caused by the activities of an "in-
sured"; 
c. is caused by a "residence employee" in 
the course of the 44residence em-
ployee^" employment by an "insured"; 
or 
d. is caused bv i aninu *vned by or in 
the care of an "insured". 
SECTION II —EXCLUSIONS 
1. Coverage E—Personal Liability and Cov-
erage F—Medical Payments to Others do 
not apply to "bodily injury" or "property 
damage": 
a. which is expected or intended by the "In-
sured"; 
b. arising out of "business" pursuits of an 
"insured" except those of a "clerical of-
fice employee"; or the rental or holding 
for rental of any part of any premises by 
an "insured". 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
(1) activities which are usual to non-
bus iness" pursuits; or 
(2) the rental or holding for rental of an 
"insured location": 
(a) on an occasional basis if used 
only as a residence; 
(b) in part for use only as a resi-
dence, unless a single family unit 
is intended for use by the occupy-
ing family to lodge more than two 
roomers or boarders; or 
(c) in part, as an office, school, studio 
or private garage; 
(3) the rental of other structures on the 
"residence premises" for use as a pri-
vate residence if the words IN-
CLUDES STRUCTURES RENTED TO 
OTHERS are shown in the Declara-
tions; 
c. arising out of the rendering of or failure 
to render professional services; 
d. arising out of a premises: 
(1) owned by an "insured"; 
(2) rented to an "insured"; or 
(3) rented to others by an "insured"; 
that is not an "insured location"; 
e. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, 
loading or unloading of motor vehi-
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cles or a. ,ther mote ^ed land con-
veyances, including trailers, owned 
or operated by or rented or loaned to 
an "insured"; 
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of a 
motor vehicle or any other motorized 
land conveyance to any person; or 
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether 
imposed by statute or otherwise, for 
the actions of a child or minor using a 
conveyance excluded in paragraph 
(1) or (2) above. 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
(1) a trailer not towed by or carried on a 
motorized land conveyance; 
(2) a motorized land conveyance de-
signed for recreational use off public 
roads, not subject to motor vehicle 
registration and: 
(a) not owned by an "insured"; or 
(b) owned by an "insured" and on an 
"insured location"; 
(3) a motorized golf cart when used to 
play golf on a golf course; or 
(4) a vehicle or conveyance not subject to 
motor vehicle registration which is: 
(a) used to service an *'insured's" 
residence; 
(b) designed for a ^ b i m , 
capped; or 
(c) in lead storage on an "insured lo-
cals on"; 
f. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, 
loading or unloading of a watercraft 
described below; 
< : • the entrustment by an "'insured" of a 
watercraft described below to any 
person; or 
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether 
imposed by statute or otherwise, for 
the actions of a child or minor using a 
watercraft described below. 
Watercraft: 
(1) with inboard or inboard-outdrive mo-
tor power owned by an "insured"; 
(2) with inboard or inboard-outdrive mo-
tor power of more than 50 horse-
power rented to an "insured"; 
(3) that is a sailing vessel with or with-
out auxiliary power, 26 feet or more 
in length owned by or rented to an 
"insured"; or 
(4) powered by one or more outboard mo-
tors with more than 25 total horse-
power if the outboard motor is owned 
by an "insured". But, outboard mo-
tors of more than 25 total horsepower 
are covered for the policy period if: 
(a) you acquire them prior to the pol-
icy period and: 
(i) you declare then i at policy in-
ception; or 
(ii) your intention to insure is re-
ported to us in writing within 
45 days after you acquire the 
outboard motors; 
(b) you acquire them during tl ie pol 
icy period. 
This exclusion does not apply while the 
watercraft is stored, 
g. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, 
loading or unloading of an aircraft; 
(2) the entrustment by an "insured" of 
an aircraft to any person; or 
(3) vicarious parental liability, whether 
imposed by statute or otherwise, for 
the actions of a child or minor using 
an aircraft. 
An aircraft means any contrivance used 
or designed for flight, except model or 
hobby aircraft not used or designed to 
carry people or cargo; 
h. caused directly or indirectly by war, iti 
eluding undeclared war, civil war, insur-
rection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act 
by a military force or military personnel, 
IV, I 
destruction 5eizure o ;e for a mili-
tary purpose, and including any conse-
quence of any of these. Discharge of a nu-
clear weapon will be deemed a warlike 
act even if accidental; 
i. which arises out of the transmission of a 
communicable disease by an "insured". 
Exclusions l.d., I.e., l.f. and l.g. do not ap-
ply to "bodily injury" to a "residence em-
ployee" arising out of and in the course of 
the "residence employee's" employment by 
an "insured". 
!. Coverage E—Personal Liability, does not 
apply to: 
a. liability: 
(1) for your share of any loss assessment 
charged against all members of an as-
sociation, corporation or community 
of property owners; 
(2) under any contract or agreement. 
However, this exclusion does not ap-
ply to written contracts: 
(a) that directly relate to the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of an 
"insured location"; or 
(b) where the liability of others is as-
sumed by an "insured" prior to 
an "occurrence"; 
unless excluded in (1) above or else-
where in this policy; 
b. "property damage" to property owned by 
an "insured"; 
c. "property damage" to property rented to, 
occupied or used by or in the care of an 
"insured". This exclusion does not apply 
to "property damage" caused by fire, 
smoke, explosion or water; 
d. "bodily injury" to any person eligible to 
receive any benefits: 
(1) voluntarily provided; or 
(2) required to be provided; 
by an "insured" under any: 
(1) workers' compensation law; 
(2) non-occupational disability law; or 
(3) occupational disease law; 
e. "bodily injury" ^- "prope damage" for 
which an "insu >" unde. lis policy: 
(1) is also an insured under a nuclear en-
ergy liability policy; or 
(2) would be an insured under that policy 
but for the exhaustion of its limits of 
liability. 
A nuclear energy liability policy is one is-
sued by: 
(1) American Nuclear Insurers; 
(2) Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Un-
derwriters; 
(3) Nuclear Insurance Association of 
Canada; 
or any of their successors; 
f. "bodily injury" to you or an "insured" 
within the meaning of part a. or b. of "in-
sured" as defined; or 
g. "bodily injury" to any employee arising 
out of or in the course of the employee's 
employment by any ADDITIONAL IN-
SURED named in the Declarations. 
3. Coverage F—Medical Payment s to 
Others, does not apply to "bodily injury": 
a. to a "residence employee" if the "bodily 
injury": 
(1) occurs off the "insured location"; and 
(2) does not arise out of or in the course 
of the "residence employee's" em-
ployment by an "insured"; 
b. to any person eligible to receive benefits: 
(1) voluntarily provided; or 
(2) required to be provided; 
under any: 
(1) workers' compensation law; 
(2) non-occupational disability law; or 
(3) occupational disease law; 
c. from any: 
(1) nuclear reaction; 
(2) nuclear radiation; or 
(3) radioactive contamination; 
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all whether -"trolled or ^controlled or 
however cau _d; or 
(4) any consequence of any of these; or 
d. to any person, other than a "residence 
employee" of an "insured", regularly re-
siding on any part of the "insured loca-
tion". 
Only the following exclusions apply to "personal 
injury". "Personal injury" does not apply to: 
1- ^ability assumed by the "insured" under 
any contract or agreement except any in-
demnity obligation assumed by the "in-
sured" under a written contract directly 
relating to the ownership, maintenance or 
use of the premises; 
2. injury caused by a violation of a penal law 
or ordinance committed by or with the 
knowledge or consent of an "insured"; 
3. injury sustained by any person as a result 
of an offense directly or indirectly related 
to the employment of this person by the 
"insured"; 
4. injury arising out of the "business" pur-
suits of an "insured"; or 
5. ciyjc or public activities performed for pay 
by an "insured". 
SECTION II —ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
We cove r the following in addition to the limits of 
liability: 
1. Claim Expenses. We pay: 
a. expenses we incur and costs taxed 
against an "insured" in any suit we de-
fend; 
b. premiums on bonds required in a suit we 
defend, but not for bond amounts more 
than the limit of liability for Coverage E. 
We need not apply for or furnish any 
bond; 
c reasonable expenses incurred by an "in-
jured" at our request, including actual 
loss of earnings (but not loss of other in-
come) up to $250 per day, for assisting us 
in the investigation or defense of a claim 
<?r suit; 
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d. interest on th^ °ntire ju ' ment which ac-
crues after <. :y of t judgment and 
before we pay or tender, or deposit in 
court that part of the judgment which 
does not exceed the limit of liability that 
applies. 
2. First Aid Expenses. We will pay expenses for 
first aid to others incurred by an "insured" 
for "bodily injury" covered under this pol-
icy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any 
other "insured". 
3. Damage to Property of Others. We will pay, 
at replacement cost, up to $1,000 per "occur-
rence" for "property damage" to property 
of others caused by an "insured". 
We will not pay for "property damage": 
a. to the extent of any amount recoverable 
under Section I of this policy; 
b. caused intentionally by an "insured" who 
is 13 years of age or older; 
c to property owned by an "insured"; 
d. to property owned by or rented to a ten-
ant of an "insured" or a resident in your 
household; or 
e. arising out of: 
(1) "business" pursuits; 
(2) any act or omission in connection 
with a premises owned, rented or con-
trolled by an "insured", other than 
the "insured location"; or 
(3) the ownership, maintenance, or use 
of aircraft, watercraft or motor vehi-
cles or all other motorized land con-
veyances. 
This exclusion does not apply to a 
motorized land conveyance designed 
for recreational use off public roads, 
not subject to motor vehicle registra-
tion and not owned by an "insured". 
4. Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $10,000 
for your share of any loss assessment 
charged during the policy period against you 
by a corporation or association of property 
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owners, when ' assessme is made as a 
result of: 
a. each "occurrence" to which Section II of 
this policy would apply; 
b. liability for each act of a director, officer 
or trustee in the capacity as a director, 
officer or trustee, provided: 
(1) the director, officer or trustee is 
elected by the members of a corpora-
tion or association of property own-
ers; and 
(2) the director, officer or trustee serves 
without deriving any income from the 
exercise of duties which are solely on 
behalf of a corporation or association 
of property owners. 
This coverage applies only to loss assess-
ments charged against you as owner or ten-
ant of the "residence premises". 
We do not cover loss assessments charged 
against you or a corporation or association 
of property owners by any governmental 
body. 
Section II—Coverage E—Personal Liability 
Exclusion 2.a.(l) does not apply to this cov-
erage. 
SECTION II —CONDITIONS 
1. Limit of Liability. Our total liability under 
Coverage E for all damages resulting from 
any one "occurrence" will not be more than 
the limit of liability for Coverage E as shown 
in the Declarations. This limit is the same 
regardless of the number of "insureds", 
claims made or persons injured. 
All "bodily injury" and "property damage" 
resulting from any one accident or from con-
tinuous or repeated exposure to substan-
tially the same general harmful conditions 
shall be considered to be the result of one 
"occurrence". 
Our total liability under Coverage F for all 
medical expense payable for "bodily injury" 
to one person as the result of one accident 
will not be more than the limit of liability for 
Coverage F as shown in the Declarations. 
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2. Severability of h /ance. . s insurance ap-
plies separately to each "insured". This con-
dition will not increase our limit of liability 
for any one "occurrence". 
3. Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or 
"occurrence", the "insured" will perform 
the following duties that apply. You will help 
us by seeing that these duties are performed: 
a. give written notice to us or our agent as 
soon as is practical, which sets forth: 
(1) the identity of the policy and "in-
sured"; 
(2) reasonably available information on 
the time, place and circumstances of 
the accident or "occurrence"; and 
(3) names and addresses of any claim-
ants and witnesses; 
b. promptly forward to us every notice, de-
mand, summons or other process relating 
to the accident or "occurrence"; 
c. at our request, help us: 
(1) to make settlement; 
(2) to enforce any right of contribution 
or indemnity agairvst any persorv or 
organization who may be liable to an 
"insured"; 
(3) with the conduct of suits and attend 
hearings and trials; and 
(4) to secure and give evidence and ob-
tain the attendance of witnesses; 
d. under the coverage—Damage to Property 
-of Others—submit to us within 60 days 
after the loss, a sworn statement of loss 
and show the damaged property, if in the 
"insured's" control; 
e. the "insured" will not, except at the "in-
sured's" own cost, voluntarily make pay-
ment, assume obligation or incur expense 
other than for first aid to others at the 
time of the "bodily injury". 
4. Duties of an Injured Person—Coverage F— 
Medical Payments to Others. The injured 
person or someone acting for the injured 
person will: 
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a. give us writte. oof of cla under oath 
if required, as soon as is practical; and 
b. authorize us to obtain copies of medical 
reports and records. 
The injured person will submit to a physical 
exam by a doctor of our choice when and as 
often as we reasonably require. 
5. Payment of Claim—Coverage F—Medical 
Payments to Others. Payment under this 
coverage is not an admission of liability by 
an "insured" or us. 
6. Suit Against Us. No action can be brought 
against us unless there has been compliance 
with the policy provisions. 
No one will have the right to join us as a 
party to any action against an "insured". 
Also, no action with respect to Coverage E 
can be brought against us until the obliga-
tion of the "insured" has been determined 
by final judgment or agreement signed by us. 
7. Bankruptcy of an Insured. Bankruptcy or in-
solvency of an "insured" will not relieve us 
of our obligations under this policy. 
8. Other Insurance—Coverage E—Personal Li-
ability. This insurance is excess over other 
valid and collectible insurance except insur-
ance written specifically to cover as excess 
over the limits of liability that apply in this 
policy. 
SECTIONS I AND II—CONDITIONS 
1. POLICY PERIOD. This policy applies only to 
loss in Section I or "bodily injury" or "prop-
erty damage" in Section II, which occurs 
during the policy period shown in the Decla-
rations. That policy period, and each succes-
sive period, begins and ends at 12:01 a.m. 
standard time, at the "residence premises". 
2. PREMIUM. The premium shown in the Decla-
rations is the premium for the policy period 
shown. If we elect to continue this insur-
ance, we will renew this policy if you pay 
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the required rene prem for the suc-
cessive policy period, subject to our premi-
ums, rules and forms then in effect. You must 
pay us prior to the end of the current policy 
period or else this policy will not continue. 
3. CONCEALMENT OR FRAUD. The entire policy 
will be void if, whether before or after a 
loss, an "insured" has: 
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented 
any material fact or circumstance; 
b. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or 
c. made false statements; 
relating to this insurance. 
4. LIBERALIZATION CLAUSE. If we change any 
part of this policy to broaden coverage with-
out charge, your policy will be interpreted to 
provide this broadened coverage. The broad-
ened coverage will begin on the date that the 
change is effective in your state. 
5. WAIVER OR CHANGE OF POLICY PROVI-
SIONS. A waiver or change of a provision of 
this policy must be in writing by us to be 
valid. Our request for an appraisal or exami-
nation will not waive any of our rights. 
6. STATE STATUTES. The terms of this policy 
that are in conflict with the statutes of the 
state in which this policy is issued, are 
hereby amended to conform to those stat-
utes. 
7. CANCELLATION. 
a. The named insured shown in the Declara-
tions may cancel this policy at any time 
by returning it to us or by letting us know 
in writing of the date cancellation is to 
take effect. 
b. We may cancel this policy only for the 
reasons stated below by letting the 
named insured know in writing of the 
date cancellation takes effect. This can-
cellation notice will be mailed to the 
named insured at the mailing address last 
shown in the Declarations. 
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Proof of mail will be si lent proof of 
notice. Delivery of this notice will be 
deemed the same as mailing. The effective 
date and time of cancellation stated in the 
notice will become the end of the policy 
period. 
(1) When the named insured has not paid 
the premium, we may cancel at any 
time by letting the named insured 
know at least 10 days before the date 
cancellation takes effect. 
(2) When this policy has been in effect 
for less than 60 days and is not a re-
newal with us, we may cancel for any 
reason by letting the named insured 
know at least 10 days before the date 
cancellation takes effect. 
(3) When this policy has been in effect 
for 60 days or more, or at any time if 
it is a renewal with us, we may can-
cel: 
(a) if there has been a material misrep-
resentation of fact which if known 
to us would have caused us not to 
issue the policy; or 
(b) if the risk has changed substantially 
since the policy was issued. 
This can be done by letting the named 
insured know at least 30 days before 
the date cancellation takes effect. 
c. When this policy is cancelled, the pre-
mium for the period from the date of can-
cellation to the expiration date will be re-
funded pro rata. 
d. If the return premium is not refunded 
with the notice of cancellation or when 
this policy is returned to us, we will re-
fund it within a reasonable time after the 
date cancellation takes effect. 
e. If this policy is cancelled by us, any AD-
DITIONAL INSURED named in the Decla-
rations will be notified in writing. 
8. NON-RENEWAL 
a. We may elect not to renew this policy. We 
may do so by mailing to the named in-
sured at the r Mng ad -,s last shown 
in the Declarations, wi^cen notice at 
least 45 days before the expiration date 
of this policy. Proof of mailing will be suf-
ficient proof of notice. Delivery of this no-
tice will be deemed the same as mailing. 
b. If this policy is not renewed by us, any 
ADDITIONAL INSURED named in the 
Declarations will be notified in writing. 
c. This policy will terminate without notice 
at the end of any policy period for failure 
to pay any premium when due. 
9. ASSIGNMENT. Assignment of this policy will 
not be valid unless we give our written con-
sent. 
10. SUBROGATION. An "insured" may waive in 
writing before a loss all rights of recovery 
against any person. If they are not so 
waived, we may require an assignment of 
rights of recovery for a loss to the extent 
that payment is made by us. 
If an assignment is sought, an "insured" 
must sign and deliver all related papers and 
cooperate with us. 
Subrogation does not apply under Section II 
to Medical Payments to Others or Damage to 
Property of Others. 
11. DEATH OF NAMED INSURED. If you die, we 
will insure your legal representative but 
only with respect to your premises and prop-
erty covered under this policy at the time of 
your death. 
The definition of "insured" will also include 
any person having temporary custody of 
your property until the appointment of a le-
gal representative. 
OPTIONAL ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
This section of your policy contains additional 
coverage options that you may select. None ap-
ply, however, unless specifically selected by you. 
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The coverages you h selected listed in the 
COVERAGES section in the Declarations. 
COVERAGE G —MONEY 
The Special Limit of Liability No. 1 under Cover-
age C—Personal Property is increased. The re-
vised limit for No. 1 is shown in the Declarations. 
COVERAGE H —REPLACEMENT COST 
PROTECTION 
We agree to amend present coverage amounts in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
1. If you have: 
a. allowed us to adjust the Coverage A limit of 
liability and the premium in accordance 
with: 
(1) any property evaluations we make; and 
(2) any increases in the cost of construc-
tion as reported to us by a recognized 
appraisal company; and 
b. notified us, within 30 days of completion, 
of any alterations to the dwelling which in-
crease the replacement cost of the dwelling 
by $5,000 or more; and 
c. elected to repair or replace the damaged 
building; 
we will: 
d. increase the Coverage A limit of liability to 
equal the current replacement cost of the 
dwelling if the amount of loss to the dwell-
ing is more than the limit of liability shown 
in the Declarations; and 
e. increase by the same percentage applied to 
Coverage A, the limits of liability for Cov-
erages B, C and D. However, we will do this 
only if the Coverage A limit of liability is 
increased under paragraph d. above as a re-
sult of a Coverage A loss. 
2. If you comply with the provisions of para-
graph 1. above and there is a loss to the dwell-
ing insured under Coverage A, then paragraph 
b. of Section I Condition 3. Loss Settlement is 
deleted and replaced by the following: 
b. Buildings under Coverage A or Coverage B 
at replacement cost without deduction for 
depreciation. Replacement cost will include 
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any increased c due tc : enforcement 
of any ordinance or law that regulates the 
construction, repair or demolition of the 
covered buildings. Loss settlements under 
this paragraph are subject to the following: 
(1) We will pay no more than the smallest 
of the following amounts for equivalent 
construction and use on the same prem-
ises: 
(a) the replacement cost of the build-
ing or any parts of it; 
(b) the amount actually and necessa-
rily spent to repair or replace the 
building or any parts of it; 
(c) the applicable limit of liability 
whether increased or not, ad-
justed in accordance with para-
graph l.d. or e. above. 
(2) When the cost to repair or replace the 
damaged building is more than $5,000, 
we will pay no more than the replace-
ment cost of the damage, less deduction 
for depreciation, until actual repair or 
replacement is completed. 
COVERAGE M —PERSONAL PROPERTY AT 
OTHER LOCATIONS 
The limit of liability for Coverage C—Personal 
Property usually located at an "insured's" resi-
dence, other than the "residence premises", is in-
creased. The revised limit is shown for Coverage 
M in the Declarations. 
COVERAGE O—EARTHQUAKE 
We insure for direct physical loss to property 
covered under Coverage A—Dwelling and Cover-
age B—Other Structures, Section I, caused by 
earthquake including land shock waves or trem-
ors before, during or after a volcanic eruption. 
1. One or more earthquake shocks that occur 
within a seventy-two hour period constitute a 
single earthquake. 
2. The following is the only deductible that ap-
plies to Coverage A and Coverage B to each 
loss caused by earthquake: 
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We will pay on lat part c \e loss which 
is more than a specified percentage of the 
total amount of insurance that applies. This 
percentage is shown for Coverage 0 in the 
Declarations. This deductible will apply sep-
arately to loss under Coverage A—Dwelling 
and Coverage B—Other Structures. This de-
ductible amount will not be less than $250 
in any one loss. 
All exclusions under Section i of this policy apply 
to Coverage 0. However, the Section I—Earth 
Movement exclusion does not apply to loss 
caused by ear thquake including land shock 
waves or tremors before, during or after a vol-
canic eruption. 
Special Exclusions 
1. We do not cover loss resulting directly or indi-
rectly from flood of any nature or tidal wave, 
whether caused by, resulting from, contrib-
uted to or aggravated by earthquake. 
2. We do not cover loss to exterior masonry ve-
neer unless the words INCLUDING EXTERIOR 
MASONRY VENEER are shown in the Declara-
tions. If exterior masonry veneer is not cov-
ered, the value of the exterior masonry veneer 
will be deducted before applying the deduct-
ible clause. For the purpose of this exclusion, 
stucco is not considered masonry veneer. 
This coverage does not increase the limits of lia-
bility stated in this policy and does not include 
the cost of filling land. 
COVERAGE P —PERMITTED INCIDENTAL 
OCCUPANCIES (Not applicable to Home Day 
Care or similar operations.) 
We cover the "business" conducted by an "in-
sured" as described in Coverage P in the Declara-
tions subject to the following. However, we do 
not cover a "business" if it involves home day 
care or similar operations. 
Section I: Applies only when the described 
"business" is conducted on the "residence prem-
ises". 
1. Coverage B—Other Structures is extended to 
include structures used in connection with the 
described "business". 
2. Coverage C—Pers' \ Propc is extended to 
include furnishings, supplies and equipment 
used in connection with the described "busi-
ness". 
Item 8 under Special Limits of Liability does 
not apply to the described "business". 
Section II: Applies to the "residence premises" 
or, if applicable, to an "insured location" when 
shown in the Declarations as an ADDITIONAL 
RESIDENCE. 
Exclusions 
All exclusions under Section II of this policy ap-
ply to Coverage P in addition to the following: 
1. This insurance does not apply to "bodily in-
jury" to: 
a. any employee of an "insured" arising out 
of the "business" use described in Cover-
age P in the Declarations other than to a 
"residence employee" while engaged in the 
employee's employment by an "insured"; 
or 
b. any pupil arising out of corporal punish-
ment administered by or at the direction of 
the "insured". 
2. Item (1) under exclusion Lb. of Coverage E— 
Personal Liability and Coverage F—Medical 
Payments to Others is deleted and the follow-
ing substituted: 
(1) activities which are usual to non-"busi-
ness" pursuits or to the necessary or inci-
dental use of the premises to conduct the 
"business" pursuits as described in Cover-
age P in the Declarations; or 
COVERAGE Q—WATERCRAFT 
Coverage E—Personal Liability and Coverage 
F—Medical Payments to Others apply to "bodily 
injury" or "property damage" arising out of: 
1. the ownership, maintenance, use, loading or 
unloading of the watercraft described for Cov-
erage Q in the Declarations; 
2. the entrustment by an "insured" of the water-
craft described for Coverage Q in the Declara-
tions to any person; or 
3. statutorily imposed vicarious parental liabil-
ity for the actions of a child or minor using a 
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watercraft desci 1 for Co- \ge Q in the 
Declarations. 
All exclusions under Section II of this policy ap-
ply except to the watercraft described for Cover-
age Q in the Declarations. 
This insurance does not apply with respect to 
watercraft with inboard or inboard-outdrive mo-
tor power or sailing vessels: 
1. to "bodily injury" to any employee of an "in-
sured" arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment by the "insured" if the employee's 
principal duties are in connection with the 
maintenance or use of watercraft; or 
2. while the watercraft is used to carry persons 
for a charge or is rented to others. 
COVERAGE R —BUSINESS PURSUITS 
Coverage E—Personal Liability and Coverage 
F—Medical Payments to Others apply to the 
"business" pursuits of the "insured" as stated 
for Coverage R in the Declarations. 
All exclusions under Section II of this policy ap-
ply except to the "business" pursuits of the "in-
sured" as stated for Coverage R in the Declara-
tions. Additionally, this insurance does not apply: 
1. to "bodily injury" or "property damage" aris-
ing out of the "business" pursuits of the "in-
sured" in connection with a "business" owned 
or financially controlled by the "insured" or 
by a partnership of which the "insured" is a 
partner or member; 
2. to "bodily injury" or "property damage" aris-
ing out of the rendering of or failure to render 
professional services of any nature other than 
teaching, including but not limited to any: 
a. architectural, engineering or industrial de-
sign services; 
b. medical, surgical, dental or other services 
or treatment conducive to the health of per-
sons or animals; and 
c. beauty or barber services or treatment; 
3. to "bodily injury" to a fellow employee of the 
"insured" injured in the course of employ-
ment; or 
4. when the "insured" is a member of the faculty 
or teaching staff of any school or college to 
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"bodily injury" or xropert* mage" arising 
out of the mainteiicxiice, use, wading, unload-
ing or entrustment by the "insured" to any 
person, of; 
a. draft or saddle animals; 
b. vehicles for use therewith; 
c. aircraft; 
d. motor vehicles or all other motorized land 
conveyances; or 
e. watercraft; 
owned or operated, or hired by or for the "in : 
sured" or employer or used by the "insured" 




This section of your policy contains supplemen-
tal coverage options which you may select. None 
apply, however, unless specifically selected by 
you. The supplemental coverages you select are 






For an additional premium, we cover the classes 
of property indicated on the Declarations page, 
subject to the Definitions, Section I Conditions 
and the Sections I and II Conditions of this policy 
and all provisions of this supplement. The most 
we will pay for loss to each class of property is 
the amount of insurance less any deductible 
shown for that class on the Declarations page. 
CLASSES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1. Jewelry, as scheduled. 
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2. Jewelry, meanin< nicies of r ->onal adorn-
ment owned by u ^ "insurea composed at 
least partially of precious metal, whether or 
not set with gems or pearls, unscheduled. 
3. Furs and garments trimmed with fur or con-
sisting principally of fur, as scheduled. 
4. Furs and garments trimmed with fur or con-
sisting principally of fur, unscheduled. 
5. Cameras, projection machines, films, home 
video cameras and recorders, and related ar-
ticles of equipment, as scheduled. 
You agree not to use this equipment for pay 
unless the words INCLUDING PROFES-
SIONAL USE are shown in the Declarations. 
6. Musical Instruments and related articles of 
equipment, as scheduled. 
You agree not to perform with these instru-
ments for pay unless the words INCLUDING 
PROFESSIONAL USE are shown in the Dec-
larations. 
7. Silverware, silver-plated ware, goldware, 
gold-plated ware, and pewter-ware; but ex-
cluding pens, pencils, flasks, smoking imple-
ments, or jewelry. 
8. Golfer's Equipment meaning golf clubs, golf 
clothing, and golf equipment. 
9. Fine Arts, as scheduled, at the location de-
scribed in the Declarations page. 
10. Postage Stamps owned by or in the custody 
or control of the "insured", including the 
following: 
a. Due, envelope, official, revenue, match, 
and medical stamps; 
b. Covers, locals, reprints, essays, proofs, 
and other philatelic property; or 
c. Books, pages, and mountings of items in 
a. and b. 
11. Coin Collections owned by or in the custody 
or control of the "insured" including the fol-
lowing: 
a. Rare or current coins; 
b. Meda)s, paper money, bank notes; 
c. Tokens of mon^v and otu -r numismatic 
property; or 
d. Coin albums, containers, frames, cards, 
and display cabinets in use with the col-
lection. 
12. Personal Computers. 
13. Sports Equipment, as scheduled. 
14. Miscellaneous Property, not otherwise 
classed as described elsewhere in this sup-
plement. 
NEWLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY 
We cover newly acquired items of a class of prop-
erty already insured for their actual cash value. 
However, for the class Fine Arts the most we will 
pay is 25% of the amount of insurance. For all 
other classes, the most we will pay is 25% of the 
amount of insurance for that class of property, or 
$25,000, whichever is less. For coverage to apply, 
the "insured" must report these new items to us 
within 30 days from the date acquired and pay 
the additional premium from that date. This 
paragraph does not apply to the class of property 
Personal Effects. 
PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
We insure the described property against risks of 
direct physical loss subject to the General Exclu-
sions and other provisions of this supplement. 
LOSS DEDUCTIBLE 
No deductible shall apply to any class of prop-
erty unless specifically shown for that class in 
the Declarations with an amount. 
Each claim for loss shall be adjusted separately 
in accordance with the Loss Settlement condi-
tions of this supplement. If a deductible amount 
is shown in the Declarations for a class of prop-
erty, we will subtract that amount from each ad-
justed loss to that class. 
46 hi* 
GENERA ;XCLU£ iNS 
We do not cover: 
i. Loss caused by wear and tear, gradual dete-
rioration or inherent vice. 
2. Loss caused by insects or vermin. 
3. Loss caused by war, including the following 
and any consequence of any of the follow-
ing: 
a.. Undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, 
rebellion, or revolution. 
b. Warlike act by a military force or military 
personnel. 
c. Destruction, seizure, or use for a military 
purpose. 
Discharge of a nuclear weapon shall be 
deemed a warlike act even if accidental. 
4. Loss caused by nuclear hazard, to the extent 
set forth in the Nuclear Hazard clause of 
Section I — Conditions. 
5. If Fine Arts are covered: 
a. Loss caused by any repairing, res-
toration, or retouching process. 
b. Loss to property on exhibition at fair 
grounds or premises of national or inter-
national expositions, unless the premises 
are covered by this policy. 
6. If Musical Instruments are covered and or-
gans not of a mobile nature are insured, we 
do not cover loss or damage to such organs 
caused by mechanical breakdown or failure, 
repairing, adjusting, servicing or mainte-
nance unless fire or explosion results; and 
then only for the loss or damage by such re-
sulting fire or explosion. 
7. If Postage Stamps or Coin Collections are 
covered: 
a. Fading, creasing, denting, scratching, 
tearing, or thinning. 
b. Transfer of colors, inherent defect, damp-
ness, extremes of temperature or depreci-
ation. 
c. Any damage from being handled or 
worked on. 
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d. Disappearan™ of inc4' :dual Stamps, 
Coins, or oth articles . .ess the item is: 
(1) Described and scheduled with a spe-
cific amount of insurance; or 
(2) Mounted in a volume and the page it 
is attached to is also lost. 
e. Loss to property in the custody of trans-
portation companies. 
f. Shipments by mail other than registered 
mail. 
g. Theft from any unattended automobile 
unless the property is being shipped as 
registered mail. 
h. Loss to property not part of a Stamp or 
Coin Collection. 
TERRITORIAL LIMITS 
We cover the property described worldwide. 
SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
1. If Fine Arts are covered under this supple-
ment, you agree that such property will be 
handled by competent packers. 
2. Golfer's Equipment includes your clothing 
while contained in a locker wThen you are 
playing golf. We cover golf balls for loss only 
by: 
a. Fire; or 
b. Burglary, provided there are visible 
marks of forcible entry into the building, 
room, or locker. 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
1. LOSS CLAUSE 
The amount of insurance under this supple-
ment shall not be reduced except for a total 
loss of a scheduled article. We will refund 
the unearned premium applicable to such ar-
ticle after the loss. 
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2. LOSS SETTLENT T 
a. Fine Arts — h ^ a total lo. o to a sched-
uled item, we will pay the amount shown 
in the schedule for that item. That 
amount is agreed to be the value of the 
article. Partial losses will be adjusted ac-
cording to 2d. below. 
b. Postage Stamps or Coin Collections — 
The amount we will pay under these 
classes of property will be determined as 
follows: 
(1) In case of loss to any scheduled item, 
the amount to be paid will be deter-
mined in accordance with paragraph 
2d. below. 
(2) When Coins or Stamps are covered on 
an unscheduled basis, we will pay the 
cash market value at the time of loss, 
but not more than $1,000 on any un-
scheduled Coin Collection, nor more 
than $250 for any one stamp, coin, or 
individual article or any one pair, 
s t r ip , block, series sheet, cover, 
frame, or card. 
We will not pay a greater proportion 
of any loss on unscheduled property 
than the amount insured on un-
scheduled property bears to the cash 
market value of all such property at 
the time of loss. 
c. Jewelry — For a covered total loss to 
scheduled jewelry, if the words AGREED 
VALUE JEWELRY COVERAGE APPLIES 
are shown in the Declarations, we will 
pay the amount shown in the schedule for 
each article. That amount is agreed to be 
the value of the article. 
d. Other Proper ty — Unless otherwise 
stated in this supplement, the value of 
the property insured is not agreed upon 
but will be ascertained at the time of loss. 
We will not pay more than the least of the 
following amounts: 
(1) The actual cash value of the property 
at the time of loss. 
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(2) The amoi for wl: the property 
could reasonably be expected to be 
repaired to its condition just before 
the loss. 
(3) The amount for which the article 
could reasonably be expected to be 
replaced with one substantially iden-
tical. 
(4) The applicable amount of insurance. 
When furs or jewelry are covered on an 
unscheduled basis, the amount to be paid 
is also subject to the limit per article, as 
shown in the Declarations page, for each 
class. 
e. Loss to a Pair, Set, or Parts 
(1) Fine Arts — In case of loss to part of 
a set, we agree to pay you the full 
amount of the set as shown in the 
schedule, if you agree to surrender 
the remaining articles of the set to us. 
If you do not agree we will settle ac-
cording to 2e.(3)A. below. 
(2) Jewelry — In case of loss to part of a 
set, we agree to pay you the value of 
the entire set in accordance with Gen-
eral Condition 2c , if you agree to sur-
render the remaining articles of the 
set to us. If this Policy has been ex-
tended to provide agreed value jew-
elry coverage, then we will pay the 
agreed value of the set. 
If you do not agree to surrender the 
remaining articles of the set to us, we 
will settle according to 2e.(3)A. be-
low. 
(3) Other Property 
A. Pair or Set 
In case of a loss to a pair or set, 
we may elect to: 
(a) Repair or replace any part to 
restore the pair or set to its 
value before the loss; or 
si h * 
(b) Pay J differen ,etween ac-
tual cash value of the prop-
erty before and after the loss. 
B. Parts 
In case of a loss to any part of cov-
ered property, consisting of sev-
eral parts when complete, we will 





PART I DEFINITIONS 
In this Policy " y o u " and "your" mean the 
NAMED INSURED shown in the Declarations, 
and the spouse if a resident of the same house-
hold. "We", "us" and "our" mean the member 
company of The Travelers providing this insur-
ance and shown as the INSURER in the Declara-
tions. In addition, certain other words and 
phrases, when printed in quotation marks, have 
specific meanings when used in this policy. These 
are defined as follows: 
A. "Auto" means: 
1. Any kind of private passenger motor ve-
hicle including, but not limited to, an au-
tomobile, motorcycle, moped, pickup, 
van, or self-propelled mobile home; or 
2. While towed by a vehicle described in 1. 
above, a trailer, farm tractor, farm 
wagon or farm implements. 
B. "Bodily injury" means bodily harm, sick-
ness, or disease which occurs during the 
term of this policy It includes required 
care, loss of services, death and mental 
anguish that results. 
C. "Business" includes any full or part-time 
trade, profession, or occupation. 
D. "Family member" means a resident of 
your household who is: 
1. Your relative, including your ward or 
foster child; or 
2. Under the a )f 21 a. i your care or 
the care of any person named in 1. 
above. 
E. "Insured" means: 
1. You; but, with respect to your use of an 
"auto" you do not own which is fur-
nished or available for your regular use, 
only if you are insured for your use of 
that "auto" under one or more "primary 
insurance" policies for not less than the 
auto liability deductible amount in Part 
IV of this supplement; 
2. Any "family member" if such "family 
member" 
a. Is legally responsible for an "occur-
rence" covered under this supple-
ment; and 
b. Is also insured for such "occurrence" 
under one or more "primary insur-
ance" policies for not less than the ap-
plicable deductible amount shown in 
Part IV of this supplement. 
3. Any other persons or organizations in-
sured for the "occurrence" in your "pri-
mary insurance" policies, but only for 
their liability for the acts or omissions of 
an "insured" under Parts 1 or 2 of this 
definition. 
E "Minimum retained limit" means the 
greater of: 
1. The total limits of any other insurance 
that applies to the "occurrence", includ-
ing insurance under other parts of this 
policy, which: 
a. Is available to an "insured"; or 
b. Would have been available except for 
the bankruptcy or insolvency of the 
insurer providing "primary insur-
ance"; or 
2. The applicable deductible amount shown 
in Part IV of this supplement. 
G. "Occurrence" means an accident, including 
exposure to conditions which results in 
"bodily injury" or "property damage". All 
injury, loss, or damage from continuous or 
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repeated exposu o the sar ,eneral con-
ditions will be considered due to one "oc-
currence". It also means offenses which re-
sult in "personal injury". 
For Loss Assessment coverage, "occur-
rence" also means: 
1. Direct loss to property owned by all 
members of the corporation or associa-
tion collectively, but only if the loss is 
caused by a peril insured against under a 
"primary insurance" policy and the loss 
is covered by a property insurance pol-
icy issued to the corporation or associa-
tion. 
2. An act of a director, officer or trustee of a 
corporation or association of property 
owners, acting as a director, officer or 
trustee, which results in "bodily injury", 
"property damage" or "personal injury" 
for which the corporation or association 
becomes legally responsible, provided 
the director, officer or trustee: 
a. Is elected by the members of a corpo-
ration or association of property own-
ers; and 
b. Serves without deriving any income 
from the exercise of duties which are 
solely on behalf of a corporation or 
association of property owners. 
H. "Personal injury" means injury caused by 
any of the following offenses committed 
during the policy term: 
1. False arrest; 
2. False detention; 
3. False imprisonment; 




8. Violation of right of privacy; 
9. Wrongful entry; 
10. Wrongful eviction; or 
11. Other invasion of right to private occu-
pancy. 
I. "Pr imary in.' ance" ns any policy 
providing the insured" with initial or pri-
mary liability insurance covering one or 
more of the types of liability listed in Part 
IV of this supplement. 
J. "Property damage" means physical injury 
to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible 
property which occurs during the policy 
term. 
K. "Recreational vehicle" means a land mo-
tor vehicle designed for recreational use off 
public roads. It does not include "autos". 
L. "Residence premises" means: 
1. Any one to four-family dwelling that you 
live in and its grounds. This includes 
other structures on the grounds; or 
2. The part of any other building where 
you live. It does not include common 
ground areas. 
PART II INSURING AGREEMENT 
In return for payment of premiums when due, 
and subject to the Sections I and II Conditions of 
this policy and the terms of this supplement, we 
will pay damages for which the "insured" be-
comes legally responsible due to "bodily injury", 
"property damage"*, or "personal injury" caused 
by an "occurrence". 
This coverage applies only to damages in excess 
of the "minimum retained limit". 
PART III DEFENSE AND 
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
A. Defense. 
1. We will defend an "insured" if sued as a 
result of an "occurrence"^ covered by this 
supplement even if the suit is groundless, 
false, or fraudulent. 
2. We have the right to join in the defense of 
any suit likely to involve us. 
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3. We will not be 'igated t 'efend any 
suit: 
a. If the "occurrence" is covered by any 
other insurance available to the "in-
sured"; 
b. If there is no applicable "primary in-
surance" in effect at the time of the "oc-
currence" and the amount of damages 
claimed or incurred is not more than 
the applicable deductible amount 
shown in Part IV of this supplement; or 
c. After our limit of liability has been ex-
hausted by the payment of judgments 
or settlements. 
4. We may investigate and settle any claim or 
suit as we see fit. 
B. Additional Coverages. 
1. Defense costs 
We will pay for the following in addition to 
our limit of liability: 
a. All costs and expenses we incur to de-
fend a claim or lawsuit against an "in-
sured". 
b. Premiums on bonds required in a suit 
we defend, but only for that portion of 
the bond not exceeding our limit of lia-
bility. We are not obligated to apply for 
or furnish these bonds. 
c. Interest which accrues after judgment 
in a lawsuit and before we pay, offer, or 
deposit in court that part of the judg-
ment which does not exceed our limit of 
liability. 
d. Reasonable expenses incurred by an 
"insured" at our request. This includes 
actual loss of wages up to $100 a day 
due to attendance at hearings or trials 
at our request. 
e. In some countries, we may be prevented 
from defending an "insured" because of 
laws or other reasons. In that event we 
will pay any expenses incurred with 
our written consent for the "insured's" 
defense. 
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2. Loss Assessnv 
We will pay, in excess of u^e "minimum re-
tained limit", your share of any loss as-
sessment charged during the policy period 
against you by a corporation or associa-
tion of property owners. This only applies 
when the assessment is made as a result of 
an "occurrence" covered by this supple-
ment. 
This coverage applies only to loss assess-
ment charged against you as owner or ten-
ant of the "residence premises". 
We do not cover loss assessments charged 
against you or a corporation or association 
of property owners by any government 
body. 
Payments made under this section are in-
cluded in the applicable limit of liability. 
PART IV DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNTS 
Types of Liability 
Auto . . . . 












$500,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
300,000 Per Occurrence 
. 300,000 Per Occurrence 
50,000 Per Occurrence 
If the "insured" maintains "primary insurance" 
with "auto" liability limits of $500,000/$500,000 
"bodily injury" and $100,000 "property dam-
age", then the deductible amount applicable to 
"auto" liability shall be such limits. 
A deductible of $1,000 will apply to each "occur-
rence" which: 
1. is covered by this supplement; and 
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2. arises out of a ve e, proper or other ex-
posure insured uy "primary insurance" 
with limits at least equal to the applicable 
deductible amount shown above; and 
3. is not covered under the provisions of the 
policies referred to in No. 2 above. 
This provision does not apply to Loss Assess-
ment. 
PART V EXCLUSIONS 
This insurance does not apply: 
1. To damages the "insured" or any company 
providing "primary insurance" may have 
to pay under any of the following laws: 
a. Worker's Compensation; 
b. Unemployment Compensation; 
c. Disability benefits; or 
d. Any other similar law. 
2. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or 
"personal injury" arising out of: 
a. The ownership, maintenance, use, load-
ing or unloading of an aircraft; 
b. The entrustment by an "insured" of an 
aircraft to any person; or 
c. Statutorily imposed vicarious parental 
liability for the actions of a child or mi-
nor using an aircraft. 
Aircraft means any contrivance used or 
designed for flight except model or 
hobby aircraft not used or designed to 
carry people or cargo. 
3. To "property damage" to: 
a. Property owned by an "insured". 
b. Watercraft under the care, custody, or 
control of an "insured". 
c. Property rented to, occupied or used by, 
or in the care of an "insured" to the ex-
tent the "insured" is under contract to 
provide insurance for such damage. 
However, this exclusion does not apply 
to liability imposed on the "insured" by 
common law or statute. 
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1. To "bodily ir ' -yM or 4' perty damage" 
expected or ...tended uj an "insured". 
However, this exclusion does not apply to 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" re-
sulting from an "insured's" use of reason-
able force to protect persons or property. 
5. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or 
"personal injury" arising out of "business" 
property or "business" pursuits of an "in-
sured". However, this exclusion does not 
apply to: 
a. Any part of a one to four-family resi-
dential dwelling you rent or hold for 
rent other than the "residence prem-
ises"; 
b. Condominium units you rent or hold for 
rent, other than a "residence premises". 
c. Any "residence premises" or other one 
to four-family residence occupied in 
part as an office, school or studio. 
d. Any "residence premises": 
(1) Rented or held for rent in part, un-
less intended for use as a residence 
by more than two roomers or board-
ers per family; 
(2) Occasionally rented or held for rent 
for short periods of time for dwell-
ing purposes; 
(3) Rented or held for rental as a pri-
vate garage. 
e. Occasional or part-time jobs of "in-
sureds" who are students under 21 
years of age. 
f. Civic activities performed by an "in-
sured" without pay. 
g. Activities connected with the "in-
sured's" occupation if a Collector, Mes-
senger, Salesman or Teacher except: 
(1) We will not pay for "bodily injury" 
or "property damage" arising out of 
a business or school the "insured": 
(a) Financially controls; 
(b) Is a joint venture member of; or 
(c) Is a partner in. 
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(2) We will r oay for c ' : m s or dam-
ages arisL ^ out of the aintenance, 
use, loading or unloading, or en-
trustment by the "insured" to any 
person of: 
(a) Draft or saddle animals; 
(b) Vehicles for use therewith; 
(c) Aircraft; 
(d) Motor vehicles or all other mo-
torized land conveyances; or 
(e) Watercraft; 
owned or operated, or hired by or 
for the "insured" or employee or 
used by the "insured" for the pur-
pose of instruction in the use 
thereof, 
h. The providing of home day care service, 
but only when, 
(1) an "insured" provides such service 
for a relative of an "insured"; or 
(2) a mutual exchange of services ar-
rangement exists involving no mon-
etary compensation. 
i. The incidental use of your private pas-
senger "autos" by an "insured" or any 
partner, agent or employee of an "in-
sured" in the "business" of: 
(1) selling; (4) storing; or 
(2) repairing; (5) parking; 
(3) servicing; 
vehicles designed for use mainly on pub-
lic highways. 
However, we do not cover vehicles 
owned by an "insured" primarily for 
use in such "business". 
j . The use of private passenger "autos" by 
an "insured" for "business" purposes 
not described in 5.i. above. However, we 
do not cover the carrying of persons for 
a fee, other than in a car pool arrange-
ment. 
k. Incidental farming by any "insured" on 
the "residence premises". 
6. To the rendering of or failure to render any 
professional service. 
7. To "bodily r **iry'\ " oerty damage" 
and "person . injury due to an "in-
sured's" act or omission as a member of 
the board of directors of any corporation, 
except non-profit corporations or organiza-
tions. 
8. To the extent that any other insurance is 
available to the "insured". 
9. To "bodily injury", "property damage", or 
"personal injury" for which the "insured" 
is also covered under a nuclear energy lia-
bility policy, even if the limits of liability 
for that policy have been exhausted. 
10. To "personal injury" due to: 
a. Violation of a penal statute or ordinance 
by or with the knowledge of the "in-
sured"; 
b. Advertising, broadcasting, or telecast-
ing activities by the "insured"; or 
c. Libel, slander, defamation, or violation 
of privacy: 
(1) If the same first injurious publica-
tion or utterance occurs prior to the 
effective date of this issuance; or 
(2) If the offense committed is about 
any organization or business, its 
products, or services, made with the 
knowledge of the falsity and by or 
at the direction of the "insured". 
11. To "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
due to the release or escape of: 
a. Waste materials; 
b. Irritants; 
c. Contaminants; or 
d. Pollutants. 
However, this exclusion does not apply if 
the release or escape is sudden and acci-
dental. 
12. To "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
caused directly or indirectly by war, in-
cluding undeclared war, civil war, insurrec-
tion, rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a 
military force or military personnel, de-
struction or seizure or use for a military 
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purpose, and in^ ading any asequence of 
any of these. Discharge of a nuclear 
weapon shall be deemed a warlike act even 
if accidental. 
13. To 44bodily injury" and "personal injury" 
to any "insured". 
14. To "bodily injury" or "property damage" 
arising out of the use of any "auto", "rec-
reational vehicle", or watercraft in racing 
events, including practicing for a race. 
This exclusion does not apply to sailboats. 
15. To "bodily injury" or "personal injury" 
arising out of the transmission of a commu-
nicable disease by an "insured". 
16. To amounts assessed against you by a cor-
poration or association of property owners 
except as provided under Additional Cov-
erages—Loss Assessment. 
PART VI CONDITIONS 
The following conditions apply in addition to the 
Sections I and II Conditions of this policy; 
A. "INSURED'S" DUTIES AFTER AN 
OCCURRENCE 
In the event of an "occurrence" which may 
involve this supplement, the "insured" must 
do the following: 
1. Give us a prompt, written notice. Include 
the names and addresses of all witnesses 
and injured persons. 
2. Promptly send us copies of all notices or 
legal papers related to the "occurrence". 
3. Cooperate with us in the investigation set-
tlement, or defense of any claim or suit. 
B. SUIT AGAINST US 
No legal action shall be brought against us: 
1. Unless the * 'insured" has fully complied 
with all the terms of this policy; and 
2. Until the amount of damages in excess of 
the "minimum retained limit" has been 
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settled. 1 . . amount aay be determined 
either by judgment against the "insured" 
or by written agreement signed by the "in-
sured", the claimant, and us. 
No one has the right to involve us as a party 
to any legal action to determine the liability 
of an "insured". 
C. LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
The most we will pay for all damages for any 
one "occurrence" is the limit shown on the 
Declarations page, regardless of the number 
of "insureds", claimants, or claims made. 
D. SEVERABILITY OF INSURANCE 
This coverage applies separately to each "in-
sured". This condition will not increase our 
limit of liability for any one "occurrence". 
E. SUBROGATION 
All of the "insured's" rights of recovery will 
become our rights to the extent of any pay-
ment we make under this supplement. The 
"insured" will do everything necessary to se-
cure such rights, and do nothing after loss to 
prejudice such rights. 
If we pay under this supplement and another 
person may be liable, we can exercise the 
rights of an "insured" against the person lia-
ble for the loss. Any recovery will be distrib-
uted in the following order: 
1. First, to any person who may have paid 
the liability exceeding the limit of our lia-
bility. 
2. Second, to us for the amount we have 
paid. 
3. Then, to any other party. 
The above amounts will be repaid less our 
proportionate share of the costs of recovery. 
This includes reasonable attorneys' fees. 
F. APPEALS 
If the "insured" or any other insurer elects 
not to appeal a judgment which exceeds the 
"minimum retained limits" we may do so. We 
will pay the cost and interest incidental to ap-
peal. 
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G. BANKRU; 
Bankruptcy or insolvency "i .-A "insured" 
will neither: 
3 Relieve us of o\ ir obligations under this 
supplement; nor 
2. Operate to cause this supplement to be 
come primary in the event the ''insured" is 
unable to satisfy the applicable deductible 
amount shown in Part IV of this supple-
ment either because of insufficient "pri-
mary insurance" or personal assets. 
ms policy is signed for the member company of 
rhe Travelers Insurance Companies which is the 
•:ror \inder this policy. 
Secretary ^ Prt>K\tipni 
Includes copyri^ at oi aisui ance Ser-
vices Office, witi ^sion. Copyright, In-
surance Services Office. Inc . 1984 1985 
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Tab 3 
Terry M. Plant, Bar No. ^ . ^  
John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 544 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
Attorneys for Travelers Indemnity Company 
4 Triad Center, Suite "On 
Post Office Box 2v 
Salt Lake City, Utah 0 4 11U • J (J 0 
(801 \ if.i-n^i^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
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D e f e n d a n t • ] 
• DRE ER GR ANTING 
| 1 AI tTIAL SUMMARY JUIHSMKNT -
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 T , u o r n e 
?;:r>-r:t f i ' -i ^f endant, The 
Travelers indemnity ^^up^i^, -- _ I lit* I'liinl 
pursuant to notice CL MCI.J.. } %-ovember 1, .-^b'l, at . J:00 a.m., 
.
 _
: -«h!f William : *:*-* x residing efendar" 
Travelers inaemnn; _ , -p-c-.?*- - ! 
Braithwaite, end >Iaintift Car la Cannon w^o representee izy . d 
counsel Pi *h Humpherys and Katha:; I- . Al:er. The Court , * csvmg 
cuiiv-i ~ . ." r- • •*''.,"('•;;- ne 
memoranda ana exhibits I: . ^ u ajppor; /nwL^w. he 
memoranda, affidavits .:n<i exhibits filed :. opposition to the 
advised as 
*.- * ne matters at issue, :* ; ir^aiiiy vjo^ u '..-use lueretor, 
RLED DISTRICT COURT 
Tn-ra Judicial District 
lll"l» | u H197 
\ ' 
HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
First Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is 
granted and said cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on 
the First Cause of Action on the ground that the Plaintiff lacks 
contractual privity with the Defendant and is not defined as an 
insured in the policy, and that the Plaintiff cannot maintain the 
action without being a party to the insurance contract or being 
defined as an insured under the policy. The Court finds that a 
right to sue for medical benefits, without contractual privity, 
does not give rise to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
that exists between parties to the contract. The Court finds that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 
First Cause of Action with prejudice and on the merits. 
2. That the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
Second Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 
is denied to the extent that the Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees 
and litigation expenses incurred in pursuing her claim for 
reimbursement of medical expenses up to the point when the 
$10,000.00 policy limit for medical expenses was paid, and further 
seeks interest on the medical expenses up to the point when they 
were paid. The motion for summary judgment is granted on the 
remaining part of the Second Cause of Action, which seeks other 
consequential damages, and the same is dismissed with prejudice and 
2 
on the merits, •'"here ^ing no aenui:.-=? 
fact. The broa.i consequential damages sought are not available fur 
hr-^^
 t.iyrv--. • t•-•:--- -*• * v"w - n t r a c t . 
3 mi- - * . , - , , ... 
Third Cause of Action of the Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ._ 
granted ana s~ ' ^ usr of H T : MI IS dismissed with prejudice and en 
the merits. - -d.irr* 
the Third Cause of Action . ., . t lie i^.a^;.i^:: . 
rri*7, "\ "or^ract with : h€ defendant a:u: that an action r^ r 
; n diiu "^l^nq may * -
cronint cniy JL. y ^  party * .*_ .uiJivii.ce cont: -
that . ^la^.~ tr was :. ,: ^i~y to the :\surance contract, ,% ; 
f
 * :^~".rrH i - p' l:~y. The Court 
finds that tL^ xiv-ji.;. :^ oU.„ : :. L ;.: i^ .t . 3<r=> 
does . * GLVC ..- thh ovenant ot good taith and fair deajL^ng 
t--* Dar^i^^ * ^  + f *-• contract. The court finds that 
there _...; ;.„.
 r*_. -_- _„ _
 r
-*:ri>ant 
is entitled to summary judgment as d mattei :
 Aaw aismissiiiq the 
Third Cause ^ F acti^r ar-H - : c . a LITIS .. I tr*- Plaintiff for alleged 
bied *' : n ana fair dealing with 
prejudice aiu- J,I tue meriLo. 
I . • ]e Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 
•:-*:.
 r : , r^+~ ^rnpnded Complaint 
is granted and said cause *. , ^ . . ... ... .-.-m:^;v j>rejud ice ai id 
on the merits. The Court grants the motion lor summary judgment on 
3 
the Fourth Cause of Action on the ground that alleged violations of 
the Utah Unfair Claim Settlement Practices statutes and rules do 
not give rise to any private cause of action. The Court finds that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the Defendant 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing the 
Fourth Cause of Action with prejudice and on the merits. 
Dated this /O ^day of /^T^ , 1997 
BY THE COURT: 
4 
1 ah 4 
Terry M. Plant, Bar No. 2 610' 
John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
Attorneys for Travelers Indemnity Company 
4 Triad Center, Suite 50 0 
Post Office Box 2 97 0 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
.SALT J,AJb . i 4 L JL , D J. r i i. JL \ J r •-, * J. i i i 
CARLA CANNON, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I ' I d l l l L l I l , 
V . 
THE TRAVELERS ^iNlTY 
COMPANY, 
Defendant, 
Judge Wi . Li am .-• L'horne 
The Court, having granted Defendant The Travelers Indemnity 
Compar -nnt:~- * ~~ rummar' ";unamer* w*r~ aspect to the First, 
summary , - , 
Action , diit h - — -
judgment, da^e_ 
respect :: • .e Second Cause 
:ered its order granting partial summary 
—/ 
HEREBY OH: :-:-v ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the First, Third and 
Fourth Causes ~^ Action of ^^^ P'^intiff-^ *• -* Amended Complaint 
are dismissea .; , ^ i ^ ,^.. 
Cause of Action cf the Plaintiff's First .Amended Complaint is 
c - . tM,i \ i ! - , :. ue ana on the merits except to the extent 
that the claim seeks attorney's fees and litigation expenses 
incurred in pursuing the claim for reimbursement of medical 
expenses up to the point that the expenses were reimbursed, and 
seeks interest on the medical expenses up to the point of 
reimbursement. 
Dated this / & day of ^ ^ c , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
i t i t o r n e y r o r P l a i n t i 
~~2^<^ 
Honorab le Tijfi'i1 iap";,A i 
T h i r d D&tii<iV^Ccfurt Judge 
it Carla Cannon 
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Terry M. Plant, Bar No. 2610 
John N. Braithwaite, Bar No. 4544 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
Attorneys for Travelers Indemnity Company 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 3 63-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 








) ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
) PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS 
) Civil No. 940906295PI 
Judge William A. Thorne 
Based upon the stipulation and motion of the parties, and 
finding good cause therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the 
remaining portion of Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action contained 
in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits, the parties having resolved the 
claim by agreement. No costs or attorney's fees are awarded to 
either party in connection with dismissal of the Second Cause of 
Action. This dismissal shall apply only to Plaintiff's claims 
for attorney's fees, costs, expenses and interest arising from 
the Plaintiff's claim for medical benefits as set forth in the 
niBD 
Thi, 
Second Cause of Action of the First Amended Complaint, and does 
not affect Plaintiff's right to appeal the dismissal of 
Plaintiff's claims previously dismissed by this Court on December 
10, 1997. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there is no further claim 
remaining in this matter for adjudication by this Court, and this 
order, together with the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, 
dated December 10, 1997, is the final order of this Court in this 
action. 
DATED this 3<D ~~ day of ^ ^^^/ 1998. 
BY THE COURT: _ 
Tab 6 
SCOTT M. MATHESON 
Governor 
STATE OF U TAJ I 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
326 SOUTH FIFTH EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102-4065 
PHONE (80113Se\££4.1 
ROGER C. DAY 
Commissioner oi Insurance 
UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT REGULATION 8:' • J 
UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES REGULATION 
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Section 1. Authority 
Section 31-2-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, provides that the Commissioner of 
Insurance shall have the powers and authority expressly conferred by or 
reasonably implied from the provisions of the code; Section 31-2-3.5(1), Utah 
Code Annotated, empowers the Commissioner to make reasonable rules and 
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reguiations necessary for, or as an aid to, the effectuation of any provision of 
the Insurance Code; Section 31-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, defines the business of 
insurance as one affected with the public interest, requiring good faith in all 
matters; Section 31-1-11, Utah Code Annotated, defines "insurance transaction11 
as including the transaction of matters subsequent to and arising out of the 
execution of the insurance contract; Section 31-2-9, Utah Code Annotated, pro-
vides, as a basis for revocation of license, methods which render the operation 
of an insurer hazardous to policyholders or the public; Section 31-5-10(4), Utah 
Code Annotated, establishes, as an additional basis for revocation of license, 
the practice of an insurer to habitually offer claimants less than the amount 
due or to compel suit to secure full payment; Section 31-17-50, Utah Code 
Annotated, in establishing standards for action by the Commissioner against 
other licensees, provides, as grounds for revocation of license, the intentional 
and material misrepresentation of the terms or effect of any insurance contract, 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices as defined in Chapter 27, and conduct 
demonstrating the licensee to be incompetent, untrustworthy, or a source of 
injury or loss to the public; Section 31-27-2(b) and (c), Utah Code Annotated, 
prohibits an agreement to engage in any joint act or practice for the purpose of 
establishing a method of transacting insurance which is unfairly discriminatory 
against any person, or a condition detrimental to free competition in the 
business of insurance or injurious to the insuring public; Section 31-27-1(2), 
Utah Code Annotated, authorizes the Commissioner to define methods of competi- . 
tion and acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance which 
are unfair or deceptive. 
Section 2. Purpose 
The business of insurance is a public trust assumed by persons accepting 
licenses to operate in this State and inherently includes a duty to treat 
claimants equitably and in good faith. The breach of such duty is considered to 
be an unfair or deceptive business practice and, if generally engaged in, an 
unfair method of competition. Such a practice is detrimental to free competi-
tion and injurious to the insuring public. The purpose of this regulation is to 
respond to the volume of complaints arising from claims settlement practices by 
affirmatively establishing standards of equity and good faith to guide licensees 
in the settlement of claims. This regulation defines and provides notice of 
such minimum standards which,, if violated knowingly, or with such frequency as 
to indicate a general business practice, will be considered to constitute unfair 
claims settlement practices. The promulgation of this regulation is done in 
recognition of the limited jurisdiction of the Utah Small Claims Court, and the 
practical unavailability to the public of other legal remedies to handle common 
claims disputes. It is intended that this regulation will help to establish 
parity between the public and professional insurance licensees and facilitate 
the prompt and fair settlement of insurance claims. 
Section 3. Scope 
The regulation defines certain minimum standards which, if violated knowingly, 
or with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, will be 
considered to constitute unfair claims settlement practices. Upon a Department 
finding made after hearing by due process of law, that conduct of a person is 
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not in accord with the standards as hereby established, penalties will be 
assessed as provided under Section 12, Except for Section 10(a), which shall 
not apply to policies of title insurance, worker's compensation, fidelity and 
surety, and boiler and machinery, this regulation applies to all persons and to 
all insurance policies, contracts and transactions. Individual agents, brokers, 
consultants and adjusters are subject to these standards, as well as other 
persons as herein defined. This regulation is not exclusive, and other acts, 
not herein specified, may also be considered to be violations of the insurance 
code or other regulations. Any changes in existing law are intended to be 
prospective only. This regulation is regulatory in nature and is intended only 
to regulate certain specified business practices and no right of private action 
or duty is intended. 
Section 4. Definitions 
(a) MPersonM shall mean any individual, corporation, association, partnership, 
reciprocal exchange, self-insurer, interinsurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal 
benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in the business of 
insurance, including agents, brokers, consultants and adjusters. Persons 
shall also mean medical service plans and hospital service plans as defined 
in Section 31-37-3, Utah Code Annotated. For purposes of this regulation, 
medical and hospital service plans shall be deemed to be engaged in the 
business of insurance; 
v J
 r,Agentu means any individual, corporation, association, partnership or 
other legal entity authorized to represent an insurer with respect to a 
claim; 
(r^ "Claimant" means either a first party claimant, a third party claimant, or 
both and includes such claimant's designated legal representative and in-
cludes a member of the claimant's immediate family designated by the 
claimant; 
(d) "First party claimant" means an individual, corporation, association, 
partnership or other legal entity asserting a right to payment under an 
insurance policy or insurance contract arising out of the occurrence of the 
contingency or loss covered by such policy or contract; 
(e) "Insurance policy" or "insurance contract" shall mean any contract of 
insurance, indemnity, medical or hospital service, suretyship, or annuity 
issued, proposed for issuance, or intended for issuance by any person; 
(f) "Insurer" means a person licensed to issue or who issues any insurance 
policy or insurance contract in this State; 
(g) "Investigation" means all activities of an insurer directly or indirectly 
related to the determination of liabilities under coverages afforded by an 
insurance policy or insurance contract; 
(h) "Notification of claim" means any notification, whether in writing or other 
means acceptable under the terms of an insurance policy or insurance 
contract, to an insurer or its agent, by a claimant, which reasonably 
apprises the insurer of the facts pertinent to a claim; 
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(i) 'Third party claimant11 means any individual, corporation, association, 
partnership or other legal entity asserting a claim against any individual, 
corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity insured under 
an insurance policy or insurance contract of an insurer; 
(j) "Worker's Compensation'1 includes, but is not limited to, Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Worker's Compensation; and 
(k) "General business practice" means a pattern of conduct found by the 
Commissioner by hearing or other legal process, on the basis of evidence 
from Court, Department, or licensee records, witness testimony, or other 
credible evidence, of policy, procedure, or practice. 
Section 5. Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair or Deceptive Acts 
and Practices Defined 
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or 
deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance: 
(a) misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to 
coverages at issue; 
(b) failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with 
respect to claims arising under insurance policies; 
(c) failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt 
investigation of claims arising under insurance policies; 
(d) refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation; 
(e) failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after 
proof of loss statements have been completed and communicated to the 
company or its representative; 
(f) not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable 
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear; 
(g) compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an 
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately 
recovered in actions brought by such insureds when claims or demands have 
been made for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately 
recovered; 
(h) attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable 
person would have believed he or she was entitled by reference to written 
or printed advertising material reasonably related to the insurance 
contract; 
(i) attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was 
altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of the insured; 
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(j) making claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by a 
statement or explanation of benefits setting forth the coverage under which 
the payments are being made; 
Ik) making Ynown to insureds ox claimants a policy o£ appealing {TOTTI arbitra-
tion awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling 
them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in 
arbitration; 
(1) delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, 
claimant, or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report 
and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, 
both of which submissions contain substantially the same information; 
(in) failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably 
clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to in-
fluence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage 
or under other policies of insurance; 
failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis, in the 
insurance policy, the facts or the applicable law, for denial of a claim or 
for the offer of a compromise settlement; 
(o) refusing payment of a claim solely on the basis of an insured's request to 
do so unless: 
(1) the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic, military 
service, or other immunity from suit or liability with respect to such 
claim; or 
the insured is granted the right under the policy of insurance to 
consent to settlement of claims; 
(pi iirectly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney; and 
(q) misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations. 
Section 6. Pile and "Record Documentation 
The insurer's claim files shall be subject to examination by the Commissioner or 
by his duly appointed designees. Such files shall contain all notes and work 
papers pertaining to the claim in such detail that pertinent events and the 
dates of such events can be reconstructed. 
Section 7. Misrepresentation of Policy Provisions 
(a) No insurer shall fail to fully disclose to first party claimants all perti-
nent benefits, coverages or other provisions of an insurance policy or 
insurance contract under which a claim is presented. 
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(b) No agent shall conceal from first-party claimants benefits, coverages or 
other provisions of any insurance policy or insurance contract when such 
benefits, coverages or other provisions are pertinent to a claim. 
(c) No insurer shall deny a claim for failure to exhibit the property without 
proof of demand and unfounded refusal by a claimant to do so. 
W-) -No insurer shall, except where there is a time limit specified in the 
policy, make-statements-,-wrrtten-or-otherwise, requiring a claimant to give 
written notice of loss or proof of loss within a specified time limit and 
which seek to relieve the company of its obligations if such a time limit 
is not complied with unless the failure to comply with such time limit 
prejudices the insurer's rights. 
(e) No insurer shall request a first party claimant to sign a release of the 
insurer that extends beyond the subject matter that gave rise to the claim 
payment. 
(f) No insurer shall issue checks or drafts in partial settlement of a loss or 
claim under a specific coverage which contain language which releases the 
insurer or its insured from its total liability. 
Section 8. Failure to Acknowledge Pertinent Communications 
(a) Every insurer, upon receiving notification of a claim shall, within ten 
working days, acknowledge the receipt of such notice unless payment is made 
within such period of time, or unless the insurer has a reason acceptable 
to the Insurance Department as to why such acknowledgement cannot be made 
within the time specified. Health insurers shall be allowed an additional 
ten working days under this subsection. If an acknowledgement is made by 
means other than writing, an appropriate notation of such acknowledgement 
shall be made in the claim file of the insurer and dated. Notification 
given to an agent of an insurer shall be notification to the insurer. 
(b) Every insurer, upon receipt of any inquiry from the Insurance Department 
respecting a claim shall, within fifteen working days of receipt of such 
inquiry, furnish the Department with an adequate response to the inquiry. 
(c) An appropriate reply shall be made within ten working days on all other 
pertinent communications from a claimant which reasonably suggest that a 
response is expected. 
(d) Every insurer, upon receiving notification or claim, shall promptly provide 
necessary claim forms, instructions, and reasonable assistance so that 
first party claimants can comply with the policy conditions and the 
insurer's reasonaole requirements. 
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Section 9. Standards for Prompt Investigation of Claims 
Every insurer shall complete investigation of a claim within forty-five days 
after notification of claim, unless such investigation cannot reasonably be 
completed within such time. 
Section 10. Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements 
AppiicaDie to All Insurers 
(a) Within twenty working days after receipt by the insurer of properly 
executed proofs of loss, the first party claimant shall be advised of the 
acceptance or denial of the claim by the insurer. No insurer shall deny a 
claim on the grounds of a specific policy provision, condition, or 
exclusion unless reference to such provision, condition, or exclusion is 
included in the denial. The denial must be given to the claimant in 
writing and the claim file of the insurer shall contain a copy of the 
denial. Where there is a "reasonable basis supported by specific 
information available for "review -by- the "Insurance Department that the first 
party claimant has engaged in criminal activity, fraud, material 
misrepresentation, material non-disclosure or has caused or contributed to 
the loss by arson, the insurer is relieved from the requirements of this 
subsection. However, the claimant shall be advised of the acceptance or 
denial of the claim within a reasonable time for full investigation after 
receipt by the insurer of a properly executed proof of loss. 
(b) If a claim is denied for reasons other than those described in paragraph 
(a) and is made by any other means than writing, an appropriate notation 
shall be made in the claim file of the insurer. 
(cj If the insurer needs more than twenty working days to determine whether a 
first party claim should be accepted or denied, it shall so notify the 
first party claimant within twenty working days after receipt of the 
notification of claim giving the reasons more time is needed. If the 
investigation remains incomplete, the insurer shall, forty-five days from 
the date of the initial notification and every forty-five days thereafter, 
send to such claimant a letter setting forth the reasons additional time is 
needed for investigation. Where there is a reasonable basis supported by 
specific information available for review by the Insurance Department that 
the first party claimant has engaged in criminal activity, fraud, material 
misrepresentation, material non-disclosure or has caused or contributed to 
the loss by arson, the insurer is relieved from the requirements of this 
subsection. However, the claimant shall be advised of the acceptance or 
denial of the claim within a reasonable time for full investigation after 
receipt by the insurer of a properly executed proof of loss. 
(d) Insurers shall not fail to settle first party claims on the casis that 
responsibility for pnyment should be assumed by otners except as may 
otherwise be provided by policy provisions. 
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(e) Insurers shall not continue negotiations for settlement of a claim directly 
with a claimant who is neither an attorney nor represented by an attorney 
until the claimant's rights may be affected by a statute of limitations or 
a policy or contract time limit, without giving the claimant written notice 
that the time limit may be expiring and may affect the claimant's rights. 
Such notice shall be given to claimants at least sixty days before the date 
on which such time limit may expire. 
(f) No insurer shall make statements which indicate that the rights of a third 
party claimant may be impaired if a form or release is not completed within 
a given period of time unless the statement is given for the purpose of 
notifying the third party claimant of the provision of a statute'of 
limitations. 
Section 11. Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements 
Applicaole to Automooile Insurance 
(a) When the insurance policy provides for the adjustment and settlement of 
first party automobile total losses on the basis of actual cash value or 
replacement with another of like kind and quality, one of the following 
methods must apply: 
(1) The insurer may elect to offer a replacement automobile which is a 
specific comparable automobile available to the insured, with all 
applicable taxes, license fees and other fees incident to transfer 
of evidence of ownership of the automobile paid, at no cost other 
than any deductible provided in the policy. The offer and any 
rejection thereof must be documented in the claim file. 
(2) The insurer may elect a cash settlement based upon the actual cost, 
less any deductible provided in the policy, to purchase a compar-
able automobile including all applicable taxes, license fees and 
other fees incident to transfer of evidence of ownership of a com-
parable automobile. Such cost may be determined by 
(A) The cost of a comparable automobile in the local market area 
when a comparable automobile is available in the local market 
area; or 
(B) One of two or more quotations obtained by the insurer from 
two or more qualified dealers located within the local market 
area when a comparable automobile is not available in the 
local market area. 
(3) When a first party automobile total loss is settled on a basis 
which deviates from the metnods d^scrib-d in subsections (a)(1) and 
(a)(2) of tnis section, the deviation must be supported oy 
documentation giving particulars of tne automobile condition. .Any 
deductions from such cost, including deductions for salvage, must 
be measurable, discernible, itemized and specified as to dollar 
amount and snail be appropriate in amount. The basis for such 
settlement shall be fully explained to the first party claimant. 
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(b) Total loss settlements with a third party claimant shall be on the basis 
of the market value or actual cost of a comparable automobile at the time 
of loss. Settlement procedures shall be in accordance with paragraphs 
(2) and (3) of subsection (a). 
(c) Where liability and damages are reasonably clear, insurers shall 
not recommend that third party claimants make claim under their own 
policies solely to avoid paying claims under such~insurer?s 'insurance 
policy or insurance contract. 
Insurers shall not require a claimant to travel unreasonably 
to inspect a replacement automobile, to obtain a repair estimate or to 
have the automobile repaired at a specific repair shop. 
(e) Insurers shall, upon the claimant's request, include the first party 
claimant's deductible, if any, in subrogation demands initiated by the 
insurer. Subrogation recoveries may be shared on a proportionate basis 
with the first party claimant when an agreement is reached for less than 
the full amount of the loss, unless the deductible amount has been other-
wise recovered. The recovery shall be applied first to reimburse the 
first party claimant for the amount or share of the deductible when the 
full amount or share of the deductible has been recovered. iNo deduction 
for expenses can be made from the deductible recovery unless an outside 
attorney is retained to collect such recovery. The deduction may then be 
for only a pro rata share of the allocated loss adjustment expense. If 
subrogation is initiated but discontinued, the insured shall be advised. 
(f) If an insurer prepares or approves an estimate of the cost of 
automobile repairs, such estimate shall be in an amount for wnich it may 
be reasonably expected the damage can be satisfactorily repaired. If the 
insurer prepares an estimate,.it shall give a copy of the estimate to the 
claimant and may furnish to the claimant the names of one or more 
conveniently located repair shops. 
(g) When the amount claimed is reduced because of betterment or 
depreciation, all information for such reduction shall be contained in 
the claim file. Such deductions shall be itemized and specified as to 
dollar amount and shall be appropriate for the amount of deductions. 
I When the insurer elects to repair and designates a specific repair 
shop for automobile repairs, the insurer shall cause the damaged auto-
mobile to be restored to its condition prior to the loss at no additional 
cost to the claimant other than as stated in the policy and within a 
reasonable period of time. 
(i) Loss of use payment shall be made to a third party claimant for the 
reasonably incurred cost of transportation, or for the r^asonablv in-
curred rental cost of a substitute vehicle during the period tne'auto-
mobile is necessarily withdrawn from service to obtain parts or effect 
repair, or, in the event the automobile is a total loss and a claim has 
been timely made, during the period from the date of loss until a reason-
able settlement offer has been made by the insurer. Loss of use payments 
shall be an amount in addition to the payment for tne value of the 
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Section 12. Penalties 
Persons found, after hearing or other legal process, to have been in viola-
tion of this regulation shall be subject to fine, suspension, or revocation of 
their insurance license or Certificate of Authority, and/or any other 
penalties or measures as are determined by the Commissioner in accordance with 
law. Any penalty imposed under this regulation shall be commensurate with the 
violation committed and subject to the following provisions and limitations: 
(a) Separate and disparate penalties may be assessed insurer, organization 
and individual persons; 
(b) Frequency of occurrence and severity of detriment to the public shall be 
considered in determining a penalty; 
(c) No license or Certificate of Authority shall be suspended on the basis of 
a single violation; and 
(d) No revocation of license or Certificate of Authority shall occur except 
upon a finding of improper conduct as a general business practice. 
Section 13. Severability 
If any provision or clause of this regulation or the application thereof to 
any person or situation is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any 
other provision or application of the regulation which can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions 
of this regulation are declared to be severable. 
Section 14. Effective Date 
This regulation shall be effective on or after the first day of December, 1982, 
/?s^, <f~£&^ 
ROGER^ey DAY ~ 7 ^ ~ 7 ^ 
Commissioner or Insurance 
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Section 31-2-3(2), Utah Co^e Annotated, provides that the Commis-
sioner of Insurance shall have the powers and authority expressly 
conferred by or reasonably implied from the provision of the code; 
Section 31-2-3.5(1), Utah Code Annotated, empowers the Commissioner 
to make reasonable rules and regulations necessary for, or as an aid to, 
the effectuation of any provision of the Insurance Code; Section 31-1-8, 
Utah Code Annotated, defines the business of insurance as one affected 
with the public interest, requiring good faith in all matters; Section 
31-1-11, Utah Code Annotated, defines "insurance transaction" as in-
cluding the transaction of matters subsequent to and arising out of the 
execution of the insurance contract; Section 31-2-9, Utah Code Anno-
tated, provides, as a basis for revocation of license, methods which 
render the operation of an insurer hazardous to policyholders or the 
public; Section 31-5-10(4), Utah Code Annotated, establishes, as an 
additional basis for revocation of license, the practice of an insurer to 
habitually offer claimants less than the amount due or to compel suit to 
secure full payment; Section 31-17-50, Utah Code Annotated, in estab-
lishing standards for action by the Commissioner against other licen-
sees, provides, as grounds for revocation of license, the intentional and 
material misrepresentation of the terms or effect of any insurance 
contract, unfair or deceptive acts or practices as defined in Chapter 27, 
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and conduct demonstrating the licensee to be incompetent, untrustwor-
thy, or a source of injury or loss to the public; Section 31-27-2(b) and 
(c), Utah Code Annotated, prohibits an agreement to engage in any 
joint act or practice for the purpose of establishing a method of trans-
acting insurance which is unfairly discriminatory against any person, or 
a condition detrimental to free competition in the business of insurance 
or injurious to the insuring public; Section 31-27-1(2), Utah Code Anno-
tated, authorized the commissioner to define methods of competition 
and acts and practices in the conduct of the business of insurance which 
are unfair or deceptive. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formeriy Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-2. Purpose 
The business of insurance is a public trust assumed by persons ac-
cepting licenses to operate in this State and inherently includes a duty 
to treat claimants equitably and in good faith. The breach of such duty 
is considered to be an unfair or deceptive business practice and, if 
generally engaged in, an unfair method of competition. Such a practice 
is detrimental to free competition and injurious to the insuring public 
The purpose of this regulation is to respond to the volume of complaints 
arising from claims settlement practices by affirmatively establishing 
standards of equity and good faith to guide licensees in the settlement 
of claims. This regulation defines and provides notice of such minimum 
standards which, if violated knowingly, or with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice, will be considered to constitute 
unfair claims settlement practices. The promulgation of this regulation 
is done in recognition of the limited jurisdiction of the Utah Small 
Claims Court, and the practical unavailability to the public of other 
remedies to handle common claims disputes. It is intended that this 
regulation will help to establish parity between the public and profes-
sional insurance licensees and facilitate the prompt and fair settlement 
of insurance claims. 
History.—Effective December 1, 1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-3. Scope 
The regulation defines certain minimum standards which, if violated 
knowingly, or with such frequency as to indicate a general business 
practice, will be considered to constitute unfair claims settlement prac-
tices. Upon a Department finding made after hearing by due process of 
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law, that conduct of person is not in accord with the standards as 
hereby established, penalties will be assessed as provided under Sec-
tion 12. Except for Section 10(a), which shall not apply to policies of 
title insurance, worker's compensation, fidelity and surety, and boiler 
and machinery, this regulation applies to all persons and to all insur-
ance policies, contracts and transactions. Individual agents, brokers, 
consultants and adjusters are subject to these standards, as well as 
other persons as herein defined. This regulation is not exclusive, and 
other acts, not herein specified, may also be considered to be violations 
of the insurance code or other regulations. Any changes in existing law 
are intended to be prospective only. This regulation is regulatory in 
nature and is intended only to regulate certain specified business prac-
tices and no right of private action or duty is intended. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-4. Definitions 
A. "Person" shall mean any individual, corporation, association, part-
nership, reciprocal exchange, self-insurer, interinsurer, Lloyds insurer, 
fraternal benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in the 
business of insurance, includfcig agents, brokers, consultants and ad-
justers. Persons shall also mean medical service plans and hospital 
service plans as defined in Section 31-37-3, Utah Code Annotated. For 
purposes of this regulation, medical and hospital service plans shall be 
deemed to be engaged in the business of insurance; 
B. "Agent" means any individual, corporation, association, partner-
ship or other legal entity authorized to represent an insurer with re-
spect to a claim; 
C. "Claimant" means either a first party claimant, a third party 
claimant, or both and includes such claimant's designated legal repre-
sentative and includes a member of the claimant's immediate family 
designated by the claimant; 
D. "First party claimant" means an individual, corporation, associa-
tion, partnership or other legal entity asserting a right to payment 
under an insurance policy or insurance contract arising out of the 
occurrence of the contingency or loss covered by such policy or con-
tract; 
E. "Insurance policy" or "insurance contract" shall mean any con-
tract of insurance, indemnity, medica or hospital service, suretyship, or 
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annuity issued, proposed for issuance, or intended for issuance by any 
person; 
F. "Insurer" means a person licensed to issue or who issues any 
insurance policy or insurance contract in this State; 
G. "Investigation" means all activities of an insurer directly or indi-
rectly related to the determination of liabilities under coverages af-
forded by an insurance policy or insurance contract; 
H. "Notification of claim" means any notification, whether in writing 
or other means acceptable under the terms of an insurance policy or 
insurance contract, to an insurer or its agent, by a claimant, which 
reasonably apprises the insurer of the facts pertinent to a claim; 
I. "Third party claimant" means any individual, corporation, associa-
tion, partnership or other legal entity asserting a claim against any 
individual, corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity 
insured under an insurance policy or insurance contract of an insurer; 
J. "Worker's Compensation" includes, but is not limited to, Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation; and 
K "General business practice" means a pattern of conduct found by 
the Commissioner by hearing or other'^ iegal process, on the basis of 
evidence from Court, Department, or licensee records, witness testi-
mony, or other credible evidence, of policy, procedure, or practice. 
History.—Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-5. Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive 
acts and practices defined 
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition 
and unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the business of insurance: 
A- misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions 
relating to coverages at issue; 
B. failing to acknowledge and act reasonably prompdy upon commu-
nications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies; 
C. failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the 
prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies; 
D. refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investiga-
tion; 
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E. failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable 
time after proof of loss statements have been completed and communi-
cated to the company or its representative; 
F. not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equita-
ble settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear; 
G. compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due 
under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the 
amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds when 
claims or demands have been made for amounts reasonably similar to 
the amounts ultimately recovered; 
H. attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a 
reasonable person would have believed he or she was entitled by refer-
ence to written or printed advertising material reasonably related to 
the insurance contract; 
L attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was 
altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of the insured; 
J. making claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompa-
nied by a statement or explanation of benefits setting forth the cover-
age under which the payments are being made; ' 
K making known to insureds of claimants a policy of appealing from 
arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of 
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the 
amount awarded in arbitration; 
L. delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an 
insured, claimant, or the physician or either to submit a preliminary 
claim report and then requiring the subsequent submission of formal 
proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain substantially the 
same information; 
M. failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become rea-
sonably clear, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in 
order to influence settlements under other portions of the insurance 
policy coverage or under other policies of insurance; 
N. failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis, 
in the insurance policy, the facts or the applicable law, for denial of a 
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement; 
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0. refusing payment of a claim solely on the basis of an insured's 
request to do so unless: 
(1) the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, diplomatic, military 
service, or other immunity from suit or liability with respect to such 
claim; or 
(2) the insured is granted the right under the policy of insurance to 
consent to settlement of claims; 
P. directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attor-
ney; and 
Q. misleading a claimant as to the applicable nature of limitations. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-6. File and record documentation 
The insurer's claim files shall be subject to examination by the Com-
missioner or by his duly appointed designees. Such files shall contain all 
notes and work papers pertaining to the claim in such detail that 
pertinent events and the dates of such events can be reconstructed. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-7. Misrepresentation of policy provisions 
A. No insurer shall fail to fully disclose to first party claimants all 
pertinent benefits, coverages or other provisions of an insurance policy 
or insurance contract under which a claim is presented. 
B. No agent shall conceal from first party claimants benefits, cover-
ages or other provisions of any insurance policy or insurance contract 
when such benefits, coverages or other provisions are pertinent to a 
claim. 
C. No insurer shall deny a claim for failure to exhibit the property 
without proof of demand and unfounded refusal by a claimant to do so. 
D. No insurer shall, except where there is a time limit specified in the 
policy, make statements, written or otherwise, requiring a claimant to 
give written notice of loss or proof of loss within a specified time limit 
and which seek to relieve the company of its obligations if such a time 
limit is not complied with unless the failure to comply with such time 
limit prejudices the insurer's rights. 
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E. No insurer shall request a first party claimant to sign a release of 
the insurer that extends beyond the subject matter that gave rise to the 
claim payment 
F. No insurer shall issue checks or drafts in partial settlement of a 
loss or claim under a specific coverage which contain language which 
releases the insurer or its insured from its total liability. 
History.-Effective December lt 1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-8. Failure to acknowledge pertinent communications 
A. Every insurer, upon receiving notification of a claim shall, within 
ten working days, acknowledge the receipt of such notice unless pay-
ment is made within such period of time, or unless the insurer has a 
reason acceptable to the Insurance Department as to why such ac-
knowledgement cannot be made within the time specified Health insur-
ers shall be allowed an additional ten working days under this 
subsection. If an acknowledgement is made by means other than writ-
ing, an appropriate notation of such acknowledgement shall be made in 
the claim file of the insurer and dated. 
Notification given to an agent of an insurer shall be notification to the 
insured. 
B. Every insurer, upon receipt of an inquiry from the Insurance 
Department respecting a claim shall, within fifteen working days of 
receipt of such inquiry, furnish the Department with an adequate re-
sponse to the inquiry. 
C. An appropriate reply shall be made within ten working days on all 
other pertinent communications from a claimant which reasonably sug-
gest that a response is expected. 
D. Every insurer, upon receiving notification of claim shall promptly 
provide necessary claim forms, instructions, and reasonable assistance 
so that first party claimants can comply with the policy conditions and 
the insurer's reasonable requirements. 
History.-Effective December 1, 1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
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R540-89-9. Standards for prompt investigation of claims 
Every insurer shall complete investigation of a claim within forty-five 
days after notification of claim, unless such investigation cannot reason-
ably be completed within such time. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-10. Standards for prompt, fair and equitable settlements 
applicable to all insurers 
A- Within twenty working days after receipt by the insurer of prop-
erly executed proofs of loss, the first party claimant shall be advised of 
the acceptance or denial of the claim by the insurer. No insurer shall 
deny a claim on the grounds of a specific policy provision, condition, or 
exclusion unless reference to such provision, condition, or exclusion is 
included in the denial. The denial must be given to the claimant in 
writing and the claim file of the insurer shall contain a copy of the 
denial. Where there is a reasonable basis supported by specific informa-
tion available for review by the Insurance Department that the first 
party claimant has engaged in aiminal activity, fraud, material misrep-
resentation, material nondisclosure or has caused or contributed to the 
loss by arson, by insurer is relieved from the requirements of this 
subsection. However, the claimant shall be advised of the acceptance or 
denial of the claim within a reasonable time for full investigation after 
receipt by the insurer of a properly executed proof of loss. 
B. If a claim is denied for reasons other than those described in 
paragraph A and is made by any other means than writing, an appro-
priate notation shall be made in the claim file of the insurer. 
C. If the insurer needs more than twenty working days to determine 
whether a first party claim should be accepted or denied, it shall so 
notify the first party claimant within twenty working days after receipt 
of the proofs of loss giving the reasons more time is needed. If the 
investigation remains incomplete, the insurer shall, forty-five days from 
the date of the initial notification and every forty-five days thereafter, 
send to such claimant a letter setting forth the reasons additional time 
is needed for investigation. Where there is a reasonable basis sup-
ported by specific information available for review by the Insurance 
Department that the first party claimant has engaged in criminal activ-
ity, fraud, material misrepresentation, material non-disclosure or has 
caused or contributed to the loss by arson, the insurer is relieved from 
the requirements of this subsection. However, the claimant shall be 
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advised of the acceptance or denial of the claim within a reasonable 
time for full investigation after receipt by the time the insurer of a 
properly executed proof of loss. 
D. Insurers shall not fail to settle first party claims on the basis that 
responsibility for payment should be assumed by others except as may 
otherwise be provided by policy provision. 
E. Insurers shall not continue negotiations for settlement of a claim 
directly with a claimant who is neither an attorney nor represented by 
an attorney untO the claimant's rights may be affected by a statute of 
limitations or a policy or contract time limit, without giving the claimant 
written notice that the time limit may be expiring and may affect the 
claimant's rights. Such notice shall be given to claimants at least sixty 
days before the date on which such time limit may expire. 
F. No insurer shall make statements which indicate that the rights of 
a third party claimant may be impaired if a form or release is not 
completed within a given period of time unless the statement is given 
for the purpose of notifying the third party claimant of the provision of 
a statute of limitations. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982-,.formerly Regulation 82-5. 
R540-89-11. Standards for prompt, fair and equitable settlements 
applicable to automobile insurance 
A. When the insurance policy provides for the adjustments and set-
tlement of first party automobile total losses on the basis of actual cash 
value or replacement with another of like kind and quality, one of the 
following methods must apply: 
(1) The insurer may elect to offer a replacement automobile which is 
a specific comparable automobile available to the insured, with all appli-
cable taxes, license fees and other fees incident to transfer of evidence 
of ownership of the automobile paid, at no cost other than any deducti-
ble provided in the policy. The offer and any rejection thereof must be 
documented in the claim file. 
(2) The insurer may elect a cash settlement based upon the actual 
cost, less any deductible provided in the policy, to purchase a compara-
ble automobile including all applicable taxes, license fees and other fees 
incident to transfer of evidence of ownership of a comparable automo-
bile. Such cost may be determined by: 
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(a) The cost of a comparable automobile in the local market area 
when a comparable automobile is available in the local market area; or 
(b) One of two or more quotations obtained by the insurer from two 
or more qualified dealers located within the local market area when a 
comparable automobile is not available in the local market area. 
(3) When a first party automobile total loss is settled on a basis which 
deviates from the methods described in subsections A(l) and A(2) of 
this section, the deviation must be supported by documentation giving 
particulars of the automobile condition. Any deductions from such cost, 
including deductions for salvage, must be measurable, itemized and 
specified as to dollar amount and shall be appropriate in amount The 
basis for such settlement shall be fully explained to the first party 
claimant 
B. Total loss settlement with a third party claimant shall be on the 
basis of the market value or actual cost of a comparable automobile at 
the time of loss. Settlement procedures shall be in accordance with 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection A. 
C. Where liability and damages are reasonably clear, insurers shall 
not recommend that third party claimants make claim under their own 
policies solely to avoid paying claims under such insurer's insurance 
policy or insurance contract 
D. Insurers shall not require a claimant to travel unreasonably to 
inspect a replacement automobile, to obtain a repair estimate or to have 
the automobile repaired at a specific repair shop. 
E. Insurers shall, upon the claimant's request, include the first party 
claimant's deductible, if any, in subrogation demands initiated by the 
insurer. Subrogation recoveries may be shared on a proportionate basis 
with the first party claimant when an agreement is reached for less 
than the full amount of the loss, unless the deductible amount has been 
otherwise recovered. The recovery shall be applied first to reimburse 
the first party claimant for the amount or share of the deductible when 
the full amount or share of the deductible has been recovered. No 
deduction for expenses can be made from the deductible recovery un-
less an outside attorney is retained to collect such recovery. The deduc-
tion may then be for only a pro rata share of the allocated loss 
adjustment expense. If subrogation is initiated but discontinued, the 
insured shall be advised. 
F. If an insurer prepares or approves an estimate of the cost of 
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automobile repairs, such estimate shall be in an amount for which it 
may be reasonably expected the damage can be satisfactorily repaired. 
If the insurer prepares an estimate, it shall give a copy of the estimate 
to the claimant and may furnish to the claimant the names of one or 
more conveniently located repair shops, 
G. When the amount claimed is reduced because of betterment or 
depreciation, all information for such reduction shall be contained in 
the claim file. Such deductions shall be itemized and specified as to 
dollar amount and shall be appropriate for the amount of deductions. 
H. When the insurer elects to repair and designates a specific repair 
shop for automobile repairs, the insurer shall cause the damaged auto-
mobile to be restored to its condition prior to the loss at no additional 
cost to the claimant other than as stated in the policy and within a 
reasonable period of time. 
I. Loss of use payment shall be made to a third party claimant for the 
reasonably incurred cost of transportation, or for the reasonably in-
curred rental cost of a substitute vehicle during the period the automo-
bile is necessarily withdrawn from service to obtain parts or effect 
repair, or, in the event the automobile is a total loss and a claim has 
been timely made, during the period from the date of loss until a 
reasonable settlement offer has been made by the insurer. Loss of use 
payments shall be an amount in addition to the payment for the value of 
the automobile. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-12. Penalties 
Persons found, after hearing or other legal process, to have been in 
violation of this regulation shall be subject to fine, suspension, or revo-
cation of their insurance license or Certificate of Authority, and/or any 
other penalties or measures as are determine by the Commissioner in 
accordance with law. Any penalty imposed under this regulation shall 
be commensurate with the violation committed and subject to the fol-
lowing provisions and limitations: 
A Separate and disparate penalties may be assessed insurer, organi-
zation and individual persons; 
B. Frequency of occurrence and severity of detriment to the public 
shall be considered in determining a penalty; 
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C. No license or Certificate of Authority shall be suspended on the 
basis of a single violation; and 
D. No revocation of license or Certificate of Authority shall occur 
except upon a finding of improper conduct as a general business prac-
tice. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
R540-89-13. Severability 
If any provision or clause of this regulation or the application thereof 
to any person or situation is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect 
any other provision or application of the regulation which can be given 
effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the 
provisions of this regulation are declared to be severable. 
History.-Effective December 1,1982; formerly Regulation 82-3. 
286 
© 1987, NILS Publishing Company 
Tab 8 
R590-88-3 INSURANCE 
METs are required to file annual reports with the 
United States Department of Labor. The annual 
report should state the extent to which a METs 
annuity or insurance-type benefits are provided by 
an insurance carrier. 
R590-88-3. Definitions. 
(A) Multiple Employer Trust (MET) - An entity is 
herein referred to as a Multiple Employer Trust 
(MET) if that entity is providing insurance type 
benefits to employees of more than one employer, 
and tha t entity is not an insurance company autho-
rized to do business in the state of Utah. 
(B) Unauthorized Multiple Employer Trust - An 
entity purporting to be a Multiple Employer Trust 
(MET) is hereby defined as an Unauthorized Mul-
tiple Employer Trust if: 
(1) The MET has not received an opinion letter 
from the United States Department of Labor recog-
nizing the entity as a qualified trust under ERISA, 
or 
(2) The benefits offered are not fully insured by an 
insurer licensed to do business in the State of Utah 
and no opinion letter recognizing the entity as a 
qualified ERISA plan has been issued from the U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
(C) An unauthorized MET is defined to be an 
unauthorized insurer. Any claimed multiple em-
ployer t rus t which does not fulfill the requirements 
of a multiemployer plan as defined by ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. 1001 et seq., as amended, is also denned to be 
an unauthorized MET and consequently an unau-
thorized insurer. 
(D) All other definitions are the same as are 
provided in Chapter 1, Title 31A, Utah Code Anno-
tated. 
R590-88-4. Prohibited Transactions. 
When the Insurance Department finds evidence 
that a person (as defined in Section 31A-1-301, Utah 
Code Annotated) is engaging, or has engaged, in one 
or more of the following practices, that person's 
actions will be treated as prima facie evidence that 
the person has shown himself to be incompetent, 
untrustworthy, and/or a source of injury to the 
public pursuant to Section 31A-23-216, Utah Code 
Annotated. These practices are: 
(A) Accepting commissions, salaries, or any other 
remuneration for placing business with or soliciting 
membership in an unauthorized MET, whether or 
not the arrangement involves a formal contract or is 
called a commission. 
(B) Using the status or title as a licensed insur-
ance agent in any way in connection with placement 
of business with an unauthorized MET. This shall 
include, but not be limited to: 
(1) Using an agent's letterhead; 
(2) Using an agent's office; 
(3) Using customer lists or contracts developed as 
an agent; and 
(4) Representing in any manner that the person 
placing this business is a licensed insurance agent. 
R590-88-5. Sanct ions . 
Agents found to be engaging in, or to have en-
gaged in, the prohibited transactions with unautho-
rized METs set forth under Section 4 of this Rule are 
subject to one or more of the following sanctions: 
(A) Revocatiorror suspension of the agent's license 
and/or the imposition of a fine pursuant to Section 
31A-23-216 Utah Code Annotated; and 
(B) Recovery of any claims or losses pursuant to 
Section 31A-15-105, Utah Code Annotated; and 
(C) Any other sanctions provided by law including 
those found in Section 31A-2-308, U.C.A. 
R590-88-6. Inquiries. 
In the event any person wishes to determine if a 
particular entity is a licensed insurer in the State of 
Utah, an inquiry should be made to the Insurance 
Department. Inquiries should be addressed as fol-
lows: Commissioner of Insurance, Utah State Insur-
ance Department, State Office Building, Room 3110, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, Attention: Insurer Li-
censing Division. Inquiries may also be made by 
telephone to the Insurance Department at (801) 
538-3800. 
R590-88-7. Severability. 
If any provision or clause of this Rule or the 
application thereof to any person or situation is held 
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other 
provision or application of the Rule which can be 
given effect without the invalid provision or appli-
cation, and to this end the provisions of this Rule are 
declared to be severable. 
References: 31A-2-101, 31A-2-201, 31A-2-211. 
History: 9880, AMD, 05/10/89; 10704, NSC, 05/11/90; 
16727, 5YR, 03/01/95. 
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ADMINISTRATION R590-89-4 
R590-89-1. Authority. 
This rule is promulgated pursuant to Subsections 
31A-20K1) and 31A-2-201(3)(a) in which the Com-
missioner is empowered to administer and enforce 
this title and to make rules to implement the provi-
sions of this title. Further authority to provide for 
timely payment of claims is provided by Subsection 
31A-26-301(l). Matters relating to proof and notice 
of loss are promulgated pursuant to Sections 31A-
26-301 and 31A-21-312(5). Authority to promulgate 
rules denning unfair claims settlement practices or 
acts is provided in Subsection 31A-26-303(4). Sub-
section 31A-2-308(l)(a) provides for penalties for 
any person who violates any insurance statute or 
rule. 
R590-89-2. Purpose. 
The business of insurance continues to be one of 
public trust assumed by persons accepting licenses 
to operate in this State and inherently includes a 
duty to treat claimants fairly, equitably and in good 
faith. The breach of such duty is considered to be an 
unfair or deceptive business practice and injurious 
to the insuring public. The purpose of this rule is to 
respond to the volume of complaints arising from 
claims settlement practices by affirmatively estab-
lishing standards of equity and good faith to guide 
licensees in the settlement of claims. Furthermore, 
as the standards are properly followed by all licens-
ees, it should encourage future self-regulation of the 
insurance industry. It is intended that this rule will 
help to establish parity between the public and 
professional insurance licensees and facilitate the 
prompt and fair settlement of insurance claims. 
R590-89-3. Scope. 
This rule defines certain minimum standards 
which, if violated, may constitute unfair claims 
settlement practices. All agency actions will be con-
ducted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act. Penalties for violation of this rule shall be 
in accordance with Section 31A-2-308, Utah Code. 
This rule applies to all persons and to all insurance 
policies, contracts and transactions. Individual 
agents, brokers, consultants, and adjusters are sub-
ject to these standards, as well as other persons 
herein defined. This rule is not exclusive, and other 
acts, not herein specified, may also be considered to 
be violations of the insurance code or other rules. 
This rule is regulatory in nature and is not intended 
to create a private right of action. 
R590-89-4. Definitions. 
A. "Agent" means any individual, corporation, 
association, organization, partnership, or other legal 
entity authorized to represent an insurer with re-
spect to a claim, whether or not licensed within the 
State of Utah to do so. 
B. "Claim" means, for the purpose of this Rule, a 
request or a demand on an insurer, whether by a 
first party or a third party, for payment of benefits 
according to the terms of an insurance policy. 
C. "Claimant" means either a first party claimant, 
a third party claimant, or both and includes such 
claimant's designated legal representative and in-
cludes a member of the claimant's immediate family 
designated by the claimant. 
D. "First party claimant" means an individual, 
corporation, association, partnership or other legal 
entity asserting a right to payment under an insur-
ance policy or insurance contract arising out of the 
occurrence of the contingency or loss covered by such 
policy or contract. For the purposes of this Rule, 
certificate holders of group disability policies are 
considered to be first party claimants. 
E. "General business practice" means a pattern of 
conduct. 
F. "Insurance policy" or "insurance contract" shall 
mean any contract of insurance, indemnity, medical 
or hospital service, suretyship, or annuity issued, 
proposed for issuance, or intended for issuance by 
any person. 
G. "Insurer" means a person who may issue or 
who does issue any insurance policy or insurance 
contract within this state, whether or not licensed to 
do so. 
H. "Investigation" means all activities of an in-
surer directly or indirectly related to the determina-
tion of liabilities under coverages afforded by an 
insurance policy or insurance contract. 
I. "Notice of Loss" shall be that notice which is in 
accordance with policy provisions and insurer prac-
tices. "Notice of Loss" shall include "Special Notice of 
Loss" as defined herein. Notice of loss shall also 
include a Notice of Default or Notice of Delinquency 
to mortgage insurers. 
J. "Notification of claim" means any notification, 
whether in writing or other means acceptable under 
the terms of an insurance policy or insurance con-
tract, to an insurer or its agent, by a claimant, which 
reasonably apprises the insurer of the facts perti-
nent to a claim. 
K "Person" shall mean any individual, corpora-
tion, association, partnership, reciprocal exchange, 
self-insurer, interinsurer, Lloyds insurer, fraternal 
benefit society, and any other legal entity engaged in 
the business of insurance, including agents, brokers, 
consultants and adjusters. 
L. "Proof of Loss" shall mean, reasonable docu-
mentation by the insured as to the facts of the loss 
and the amount of the claim. 
M. "Special Notice of Loss" shall mean Notice of 
Loss required to be given by means other than first 
class mail, such as by telephone or facsimile, or at 
times which could be other than during normal 
business hours. 
N. "Specific Disclosure" shall mean notice to the 
insured by means of policy provisions in boldface 
type or a separate written notice mailed or delivered 
to the insured. 
O. "Third party claimant" means any individual, 
corporation, association, partnership or other legal 
entity asserting a claim against any individual, 
corporation, association, partnership or other legal 
entity insured under an insurance policy or insur-
ance contract of an insurer. 
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R590-89-5. Notice of Loss. 
A. Notice of loss to an insurer, if required, shall be 
considered timely if made according to the terms of 
the policy, subject to the definitions and provisions of 
this rule. 
B. Notice of Loss may be given by an insured to 
any appointed agent, authorized adjuster, or other 
authorized representative of an insurer unless the 
insurer clearly directs otherwise by means of Spe-
cific Disclosure as defined herein. 
C. Subject to policy provisions a requirement of 
written or Special Notice of Loss may be waived by 
any appointed agent, authorized adjuster, or other 
authorized representative of the insurer. 
D. If Special Notice of Loss is required, the in-
sured shall be advised by Specific Disclosure, as 
defined herein. 
E. Insurance policies shall not require Notice of 
Loss to be given in a manner which is inconsistent 
with the actual practice of the insurer. An insurer 
shall not generally conduct business on the basis of 
waivers of right, enforcing the terms of the contract 
only in exceptional circumstances. For example, if 
the general practice of the insurer is to accept Notice 
of Loss by telephone, the policy shall reflect that 
practice, and not require that the insured furnish 
"immediate written notice" of loss. 
R590-89-6. Proof of Loss. 
A. Proof of loss to an insurer, if required, shall be 
considered timely if made according to the terms of 
the policy, subject to the definitions and provisions of 
this rule. 
B. The requirements of Subsections 31A-21-
312(l)(a) and (b) may be satisfied in practice and do 
not require that the actual language of the above-
noted sections be recited in the policy. 
R590-89-7. Unfair Methods, Deceptive Acts and 
Pract ices Defined. 
The following are hereby defined as unfair meth-
ods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and 
practices in the business of insurance, and the 
commission of which are violations of this rule: 
A. Denying or threatening the denial of the pay-
ment of claims or rescinding, canceling or threaten-
ing the rescission or cancellation of coverage under a 
policy for any reason which is not clearly described 
in the policy as a reason for such denial, cancellation 
or rescission. 
B. Failing to provide the insured or beneficiary 
with a written explanation of the evidence of any 
investigation or file materials giving rise to the 
denial of a claim based on misrepresentation or 
fraud on an insurance application, when such mis-
representation is the basis for the denial. 
C. Compensation by an insurer of its employees, 
agents or contractors of any amounts-which are 
based on savings to the insurer as a result of 
denying the payment of claims. 
D. Failing to deliver a copy of standards for 
prompt investigation of claims to the Insurance 
Department when requested to do so. 
E. Refusing to pay claims without conducting a 
reasonable investigation. 
F. Offering first party claimants substantially less 
than the reasonable value of the claim. Such value 
may be established by one or more independent 
sources. 
G. Making claim payments to insureds or benefi-
ciaries not accompanied by a statement or explana-
tion of benefits setting forth the coverage under 
which the payments are being made and how the 
payment amount was calculated. 
H. Failing to pay claims within 30 days of properly 
executed proof of loss when liability is reasonably 
clear under one coverage in order to influence settle-
ments under other portions of the insurance policy 
coverage or under other policies of insurance. 
I. Refusing payment of a claim solely on the basis 
of an insured's request to do so unless. 
1. the insured claims sovereign, eleemosynary, 
diplomatic, military service, or other immunity from 
suit or liability with respect to such claim; or 
2. the insured is granted the right under the policy 
of insurance to consent to settlement of claims. 
J. Advising a claimant not to obtain the services of 
an attorney or suggesting the claimant will receive 
less money if an attorney is used to pursue or advise 
on the merits of a claim. 
K Misleading a claimant as to the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
L. Requiring an insured to sign a release that 
extends beyond the occurrence or cause of action 
that gave rise to the claims payment. 
M. Deducting from a loss or claims payment made 
under one policy those premiums owed by the in-
sured on another policy unless the insured consents. 
N. Failing to settle a first party claim on the basis 
that responsibility for payment of the claim should 
be assumed by others, except as may otherwise be 
provided by policy provisions. 
O. Issuing checks or drafts in partial settlement of 
a loss or a claim under a specified coverage when 
such check or draft contains language which pur-
ports to release the insurer or its insured from total 
liability. 
P. Refusing to provide a written basis for the 
denial of a claim upon demand of the insured. 
Q. Denial of a claim for medical treatment after 
preauthorization has been given, except in cases 
where the insurer obtains and provides to the claim-
ant documentation of the pre-existence of the condi-
tion for which the preauthorization has been given 
or if the claimant is not eligible for coverage. 
R. Refusal to pay reasonably incurred expenses to 
an insured when such expenses resulted from a 
delay, as prohibited by these rules, in claims settle-
ment or claims payment. 
S. When an automobile insurer represents both a 
tort feasor and a claimant: 
a. failing to advise a claimant under any coverage 
that the same insurance company represents both 
the tort feasor and the claimant as soon as such 
information becomes known to the insurer; 
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b. allocating medical payments to the tort feasor's 
liability coverage before exhausting a claimant's 
personal injury protection coverage. 
T. Failure to pay interest at the legal rate, as 
provided in Title 15, Utah Code, upon amounts that 
are overdue under these rules. 
R590-89-8. F i le and Record Documentat ion. 
The insurer's claim files shall be subject to exami-
nation by the Commissioner or by his duly appointed 
designees. Such files shall contain all notes and 
work papers pertaining to the claim in such detail 
tha t pertinent events and the dates of such events 
can be reconstructed. 
R590-89-9. Misrepresentation of Pol icy Provi-
sions: Prohibited Acts Applicable to All In-
surers. 
A. No insurer shall fail to fully disclose to first 
party claimants all pertinent benefits, coverages or 
other provisions of an insurance policy or insurance 
contract under which a claim is presented, including 
loss of use and household services. 
B. No agent shall conceal from first party claim-
ants benefits, coverages or other provisions of any 
insurance policy or insurance contract when such 
benefits, coverages or other provisions are pertinent 
to a claim. 
C. No insurer shall deny a claim for failure to 
exhibit the property without proof of demand and 
unfounded refusal by a claimant to do so. 
R590-89-10. Failure to Acknowledge Pert inent 
Communications. 
A. Every insurer, upon receiving notification of a 
claim shall, within 15 days, acknowledge the receipt 
of such notice unless payment is made within such 
period of time, or unless the insurer has a reason 
acceptable to the Insurance Department as to why 
such acknowledgment cannot be made within the 
t ime specified. 
B. Every insurer, upon receipt of an inquiry from 
the Insurance Department respecting a claim shall, 
within fifteen days of receipt of such inquiry, furnish 
the Department with a substantive response to the 
inquiry. 
C. A substantive response shall be made within 15 
days on all other pertinent communications from a 
claimant which reasonably suggest tha t a response 
is expected. 
D. Every insurer, upon receiving notification of 
claim shall promptly provide necessary claim forms, 
instructions, and reasonable assistance so tha t first 
party claimants can comply with the policy condi-
tions and the insurer's reasonable requirements. 
R590-89-11. Standards for Prompt Investiga-
t ion of Claims. 
Every insurer shall complete investigation of a 
claim within 45 days after notificalion of claim, 
unless such investigation cannot reasonably be com-
pleted within such time. It shall be the burden of the 
insurer to establish, by adequate records, tha t the 
investigation could not be completed within 45 days 
of its notification of such claim. 
R590-89-12. Minimum Standards for Prompt, 
Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable 
to All Insurers. 
A. The insurer shall provide to the claimant a 
statement of the time and manner in which any 
claim must be made and the type of proof of loss 
required by the insurer. 
B. Within 30 days after receipt by the insurer of 
properly executed notice of loss, the insurer shall 
complete its investigation of the claim and the first 
party claimant shall be advised of the acceptance or 
denial of the claim by the insurer unless the inves-
tigation cannot reasonably be completed within that 
time. If the investigation cannot be completed 
within 30 days the insurer shall so communicate to 
the claimant and shall continue to so communicate 
at least every 30 days until the claim is either paid 
or denied. No insurer shall deny a claim on the 
grounds of a specific provision, condition, or exclu-
sion unless reference to such provision, condition or 
exclusion is included in the denial. Any basis for the 
denial of a claim shall be noted in the insurer's claim 
file and must be communicated promptly and in 
writing to the claimant. 
C. Unless otherwise provided by law, an insurer 
shall promptly pay every valid insurance claim. A 
claim shall be overdue if not paid within 30 days 
after the insurer is furnished written notice of the 
fact of a covered loss and of the amount of the loss. 
Payment shall mean actual delivery or mailing of 
the amount owed. If such written notice is not 
furnished to the insurer as to the entire claim, any 
partial amount supported by written notice or inves-
tigation is overdue if not paid within 30 days. Any 
payment shall not be deemed overdue when the 
insurer has reasonable proof to establish tha t the 
insurer is not responsible for the payment, notwith-
standing tha t written notice has been furnished to 
the insurer. 
D. If negotiations are continuing for settlement of 
a claim with a claimant, notice of expiration of 
statute of limitation or contract time limit shall be 
given to the claimant at least 60 days before the date 
on which such time limit may expire. 
E. No insurer shall make statements which indi-
cate that the rights of a third party claimant may be 
impaired if a form or release is not completed within 
a given period of time unless the statement is given 
for the purpose of notifying the third party claimant 
of the provision of a statute of limitations. 
F. Proof of loss requirements may not be unrea-
sonable and should consider all of the circumstances 
surrounding a given claim. 
R590-89-13. Standards for Prompt, Fair and 
Equitable Settlements Applicable to Automo-
bile Insurance. 
A. When the insurance policy provides for the 
adjustments and settlement of first party automo-
bile total losses on the basis of actual cash value or 
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replacement with another of like kind and quality, 
one of the following methods must apply: 
(1) The insurer may elect to offer a replacement 
automobile which is a specific comparable automo-
bile available to the insured, with all applicable 
taxes, license fees and other fees incident to transfer 
of evidence of ownership of the automobile paid, at 
no cost other than any deductible provided in the 
policy. The offer and any rejection thereof must be 
documented in the claim file. 
(2) The insurer may elect a cash settlement based 
upon the actual cost, less any deductible provided in 
the policy, to purchase a comparable automobile 
including all applicable taxes, license fees and other 
fees incident to transfer of evidence of ownership of 
a comparable automobile. Such cost may be deter-
mined by: 
(a) The cost of a comparable automobile in the 
local market area when a comparable automobile is 
available in the local market area; or 
(b) One of two or more quotations obtained by the 
insurer from two or more qualified dealers located 
within the local market area when a comparable 
automobile is not available in the local market area. 
(3) When a first party automobile total loss is 
settled on a basis which deviates from the methods 
described in subsections A(l) and A(2) of this section, 
the deviation must be supported by documentation 
giving particulars of the automobile condition. Any 
deductions from such cost, including deductions for 
salvage, must be measurable, itemized and specified 
as to dollar amount and shall be appropriate in 
amount. The basis for such settlement shall be fully 
explained to the first party claimant. 
B. Total loss settlements with a third party claim-
ant shall be on the basis of the market value or 
actual cost of a comparable automobile at the time of 
loss. Settlement procedures shall be in accordance 
with paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection A. 
C. Where liability and damages are reasonably 
clear, insurers shall not recommend that third party 
claimants make a claim under their own policies 
solely to avoid paying claims under such insurer's 
insurance policy or insurance contract. 
D. Insurers shall not require a claimant to travel 
an unreasonable distance to inspect a replacement 
automobile, to obtain a repair estimate or to have 
the automobile repaired at a specific repair shop. 
E. Insurers shall, upon the claimant's request, 
include the first party claimant's deductible, if any, 
in subrogation demands initiated by the insurer. 
Subrogation recoveries may be shared on a propor-
tionate basis with the first party claimant when an 
agreement is reached for less than the full amount of 
the loss, unless the deductible amount has been 
otherwise recovered. The recovery shall be applied 
first to reimburse the first party claimant for the 
amount or share of the deductible when the full 
amount or share of the deductible has been recov-
ered. No deduction for expenses can be made from 
the deductible recovery unless an outside attorney is 
retained to collect such recovery. The deduction may 
then be for only a pro rata share of the allocated loss 
adjustment expense. If subrogation is initiated but 
discontinued, the insured shall be advised. 
F. If an insurer prepares or approves an estimate 
of the cost of automobile repairs, such estimate shall 
be in an amcrant for which it may be reasonably 
expected the damage can be satisfactorily repaired. 
If the insurer prepares an estimate, it shall give a 
copy of the estimate to the claimant and may furnish 
to the claimant the names of one or more conve-
niently located repair shops. 
G. When the amount claimed is reduced because 
of betterment or depreciation, all information for 
such reduction shall be contained in the claim file. 
Such deductions shall be itemized and specified as to 
dollar amount and shall be appropriate for the 
amount of deductions. 
H. When the insurer elects to repair and desig-
nates a specific repair shop for automobile repairs, 
the insurer shall cause the damaged automobile to 
be restored to its condition prior to the loss at no 
additional cost to the claimant other than as stated 
in the policy and within a reasonable period of time. 
I. Where coverage exists, loss of use payment shall 
be made to a claimant for the reasonably incurred 
cost of transportation, or for the reasonably incurred 
rental cost of a substitute vehicle, including collision 
damage waiver, during the period the automobile is 
necessarily withdrawn from service to obtain parts 
or effect repair, or, in the event the automobile is a 
total loss and the claim has been timely made, 
during the period from the date of loss until a 
reasonable settlement offer has been made by the 
insurer. The insurer may not refuse to pay for loss of 
use for the period that the insurer is examining the 
claim or making other determinations as to the 
payability of the loss, unless such delay reveals that 
the insurer is not liable to pay the claim. Loss of use 
payments shall be an amount in addition to the 
payment for the value of the automobile. 
J. Subject to subsection A and B, an insurer shall 
fairly and equitably and in good faith attempt to 
compensate a claimant for all losses incurred under 
collision or comprehensive coverages. Such compen-
sation shall be based at least, but not exclusively, 
upon the following standards: 
1. An offer of settlement shall not be made exclu-
sively on the basis of useful life of the part or vehicle 
damaged. 
2. An estimate of the amount of compensation for 
the claimant shall include the actual wear and tear, 
or lack thereof, of the damaged part or vehicle. 
3. Actual cash value shall take into account the 
cost of replacement of the vehicle and/or the part for 
which compensation is claimed. 
4. An actual estimate of the true useful life re-
maining in the part or vehicle shall be taken into 
account in establishing the amount of compensation 
of a claim. 
5. Actual cash value shall include taxes and other 
fees which shall be incurred by a claimant in replac-
ing the part or vehicle or in compensating the 
claimant for the loss incurred. 
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K. An insurer may not demand reimbursement of 
Personal Injury Protection payments from a first-
par ty insured of payments received by that party 
from a settlement or judgement against a third 
party. 
R590-89-14. Unfair Claims Settlement Prac-
t ices Applicable to Automobile Insurance. 
The Following acts or practices are defined as 
unfair claims settlement practices pertaining to au-
tomobile insurance: 
A. Using as a basis for cash settlement with a 
claimant an amount which is less than the amount 
which the insurer would be charged if repairs were 
made, unless such amount is agreed to by the 
claimant or provided for by the insurance policy. 
B. Refusing to settle a claim based solely upon the 
issuance or failure to issue a traffic citation by a 
police agency. 
C. If an application for benefits is required by the 
insurer, failing to provide a section for each coverage 
under the policy under which the claimant can make 
a claim. 
D. Failing to, in good faith, disclose all coverages, 
including loss of use, household services, and any 
other coverages available to the claimant. 
E. Requiring a claimant to use only the insurer's 
claim service in order to perfect a claim. 
F. If the insurer makes a deduction for the salvage 
value of a total loss retained by the claimant, failing 
to furnish the claimant with the name and address 
of the salvage dealer who will purchase the salvage 
for the amount deducted if so requested by the 
claimant. 
G. Refusing to disclose policy limits when re-
quested to do so by a claimant or claimant's attorney. 
H. Using a release on the back of a check or draft 
which requires a claimant to release the company 
from obligation on further claims in order to process 
a current claim when the company knows or reason-
ably should know that there will be future liability 
on the part of the insurer. 
I. Refusing to use a separate release of claims 
document ra ther than one on the back of a check or 
draft when requested to do so by a claimant. 
J . Intentionally offering less money to a first party 
claimant than the claim is reasonably worth, a 
practice referred to as low-balling." 
K Refusing to offer to pay claims based upon the 
Doctrine of Comparative Negligence without a rea-
sonable basis for doing so. 
L. In a bailment situation, imputing the negli-
gence of a permissive user of a vehicle to the owner 
of the vehicle. 
R590-89-15. Penalt ies . 
Subject to the provisions of the Utah Administra-
tive Procedures Act, violators of this rule shall be 
subject to fine, suspension, or revocation of their 
insurance license or Certificate of Authority, and/or 
any other penalties or measures as are determined 
by the commissioner in accordance with law. Any 
penalty imposed under this rule shall be commen-
surate with the violation committed and subject to 
the following provisions and limitations: 
A. Separate and disparate penalties may be as-
sessed insurer, organization and individual persons; 
B. Frequency of occurrence and severity of detri-
ment to the public shall be considered in determin-
ing a penalty; -
C. No license or Certificate of Authority shall be 
suspended on the basis of a single violation; and 
D. No revocation of license or Certificate of Au-
thority shall occur except upon a finding of improper 
conduct as a general business practice. 
R590-89-16. Severability. 
If any provision or clause of this rule or the 
application thereof to any person or situation is held 
invalid, such invalidity shall not affect any other 
provision or application of this rule which can be 
given effect without the invalid provision or appli-
cation, and to this end the provisions of this rule are 
declared to be severable. 
R590-89-17. Effective Date. 
This rule shall take effect on September 14, 1989. 
References: 31A-2-201, 31A-26-301, 31A-26-303, 31A-
21-312, 31A-2-308. 
History: 10075, AMD, see CPR; 10075, CPR, 09/14/89; 
10076, EMR, 07/01/89; 16728, 5YR, 03/01/95. 
R590-91. Credi t Li fe a n d D i s a b i l i t y Insur-
a n c e . 
R590-91-1. Purpose and Authority. 
R590-91-2. Definitions. 
R590-91-3. Rights and Treatment of Debtors. 
R590-91-4. Policy Forms, Filing and Reserves. 
R590-91-5. Reasonableness of Benefits in Relation to Pre-
mium. 
R590-91-6. Credit Life Insurance Prima Facie Rates. 
R590-91-7. Credit Disability Insurance Prima Facie 
Rates. 
R590-91-8. Refund Formulas. 
R590-91-9. Experience Reports and Adjustment of Prima 
Facie Rates. 
R590-^l-10. Rating Procedures — Permissible Rates — 
Direct Business Only. 
R590-91-11. Disclosure. 
R590-91-12. Unfair Marketing Practices. 
R590-91-13. Severability. 
R590-91-1. Purpose and Authority. 
The purpose of this Rule is to protect the interests 
of debtors and the public in this State and to ensure 
a fair and equitable credit insurance market as 
authorized by Section 31A-2-201, Utah Code, by 
establishing a system of reasonable prima facie 
rates, policy form, and operating standards for the 
transaction of credit life insurance and credit dis-
ability insurance. This rule interprets and imple-
ments the Utah Statutes, including but not limited 
to the following sections: Title 31A, Chapter 22 Part 
VIII, Section 31A-19-201, and Title 70C, Chapter 6, 
Parts 1 and 2, Utah Code. 
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CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
attorneys for Plaintiff Carla Cannon 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLA CANNON, 
) AFFIDAVIT OF GARY T. FYE 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
J ) Civil No. 940906295PI 
^TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) The Honorable William A. Thorne 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF TRAVIS ) 
I GARY T. FYE, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am the owner and principal of Gary T. Fye Company in Austin, Texas. I 
investigate and analyze disputed insurance claims. My work in claim practices consulting is 
national in scope. I have established an archive of insurance industry materials over the last 20 
years which provides a wide view of insurance industry practices. I have been continuously 
employed in claim investigation or review since 1962. My curriculum vitae is attached as 
Exhibit "A" and is true and correct. 
1 CO 
I 2. I have been retained in connection with insurance claims litigation in Alabama, 
p\laska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Oregon, 
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. I have been engaged 
as an expert in insurance claim practices for both plaintiffs and defendants. 
3 . 1 have been qualified to testify as an expert witness and give opinions about insurance 
claims practice on more than 38 occasions in the state and/or federal courts of Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Florida, Hawaii, Oklahoma, Texas and Utah. I have provided written opinions or 
given expert witness depositions in more than 100 other cases. 
II 
4. I am familiar with premises liability and medical payments claims which arise under 
Homeowner's policies. Adjusting activities in these cases vary little between the various states. 
There are general laws, regulations and guidelines relating to the proper adjustment of these 
kinds of claims that are accepted and recognized by the insurance industry. For example, see the 
JLJnfair Property Casualty Claims Settlement Practices Model Regulation established by the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), attached as Exhibit "B". There are 
many other similar guidelines promulgated by industry organizations and associations. These 
model acts, regulations and guidelines are recognized by almost every insurer as the industry 
'standards and duties for adjusters, and non-compliance with these standards and duties is 
.considered improper claims procedure. Most insurance companies have specifically adopted the 
model acts, regulations and guidelines as internal company standards and policies with which all 
2 
OfcVJ 
adjusters are required to comply. These companies include the two largest writers of 
homeowner's insurance - State Farm and Allstate. Even defendant Travelers recognizes these 
laws, regulations and guidelines as industry standards and duties with which its adjuster should 
comply. See portions of Traveler's claims manuals (attached as Exhibit "C") and testimony of 
its adjuster, Tom Day (pp. 15-17 of Deposition of Day.) It is the practice in the insurance 
industry that adjusters handling claims such as the Cannon claim, comply with the internal 
company standards, general industry standards, case law, statutory law, and insurance 
regulations of the given state. 
5. Prior to preparing this affidavit, I reviewed the Cannon claim file, the policy, the 
deposition of Cannon, the deposition of adjuster Day, portions of Traveler's manuals on claim 
practices, the case of Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the Utah Unfair 
Claims Settlement Practices Regulation, §§31A-26-301 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated, and 
Casualty Claim Practice by James H. Donaldson, a widely accepted and authoritative text book 
pn claim practices.1 (A copy of the cited language is attached as Exhibit "D".) 
6. My training and experience spans about 35 years in the claims business. In that time, 
at has always been the practice of claims adjusters to treat medical payments claimants (referred 
to as "medpay insureds"), such as Carla Cannon, as first-party insureds. Adjusters are taught 
that when a homeowner purchases homeowner's coverage, one of the benefits of the policy is that 
|| "Since this [medical payments coverage] is a beneficiary contract as to others than the insured, who is a contracting party, the 
beneficiary succeeds to the same rights as he would have had had he been a party to the agreement " (Bracketed portion added 
jor clarification ) 
I 3 
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pon-adversarial handling of first-party benefits will be available to guests, invitees and like 
n/isitors. The "named" insured pays for everyone insured by the policy and certainly doesn't 
pxpect that his visitors or other unnamed insureds will be subject to 2nd class or unfair claims 
handling methods. In that sense, adjusters are generally taught that the insured purchases the 
policy as a mechanism to transfer the risk of the financial consequences of a covered occurrence 
10 the insurer for all first-party beneficiaries included in the broad grants of coverage written into 
the homeowner's policy. 
7. This is not to say that adversarial situations can't potentially arise in these first party 
relationships, but the adjusting goal is to handle all claims in such a manner that the public has 
confidence in the insurance system or mechanism. Most modern insurers, particularly since the 
advent of unfair claim practices acts, regulations and guidelines, don't differentiate general duties 
as between first and third party claimants and establish the same standards of reasonableness2 for 
all claims handling as a general proposition. The Utah Unfair Claims Settlement Practices 
Regulation does not distinguish between first party or third party claimants when addressing 
general claims practices, and require that the insurers generall) treat all claimants the same. 
Claimant" means either a first party claimant, a third party claimant, or both and includes 
such claimant's designated legal representative and includes a member of the claimant's 
immediate family designated by the claimant." See R590-89-4(C) Unfair Claims 
Settlement Practices Rules, Utah Administrative Code, 1996, which became effective 
September 14, 1989 (attached as Exhibit "E"); see also the prior version of this rule 
I which defines "Claimant" the same: R540-89-4(C), Utah Administrative Code, effective 
from December 1, 1982 to September 13, 1989 (attached as Exhibit "F"). 
ji 
? Prompt and objective investigations and prompt payment when liability becomes reasonable clear 
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8. In the case of a medpay claim under homeowner's coverage (such as the present 
[claim), there are express provisions of the policy making the injured person an insured. The 
ipreadth of coverage and responsiveness to the needs of insurance "consumers" are part of the 
.peace of mind and security being sold when the insurance is purchased. While lawyers and 
[courts infrequently struggle with other views of the transaction, adjusters know the medpay 
[insured is privy to the contract of insurance by virtue of the coverage grant.3 To assume 
Otherwise would open the door to abusive and unresponsive practices which will inevitably occur 
to any insured who is not specifically named in the policy (including the spouse and children of 
£he "named" insured who are often not "named" insureds). 
9. The Cannon file materials depict a substandard claim effort by Travelers, with no 
Attempt to adhere to an appropriate adjusting plan and timetable to meet Cannon's (the medpay 
jpsured's) need or respond to her claim in an appropriate manner. 
10. Based either on industry standards or the law in Utah applicable to proper claims 
fiandling, Travelers violated many of its duties to Cannon, including the following: 
a. Travelers breached its duties to investigate and indemnify by not immediately and 
affirmatively learning the facts of the accident which would support payment4 of the 
medpay claim and allay its concerns that the injury may have been incurred in a remote, 
non-covered activity. Travelers acted wrongfully toward Cannon when it didn't interview 
!f It is not as if anyone is actually able to "bargain"' for homeowner's insurance provisions 
if Usually referred to as the Egan v Mutual of Omaha standard which require the investigation to follow all leads - those which 
;upport payment as well as those which might support denial Affidavit, Gary T Fye, page 4 
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the witnesses she identified, nor did adjuster Day attempt to obtain the medical 
information he professed to need by using the permission slips furnished by Cannon. 
This type of claim handling falls below the standards of the industry. 
b. The communication efforts made by Travelers to the medpay insured did not 
satisfy Travelers' obligations to provide the insured with proper claim service. They 
were essentially a misrepresentation of policy conditions such as the misrepresentation 
that the policy would cover only the amount that Cannon personally paid out, and a 
misrepresentation of the level of proof required to obtain coverage under the policy. The 
"medical certainty" standard raised by adjuster Day does not appear in the policy, nor 
does it ring true for claim practices. It patently was designed to create a catch-22 for 
Cannon. She could only report her accident to a physician the same way she reported it 
to Day - in retrospect. A physician's report depends on the history given by the patient 
which the physician corroborates by the surrounding circumstances and the mechanics of 
the injury. "Medical certainty" is usually not possible, but the "more likely than not" 
standard is. This not-so-subtle device, as it was attempted in the Cannon claim, is simply 
a form of "stonewalling" by raising unreasonable barriers to coverage. Fair claim 
handling would have been to explain the actual standard, followed by a rapid investigation 
of medical records and witnesses which would show the two most important truths: 
There was no prior back injury; and Cannon contemporaneously told other credible 
witnesses about the incident. As a result, Travelers mislead Cannon and did not explain 
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the steps that Cannon (the medpay insured) actually was required to take before Travelers 
could properly consider the claim. 
c. Travelers violated its duties by refusing to provide Cannon a copy of the 
insurance policy when requested and by forcing Cannon to file a law suit to obtain a 
copy. This was particularly egregious in light of Day's misrepresentations about the 
coverage, such as the proof of loss requirements and the requirement that Cannon 
personally pay the bill before defendant would have to pay the benefits. 
d. Travelers forced Cannon into litigation by refusing to pay benefits that were 
reasonably clear and were owing, and by providing inadequate explanations or requests 
for information which would allow Cannon to provide defendant with any needed 
information. 
e. Late notice is a common occurrence in claims handling. The reasons are 
varied, but a common reason is a phenomenon called "denial" where the accident victim 
denies being injured until faced with the reality. The Cannon facts are not uncommon 
and created no special problems for the claims handlers. Notice of the claim 
approximately four months after the accident is not a proper basis to delay or deny any 
benefits to Cannon. 
f. The positions evidenced by the Travelers' communications from the beginning 
and throughout the prelitigation claims handling process, evidenced an adversarial and 
resistant attitude toward the medpay insured. Instead of being helpful, adjuster Day 
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remained uncooperative and attempted to compromise a claim which was covered in full. 
Often, Day would not even respond to communication of Cannon and he eventually 
closed his file knowing full well Cannon was suffering financial problems due to 
defendant's non-payment. 
g. Travelers is in no way relieved of its duties of full disclosure of benefits and 
proper claim handling by virtue of the medpay insured not being the "named" insured. In 
fact, adjuster Day recognized that Travelers had a contractual relationship with Cannon 
when he, in effect, required her on January 25, 1993, to comply with policy requirements 
of proof. It was improper for Day to treat Cannon as a third party claimant as it related 
to the medpay coverage. 
h. The failure of Travelers to have a "normal S.I.R. Review" (Serious Injury 
Report) until June 15, 1994 demonstrates that Travelers handled this claim with 
indifference toward Cannon's rights to coverage. By not offering payment while the 
medpay insured suffered the covered economic consequences of the accident, Travelers 
breached the requirements of the insurance policies and the other duties it owed to the 
medpay insured. 
i. The delay of Travelers in paying the medical claim was all the more egregious 
because Travelers ignored its obligations to Cannon by withholding a majority of her first 
party medpay benefits (that was not reasonably subject to dispute) in order to force a 
settlement of her potential third party claim against the Andersons. Travelers breached its 
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"good faith" duties owed to Cannon by refusing to pay most of the medical bills because 
she had not personally paid the bills. There was no such requirement under the policy. 
j . An insurer should not discourage its insureds to hire an attorney by suggesting 
that the insured will receive less money. Day violated this duty which worsened the 
situation by attempting to prevent Cannon from seeking the legal consultation which 
would disclose defendant's other wrongful activities. 
k. Three other claims handling issues in the Cannon case are indicators of what is 
normally referred to as "bad faith" claims handling: (1) The delay in investigating, 
reviewing, corresponding, answering supervisory inquiries (follow-up), and issuing 
payment; (2) lack of proper file documentation of significant activities; (3) and lack of 
proper service in not giving Cannon a copy of her recorded statement in transcript frm 
when it was requested. 
11. A reasonable adjuster would know that if insurance benefits are not timely paid, 
piost people who have suffered a debilitating medical problem due to a covered accident, would 
uffer financial and emotional distress. This would be especially true in a situation like Ms. 
Cannon's, a single working lady with no other means of support. 
12. There was no reasonable basis for Travelers' violations of duties as set forth above. 
Any lack of information that Travelers claims as a justification for non payment was due to its 
failure to: (1) reasonably and promptly investigate, (2) communicate properly what was needed, 
(3) fully and fairly disclose the terms and conditions of the policy, and (4) fairly evaluate 
- ^ l 
[Cannon's claims. This situation was not fairly debatable given the numerous violations of 
[Travelers' duties. A reasonable insurer acting reasonably in fulfilling its duties under similar 
circumstances would have promptly paid (at least by June, 1993 and probably earlier) all of 
Cannon's medical bills up to the policy limits of $10,000. 
13. DATED this jf*day of August, 1997. 




Subscribed to and sworn before me this > / day of August, 1997. 
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Notary'jPublic,
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582 
Nathan D. Alder, #7126 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Carla Cannon 
175 S. West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)355-3431 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARLA CANNON, 
) SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, ) GARY T. FYE 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 940906295PI 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
) The Honorable William A. Thome 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
COUNTY OF TRAVIS ) 
GARY T. FYE, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. I have described my experience and qualification in my previous affidavit dated August 
27, 1997. 
2. In my Affidavit of August 27, 1997, I refer in paragraph 10 to "duties" that Travelers 
violated with regard to Carla Cannon. My use of the term "duty" or "duties" is meant to indicate my 
personal knowledge of the practices and standards in the industry for claims adjusters and insurance 
companies. The insurance industry must also recognize, observe and be governed by certain 
regulations, statutes and laws in regard to claims handling. My use of the term "duty" also indicates 
my personal knowledge of the practices and internal policies of insurers and claims adjusters as they 
\ \-vc 
comply with the applicable regulations and laws regarding claims handling.. Some of the "duties," 
responsibilities or obligations that are recognized and observed in the industry are those mentioned in 
paragraph 10 and its subparts. 
3. My use of the word "duty" is not an attempt to give, nor should it be interpreted to be, 
a legal opinion or conclusion regarding the law. 
DATED thisD^day of November, 1997. ^ 
GAR"! 
Subscribed to and sworn before me this gj]^~day of November, 1997. 
l / # 3 * \ KAYOGDEN i ~. _ 
i & C E t i NOTARY PUBLIC I ^SkiiP^ 
  i 
NOTARY PUBLIC \ 
State of Texas t 
V^T^Z Comm Exp 04-07-98 I 
My commission expires: 
Notary EMblicH 
Residing at g>lOS U L X ^ ^ K C L 
